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Why  a Law of the Sea Workshop? 
JOHN C. MARR  ' 
Director General 
International Center for Living Aquatic 
Resources Management 
When  the  oceans beyond  three-mile  territorial  seas 
were  "high-seas,'* the  fishery resources of the high seas 
were common property resources. In the absence of any 
legal basis for management measures, the high seas fish- 
eries offered unlimited  access or unlimited entry. They 
were  open to all.  The history of such fisheries all over 
the  world  has  made  it abundantly, even redundantly, 
clear  that they are soon overcapitalized and overfished. 
The consequences of unlimited entry are economic and 
biological disaster. 
In  recent  years  law  of  the  sea  matters  have  been 
dynamically  evolving,  both  within  the  Third  United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and without. 
Regardless of the  outcome of the UN  Conference, it is 
clear that most, if not all, coastal states will claim a 200- 
mile  zone of extended economic jurisdiction.  One very 
exciting  aspect  of  the  extended  economic zones with 
respect  to fisheries is  that with jurisdiction  comes the 
possibility  of  management,  of  avoiding the previously 
inevitable economic and biological disasters. This pros- 
pect  is  particularly  exciting  in  the  South China  Sea 
where the extended zones will meet in the center; there 
will be no more "high  seas" in the South China Sea. 
Because of such important changes in the law of the 
sea, in  1977 ICLARM  began  a study of the law of the 
sea developments and their probable  effects on fishery 
development and management, With particular reference 
to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. This study 
was  undertaken  by Dr.  Francis T.  Christy, Jr.,  of Re- 
sources for the Future, who joined ICLARM for 9 mo, 
during  which  period  he  travelled  extensively  within 
these two regioni, contacted individuals concerned with 
these problems, and obtained information on the specific 
problems facing each country. 
One result of Dr. Christy's odyssey was a comprehen- 
sive report which will  be published by ICLARM. Another 
result  was  the  decision to arrange this workshop itself. 
Early in  the  conceptual  planning of the workshop, Dr. 
Christy and I had the good fortune to meet with Prof. 
Kernial Sandhu, Director  of the Institute of Southeast 
Asian  Studies (ISEAS),  Arising from that meeting were 
more  specific plans  for  the  workshop, including joint 
sponsorship by ISEAS and ICLARM. 
Two of the major problems in  connection with the 
extended  economic  zone  are  allocation  and  imple- 
mentation.  Some fishes are migratory  and move freely 
from the waters of one country to the waters of another 
without  respect  to  political  boundaries.  How  should 
such  resources be  allocated  among the  countries con- 
cerned? The best  of fishery management plans is of no 
value  if  it  cannot  be  effectively  implemented.  Two- 
hundred-mile zones can encompass vast areas and impose 
special problems of ensuring integrity in the use  of the 
resources. These  two  general problems-allocation  and 
implementation-were  chosen  for special consideration 
by  the workshop. Background papers were prepared by 
five  experts from  the region  and presented by them at 
the workshop. These are contained in the present report villaw of the Sen Workshop 
of the workshop proceedings. 
The participants  in the  workshop were  drawn  from 
the region, largely from foreign ministries, departments 
of fisheries, universities, and the private sector. However, 
and I would emphasize this, all were invited in their per- 
sonal capacities. After the Opening Session, the workshop 
was  closed. Thus, each participant  was  free to speak in 
his or her personal capacity without the constraints of 
formal institutional positions. 
There  were  two  major  objectives of the workshop, 
first, to bring individuals together  to stimulate interest 
in the subject matter of the workshop and, especially, to 
facilitate communication between these individuals and, 
through  them,  between  and  within  governments, and 
among governments, the academic community, and the 
private  sector. We  hope  that lines  of  communication 
strengthened or established at the workshop will be kept 
open  in  the  future.  Second,  the  workshop  sought  to 
identify specific problems, the  alternatives open in the 
solution  of  such  problems,  and  the  consequences  of 
following  the various alternatives. While  attainment  of 
this objective was useful in the context of the workshop, 
we  hope  that  the  publication  and  distribution  of the 
report  of  the workshop proceedings in Southeast  Asia 
and elsewhere will make it of much wider use. 
It should be made clear that the workshop was mt an 
exercise to design  an  ISEAS/ICLARM pcogram relating 
.. 
to law of the sea matters. While the participants pointed 
out some ways in which ISEAS/ICLARM could continue 
to perform useful functions in this general area, program 
design was not an objective of the workshop. 
A final word about the workshop. ISEAS and ICLARM 
only  provided a forum  in which the participants could 
meet informally and discuss problems of mutual concern. 
ISEAS and ICLARM were in no sense proposing solutipns I 
I 
to such problems. Nor, indeed, could they have done so. 
Clearly, solutions to law of the sea problems are a matter 
of national  concern  and must be  sought within and by 
each individual country. 
As  indicated, I believe  that  the changing law of the 
sea offers both challenges and opportunities in the devel- 
opment  and  management  of  marine  fishery  resources 
and marine fisheries, which account for 86% of the total 
world fishery production. These changes will also affect 
the  quantity  and  distribution  of  fishery  production. 
Thus, considerable attention will continue to be devoted 
to these  matters by  ICLARM.  Future workshops may 
deal  with  regional  problems  or  with  subject  matter 
problems. And, judging  from past  experience, requests 
for  specific  undertakings  will  continue  to arise  from 
individual  governments  and  froni  regional  bodies. 
Clearly, there  are useful functions to be  performed in 
these areas by international, nongovernmental organiza- 
tions such as ICLARM. Keynote Address 
Acting Foreign MinisJer 
Republicof the Philippines 
At the outset, allow me to congratulate the Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the International 
Center  for  Living  Aquatic  Resources  Management 
(ICLARM)  and their officials for organizing and spon- 
soring the workshop on  "The Law of  the Sea: Problems of 
Conflict and Management of Fisheries in Southeast Asia." 
I share the view of the organizers that the workshop 
should focus on two of the many issues which the topic 
entails,  namely:  the  necessity to reach agreements on 
the sharing and management of fishery stocks that swim 
through  the  waters  of  neighboring  coastal  states; and 
the problems of implementing and enforcing regulations 
and agreements which may be evoIved by the states in 
the region. 
There are a mmber of  factors which may give rise to 
problems  of conflict and management of fisheries and 
fishing activities in Southeast Asia. The most important 
problem  appears to be biological, that is, the fact that 
pelagic  fishes,  which  move  from  one area to another, 
abound in this part of the world. 
The Southwest Pacific which  merges into Southeast 
Asia, appears to be  one of the few places in the world 
where tunas are not yet fully exploited. Since tunas pro- 
vide  the  most important canned  fish  consumed in de- 
veloped  countries  and  at  the  same  the constitute 
one of the most important exports of many developing 
countries of the region, their conservation and wise uti- 
lization can not beoveremphasized. 
Because  migratory  fish  resources  form  part  of the 
patrimony of the States of  Southeast Asia,  any action 
by one state, for example, to deplete the stock, must of 
necessity affect the other states. 
Even  within the confines of each coastal state there 
are  potential problems such as  overfishing, the sophis- 
tication  of  fishing gear  and equipment, the increase in 
the number  of fishermen and  fishing vessels, as well as 
conflicts between inshore and trawl fishermen, between 
offshore and deep sea fishermen, and between local and 
foreign fishermen. 
Illegal  fishing through  the use  of dynamite, poison, 
prohibite6  nets  and  constructions,  and  poaching  by 
foreign fishennen pose  problems of  implementation of 
local laws and international agreements. 
The widely-believed outcome of the fisheries question 
in the on-going Third UN  Confernce on the Law of the 
Sea-the  establishment of a 200-mi economic zone pro- 
viding coastal states with jurisdiction over its fish life- 
can be another source of conflict. The establishment of 
such zone will affect to a considerable degree the regime 
of exploitation and management of living resources of 
the sea. Even though the 200-mi zone would cover only 
some 35% of the oceans, they would include about 90% 
of the resources presently under commercial exploitation. 
It has been pointed  out that the drawing of bound- 
aries in the South China Sea would give rise  to contro- 
versy  because  of  conflicting  territorial  claims to the 
Paracel and Spratly island groups. Possible overlapping 
economic  zones between adjoining or opposite coastal viiillaw of  the Sm Workshop 
states,  and  questions  of  traditional  as  well  as  treaty 
fishing rights, will also be sources of conflict. Add to  this 
the  fact  that there  are  semienclosed seas in Southeast 
Asia,  for  which  special  solutions  to  the  problem  of 
exploitation and conservation of living resources have to 
be found. 
A  fourth possible source of frictirm among member 
states of the Southeast Asian region insofar as manage- 
ment of fish resources is concerned will be  the attitude 
which these states will take towards neighboring or dis- 
tant fishing nations. Faced with the constriction of the 
high seas fishing areas and the drastic reduction of their 
catch, the leading deep sea fishing states have to make 
arrangements  with  the  states  which  have  assumed, or 
will  assume, jurisdiction  over  their  customary  fishing 
grounds. The interest of those nations are now focused 
on  Southeast  Asia  among  other  regions, trying either 
to sell their surplus vessels or to negotiate joint venture 
or bilateral  arrangements with several countries in the 
region. 
If one state in the region adopts more liberal regula- 
tions  than  other states,  there might be little incentive 
for  the  other  states  to maintain  their controls:  there 
could  be  a  mutually  destructive  competitive  race  to 
capture what  could  only be considered as intermediate 
benefits. 
On the other hand a state in the region which might 
feel hemmed in  by the  exclusive economic zones may 
seek  accommodation  either  with  other  states  in  the 
region or even outside the region. 
Paradoxically,  the  provisions  of  the  ICNT of  the 
current  Third  United  Nations Conference on the  Law 
of the  Sea  may  also  give  rise  to conflict  of fisheries 
management  in  Southeast  Asia.  For  example,  one  of 
the hard  core issues in the on-going conference on the 
Law of the Sea is the right of access of land-locked and 
geographically  disadvantaged  states  to  the  exclusive 
economic zones of coastal states. 
Article 61 grants coastal states the right to determine 
the allowable catch of the living resources in its economic 
zone. Article 62 obligates the coastal states to promote 
the objective of optimum utilization  of living resources 
in  the exclusive economic zone. 
The determination of allowable catch, the capacity of 
coastal states to harvest the allowable catch, the ques- 
tion of access to be granted to other states in the exclii- 
sive  economic zone, and  other matters of consewatiorl 
and  management  will  give  rise  to  problems  ncrdir~g 
regional arrangements. 
The role  of regional arrangements in this mattcr has 
already been recognized in Article 63 of the ICNT which 
provides that  "where  the same stock or stocks of asso- 
ciated species occur within the exclusive economic zones 
of  two  or more  coastal  states, these  states shall seek 
either directly or through subregional or regional organi- 
zations to agree upon the measures necessary to  coordi- 
nate  and  ensure  the conservation and development  of 
such  stocks"  and  "where  the same stock or stocks  of 
associated  species  occur  both  within  the  exclusive 
economic zone  and in an  area beyond and adjacent td 
the zone, the coastal state and the states fishing for such 
stocks in the adjacent  area shall seek either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations 
to agree upon thk measures necessary for the conserva- 
tion of these stocks in the adjacent area." 
There  are  other  peripheral  issues  which might give 
rise  to  conflict.  For  example,  unless  the  archipelagic 
principle is approved at the Law of the Sea Conference, 
two archipelagic states in the region-Indonesia  and the 
Philippines-might  find  it difficult to adhere to the final 
Convention. Despite differing approaches to the problem, 
the two states agree  that the  right of passage does not 
confer any right to fish in archipelagic waters. 
Technical assistance, advisory services and scholarships 
granted by government institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations will  go  a long way towards the conserva- 
tion  of  marine  life  and  modernization  of  the  fishing 
industry in Southeast Asia. 
Regional seminars and symposiums are also important 
instruments for the exchange of experience as well as the 
dissemination  of knowledge  and  techniques  to insure 
scientific  and  progredve  development  of  the  fishing 
industty and the harmonization of national policies in 
the region. 
A regional  agreement setting forth principles for the 
management  of  fisheries in the Southeast Asian region 
may  merit  consideration.  The  fundamental  objective 
of  any  agreement which may be  established, I believe, 
should be the creation of adequate jurisdictional bases 
for the efficient and effective management of the fishing 
stocks in the  region, This workshop  could recommend 
ways by which adequate jurisdictional bases for manage- 
ment could be developed. It could, for example, set into 
proper  perspective what areas are suitable for regional 
standards and what matters are better left to the national 
management entities. 
A necessary corollary to this regional agreement on 
management of fisheries would be a regional specialized 
agency  which  may  be  established  independently  or 
developed from an existing organization. This workshop 
could  suggest  guidelines  on  the  establishment  of  the 
agency:  its  functions,  authority,  and  other  related 
matters. 
It should not be overlooked that any regional agree- 
ment  for fishing management, or the establishment  of 
a regional agency for that matter, can only be  achieved Keynote ~ddresslix 
through  a  spirit  of  accommodation  and  compromise 
because  of  differing  national  interests  and  policies. 
Obviously, each  country  will have its own view  of 
the  political,  economic,  or  social  benefits  which  will 
be derived from the institution of a fishery regime in the 
region,  depending more  upon  national  priorities  than 
upon international considerations. 
Perhaps  the  ASEAN  member  countries  could  take 
the lead in the establishment of a fishery regime since 
it is the only cohesive group so far in the region. ASEAN 
has  the  advantage  of  an  existing  framework and  an- 
nounced  objectives of cooperation among others in the 
economic development field. 
To my mind, an  effective management system is one 
that meets several criteria. Firstly, the system must make 
all parties capable of significantly influencing the system. 
States must feel that they are better off by maintaining 
the management system than by doing without it. 
Secondly, the management system should be flexible 
enough to accommodate changing conditions. 
Thirdly, the system must be  simple. It must not be 
so complex that the difficulties in establishing and nego- 
tiating arrangements, in acquiring information and adopt- 
ing and enforcing regulations, far outweigh the benefits 
that can be obtained from the system. 
Fourthly, it may be advisable that whatever regional 
management  agreement is  established in  the region, it 
should incorporate provisions for dispute avoidance and 
dispute settlement. 
The recommendations and suggestions from this work- 
shop should prove of immense value to the policy making 
sectors of the governments in Southeast Asia. It may be 
a worthy objective of this workshop to attempt to find 
some congruence between those  recommendations and 
suggestions and the individual national goals of the states 
in the region. 
In arriving at your conclusions and recommendations 
you  will  necessarily  have  to distinguish between  the 
ideal and the possible, between the theoretical and the 
practical. It may even be  said that sometimes the best 
is the  enemy of the good. So that  a more modest ap- 
proach at regional management might provide common 
ground for a consensus. 
There is an urgent need for coordinated national and 
international action which can not await the conclusion 
of a new  International Convention on the Law of  the 
Sea.  Indeed,  such  need  will  continue  even  after  the 
adoption of such treaty. 
The race to exploit the living resources of the world 
oceans to supplement land based agriculturs in order to 
satisfy  the  food  requirements  of  a  burgeoning  world 
must be rationalized and kept within bounds. 
Conservation measures are necessary to renew dwin- 
dling  stocks  and  to  save  valuable  species  from 
extinction. Needless to say, management and control are 
central to conservation. 
I  wish  this  workshop  all  success.  Your  pioneering 
efforts are a valuable contribution not  only to the im- 
provement  of  the  human  condition  but  also  to the 
survival of nian in this planet. ISEAS and the Law of the Sezi 
KERNIAL  SANDHU 
Director 
Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies 
As some of you already know, the Institute of South- 
east Asian Studies is an autonomous,  nonprofit research 
center for scholars and other specialists concerned with 
modern  Southeast  Asia,  particularly  the  multifaceted 
problems of development and modernization, and polit- 
ical  and  social  change.  The  Institute is  supported  by 
annual  grants  from  Singapore  and other governments, 
as well as donations from international and other private 
organizations and individuals. It has neither students nor 
teaching  functions,  being  purely  a  research  body.  In 
addition  to support  staff,  the  Institute has  20  to 25 
academicians and other specialists  working at the Institute 
at any one time. About half of these are Southeast Asians, 
including  Burmese, Indonesians,  Malaysians,  Filipinos, 
Singaporeans, Thais, and Vietnamese,  and others come 
from as far afield as Europe, Japan, and North America. 
Though  from  different disciplinary and  national back- 
grounds, all these scholars share a common concern, that 
is, an interest in  the problems of Southeast Asia. They 
function as a community of scholars and interact among 
themselves and with the public at large through a series 
of  seminars and  professional  meetings.  Their  research 
findings  are  published  through  various  outlets  of  the 
Institute  and  distributed  all  over  the  world.  In other 
words,  the  Institute  is  no proverbial  ivory  tower.  Its 
involvement in regional and international affairs is both 
direct and contemporary. In this light it was quite natural 
that we  should get  involved in a workshop focused on 
the Law of the Sea and problems of conflict and manage- 
ment of fisheries in  the rbgion. Then, too, quite apart 
from  its  intrinsic  merits,  the  topic  falls  within  the 
Institute's  ongoing research interests in the general area 
of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Resources. 
Likewise, that the Institute should join  forces with 
ICLARM in  cosponsoring  this  Workshop  would  also 
seem only logical as the Institute is already, and increas- 
ingly so, working closely  with other organizations and 
institutions,  both  within  and  outside  the  region,  in 
facilitating  such  activities. Moreover, in this particular 
case,  there  was  a  real  meeting  of  minds between the 
Institute and ICLARM as the subject of this Workshop- 
The Law of  the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Manage- 
ment of Fisheries in Southeast Asia-spans  the rewarch 
and professional interests of both ICLARM and the Insti- 
tute. Hence, our joint presence here today. 
With  regard  to the Workshop itself, what we  at the 
Institute, like ICLARM, are hoping might emerge from 
it are not so much commitments by countries or binding 
recommendations  to  them,  but  rather  more  precise 
identification and definition  of the problems involved, 
and  thence  examination  and  analysis  of  alternative 
means for dealing with them, bearing in mind the various 
budgetary, political, and manpower constraints involved. 
It is our hope that before the end of this Workshop we 
would  have  made  progress  towards  such  objectives. 
Needless to say, what we  do achieve in fact will depend 
very much on all  of us, individually and collectively. 
Thank  you. Workshop Summary Report 
FRANCIS  T.  CHRISTY,  JR. 
Introduction 
The changes that are taking place in the law of the 
sea are of considerable importance to  most coastal states, 
both in their effect on the distribution of the sea's wealth 
in fisheries and in the increase in coastal state's responsi- 
bility for the management of  the resources. Very few, if 
any, nations are adequately prepared to deal with these 
effects,  and  dl  need  to improve  their  competence  to 
deal with emerging issues. It was with this objective in 
mind that ICLARM and ISEAS joined in convening the 
Workshop on the Law of  the Sea  for Southeast Asian 
states. 
In  seeking  to reach  this  objective,  the  workshop 
focused in  general on only two of the many issues being 
raised by the changes inthe law of the sea. It did so partly 
because of the desirability of having a relatively narrow 
focus for discussion and, in part, because of the recogni- 
tion of the fundamental importance of the two Issues- 
allocation and implementation. The issue of allocation is 
that of determining "who  gets what"  from the sea's  re- 
sources. It is an issue that must be resolved if nations are 
to avoid a mutually destructive race for the common re- 
sources of the oceans. Implementation is of equal irnpor- 
tame in that the best  management plans and the most 
beneficial arrangements with forkis  countries will be of 
no value if they cannot satisfactorily be put into effect. 
The workshop recognized that the problems of allo- 
cation could only be  dealt with in terms of the process, 
not the product. It was not appropriate for the workshop 
to determine  who  "should"  get  what  from  the  sea's 
wealth  in  fisheries  or  where  the  boundaries  between 
neighboring or opposite coastal states should be drawn. 
These are matters for negotiation among the concerned 
states. The workshop, therefore, adopted a basic working 
assumption  that  all  states in  the region would extend 
their jurisdictions over fishery resources and would reach 
agreements as  to the location of their boundaries. This 
assumption  was  adopted  to facilitate  discussion  and 
avoid the problems of boundary and territorial disputes. 
It  was  recognized, however,  that  the  extension  of 
jurisdiction  would have disparate effects and that some 
states would lose while others would gain. Means for the 
amelioration of these effectsare currently being discussed 
at the 3rd United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea and it seemed appropriate  that this aspect be con- 
sidered by the workshop as a separate problem. 
Thus,  the  discussion  of  the three separate working 
groups focused on three  separate issues:  the allocation 
of living resources,  the  effects  of extensions  of juris- 
diction, and the problems of enforcement. A "discussion 
guide" was prepared fox the use of each of the working 
groups,  so that  each  group  would  consider all of the 
issues. The guide is presented below: 
Discussion Guide 
1. Problems in allocation of living resources 
a. Are  bilateral,  multilateral,  or  regional  agree- xivlLaw of  the Seo Workshop 
ments necessary for allocation, research, preven- 
tion of waste, and enforcement? 
b. What  are the advantages and  disadvantages of 
bilateral,  multilateral,  and  regional  arrange- 
ments? 
2. What  does extension of national jurisdiction entail 
for Southeast Asian countries? What are the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of such actions? 
3. Problems of enforcement 
a. How can enforcement capabilities of the states 
be strengthened? 
b. What  are the advantages and disadvantages of 
such measures? 
c. What  can be done to guarantee compliance by 
foreigners? 
d. What  are the advantages and  disadvantages of 
such actions? 
Throughout the discussions, the problems of inforrna- 
tion  needs  and  research  requirements  were  raised  fre- 
quently. It is quite  clear that knowledge of the fishery 
resources in  the region is seriously deficient and that a 
considerable amount of research needs to be done. Even 
though research problems were not identified as an issue 
before the workshop, the discussion of the problems and 
their importance justifies separate treatment in the Surn- 
mary.  The  Summary,  therefore,  is  broken  into four 
-one  on information  needs and the other three on the 
substantive issues raised in the "discussion guide." 
The Summary is drawn not only from the discussions, 
the background papers, and the working group reports, 
but also from the remarks presented by those participants 
who were  asked to initiate the discussions. For each of 
the  four subjects, th&e  is a brief presentation of back- 
ground  information  and  a  statement  of  the problems 
needing  attention.  This  is Followed  by  suggested  ap- 
proaches for resolution  of  some  of the problems iden- 
tified in the  discussions. It should be  emphasized that 
these  ate not recommendations for action, but sugges- 
tions as to  the possible approaches that might be followed. 
Information Needs 
It was  generally agreed that there  are major gaps in 
our knowledge about the fishery resources of the region. 
For  the problems  being  considered by  the workshop, 
information on three particular kinds of stocks needs to 
be  greatly improved-(a)  the scads and mackerels, (b) 
yellowfin  and  skipjack  tunas,  and  (c)  the  demersal 
(bottom-living)  stocks,  particularly  those  occurring 
along present  and likely future boundaries between the 
states.  For  each  of  these,  more ,knowledge is needed 
about the status of the stocks, rates of growth, and the 
effects  of  fishing on  the  yields.  In  addition, for  the 
first  two  kinds,  infomiation  on  migratory  patterns  is 
crucial. 
It is known that several stocks of  scads, mackerels, 
and  tunas  migrate  across  state  boundaries.  Common 
stocks  of  scads  and mackerels  are  believed  to occur 
along  the  margins  of  the  Gulf  of  Thailand  and  the 
eastern  margins  of  the  South  China  Sea.  The  tunas 
that  are  found  in  Philippine  and  Indonesian  waters 
are  thought  to be  from  the  same  stocks that  swim 
through  the waters of Micronesia, Papua New  Guinea, 
and  farther  east.  However,  there  is very  little precise 
knowledge  about  the  migratory  paths  or  about  the 
location  of  the spawning areas of the stocks. In some 
cases,  as  noted  in  the  background papers, overexploi- 
tation may already have occurred. 
For such shared stocks that swim through the waters 
of two or more coastal states, agreements on allocation 
and management  measures  are  absolutely  neceksary  if 
the benefits  to be  derived from the resources are not 
to be  dissipated. If  any one state attempts to maximize 
the  catch without  regard to the interests of  the other 
states, the  stock will become depleted  (fished beyond 
the  point  of maximum sustainable yield) and produce 
little  or no benefits  for any of  the sharing states. The 
problems  of  allocation  and  management  are  further 
complicated  if  the  stock  is  especially  vulnerable  or 
occurs  only  in  its  immature  form  when  it is in  the 
waters of one of  the states. In this situation, excessive 
fishing by  that state  may seriously diminish the  total 
yields that could be made available to aU  states. 
It is clear that inforrnation  on these various aspects 
is important  for the decisions that must be made. But 
it is  equally clear that there  are considerable problems 
involved  in  obtaining  the  information. Some of  those 
pointed  out  at  the  workshop  are  the  costs of under- 
taking research  on marine resources, the  difficulties of 
getting  accurate  reports  of  quantity  and  location  of 
catches, the low value placed by some administrators on 
the need for the information, and the lack of uniformity 
among the states in the collection of statistics. 
There is little need to elaborate on the costs of marine 
research. The mobility of the species, the fact that they 
lie in  an  opaque medium, the difficulties of developing 
controlled environments, the necessity for using vessels, 
and many other factors mean that the costs of developing 
knowledge are considerably higher than the costs of re- 
search on land resources. 
One of the best tools for management research is the 
records  of  quantities  of catch, size  of individuals, and 
location of  catches and the amount of effort spent by 
the fishermen. But it was frequently noted tliroughout 
the  workshop  that  such  records are  very  difficult  to 
obtain.  Many  of  the  catches  are  made  by  artisanal 
fishermen  using  small  craft,  fishing  from  small  and Workshop Summary ~eportlxv 
isolated villages, and landing a wide variety of species. 
In the Philippines, for example, it was pointed out that 
tunas,  frequently  immature  fish,  are  taken  largely by 
fishermen using vessels under 3 t and that their catches 
are  not included in the commercial fishery records. It 
was also stated  that in some countries a large but un- 
knod  amount  of vessels  are not licensed, so that the 
total amount of effort spent is not known. 
An additional difficulty is the low value placed on the 
collection of the relevant data. It appears that in certain 
countries, those responsible for setting budgets for fish- 
eries  are  often  more  concerned  about  development 
prospects than about management needs and that they 
therefore  place  a  low  priority  on  collection  of  such 
important data as catch per unit of effort. 
Also, although efforts are being made to  improve the 
situation, there is still a considerable lack of uniformity 
among the countries in the hds  of statistics collected. 
This creates particular difficulties for evaluating shared 
stocks of fish. 
A  somewhat separate  but  still important problem 
raised at the workahop relates to  the fact that information 
has value and that the potential for misuse of information 
may inhibit its production. One of the issues being raised 
at the UN  Conference on the Law  of the Sea is whether 
coastal  states  should  have  the  sole  responsibility for 
determining the optimum yields of the stocks in  their 
zones or whether this should be done jointly with neigh- 
boring concerned states or by an international organiza- 
tion of recognized competence. Some states fear that if 
the coastal state has the sole responsibility, it may tend 
to underestimate the optimum yield so as to reduce or 
eliminate any surpluses that might be made available to 
foreign fishermen. Other states, however, are concerned 
that  foreigners  or  international  organizations may not 
fully take account of the economic, social, and ecological 
factors that are important in determining optimum yields 
and that foreign participation in such research would be 
an infringement on the coastal state's sovereignty. 
Not  all of these problems in the production of infor- 
mation are readily resolvable, but some suggestions were 
made for steps that might help to alleviate some of the 
difficulties. It was suggested that cooperation on research 
on  shared  stocks  among  concerned  states  would  be 
desirable. For example, the migratory patterns of scads, 
mackerels, and tunas can be  determined by tagging of 
individual  animals  and  recording the location  of their 
recapture. Since tagging will take place in the  zone of 
one state and capture might occur in the zone of another, 
cooperation  is  essential.  As  another  example, it was 
pointed  out that  although marine  research might have 
low priority in any one state, the aggregate interest of all 
states would justify joint research undertakings and that 
the costs to the individual states could be reduced. Costs 
could be reduced by cooperation in the use of research 
vessels,  training  of  research  personnel,  the  develop- 
ment  of  research  methodologies particularly suited to 
the region, and in many other ways. Although coopera- 
tive  research efforts already exist in the region, it was 
thought  that these could be supplemented and comple- 
mented by other approaches. 
Although  cooperative undertaking  are  desirable, it 
was  recognized that the primav responsibility for the 
production of information lies with the individual states. 
In  this  regard,  it  was  pointed  out that  decisions  on 
management  of  fisheries  and  on  arrangements  with 
foreigners  are  being  made,  and  must be  made, in the 
absence of full information on the resources. Information 
will never be full and uncertainty  will always exist. The 
importance  of' this  fact  is  that  research  should relate 
directly to the decisions that have to be made. As noted 
in the workshop, one of the  first and most important 
tasks is the clarification of the objectives to be sought 
from  the  use  of  fishery  resources.  Objectives  are not 
always  clearly  stated  by  governments,  and  several 
different objectives may be in conflict with each other. 
Decision makers need to resolve the conflicts and then 
determine as precisely as possible the various elements 
of  the  decisions  required  to reach  the  objectives. On 
this  basis,  they  can  then  determine  the information 
that they need to make the decisions. This will permit 
a more efficient direction of research efforts and reduce 
the costs of research programs. 
lrnproved collaboration among those responsible for 
agreements with foreign states, those responsible for fish- 
eries management, and researchers is necessary to maxi- 
mize  the benefits that can be derived from the changes 
in  the law of the sea. Indeed, it was the  essence of the 
workshop to help stimulate such collaboration. 
Allocation of Shared Stocks 
The fact that many valued stocks of fish freely swim 
across  national  boundaries calls  for  a  high  degree  of 
cooperation  among the  concerned  states in the  distri- 
bution of benefits. Fundamentally, the achievement of 
effective cooperation  depends upon  whether the states 
perceive that the benefits of cooperation in allocation 
are  greater  than  the  losses they  might  experience by 
proceeding unilaterally. It is thus important to improve 
the perceptions of the individual states with regard  to 
the nature  of the cooperation required, the benefits to 
be derived, and the costs (including the apparent infringe- 
ment on sovereign rights) that might  be  incurred. The 
workshop touched on several of these aspects. 
Some of the participants pointed out that one of the xvi/Low of  the Sea Workdiop 
basic problems was the lack of appreciation by some af 
the decision makers of the need for reaching agreements 
on the allocation crf  fighery  benefits. This is due in part 
to the kk  of clear-cut information on the status of the 
stoch and  their  migratory  patterns.  The  present  or 
potential  damap of  unilateral  approaches  have  not 
been sufficiently well  demonstrated to those concerned 
to stimulate them to  take action. In some cases, damages 
may not yet have occurred, but in others it may be that 
the proof is not sufficiently convincing or has not been 
brought  to the  attention  of  those responsible for the 
decisions. The lack of communication among different 
agencies  within  governments  is  an  impediment to the 
initiation  of negotiations on the allocation of benefits 
from shared stocks. 
Another  problem raised at the workshop is that of 
resolving the numerous technical difficulties in the devel- 
opment  of  allocation  systems.  Various  systems  have 
been suggested. One would be the distribution of national 
quotas, i.e.,  shares of the total allowable catch that can 
be  taken  within  any  zone.  Under this arrangement the 
fisherrnen of  any  one state would  be  able to fish any- 
where in the region until they reach their state's quota. 
Another system would be that of zonal quotas in which 
the  share  acquired by  a particular state is  taken  only 
within the zone of that state. Quotas could  be  made 
transferable so that a state could sell or lease rights to 
take its share or a portion ofits  share. This would approx- 
imate a system in which the benefits from the resources, 
rather than the yield from the resources, are distributed 
among the concerned states. There are various advantages 
and disadvantages to these different systems and a large 
number  of  complexities involved in implementing any 
one  of them.  Indeed, the problems associated with the 
development of viable  systems for allocation of shared 
stocks still have  to be  resolved in most regions of  the 
world. This is notably true for the tunas of the eastern 
tropical Pacific and for a variety of species in the North- 
east Atlantic. 
Another problem that was raised is that of the possi- 
bility  or  likelihood that  a stock may  be  particularly 
vulnerable in a certain zone or area within a zone. If the 
fishermen from a state or area within a state have access 
to a stock only when it is immature, their catches may 
reduce the harvests of bigger individuals in the zones of 
other  states and could  eventually lead to depletion of 
the stock. If these fishermen restrained their catches, the 
total yields for all  fisherrnen might be  higher.  But the 
restraint would mean  a sacrifice on the part of  one of 
the states, a sacrifice that would be difficult to make. 
It was  pointed  out  that  in  the  Philippines  a large 
amount of the tunas that are caught are immature tunas 
taken by  artisanal fishermen. Although  all states sharing 
the  tuna  stocks may  be  b&ter  off  by preventing the 
artisanal catch of  the  immature tuna, such a measure 
would be  difficult to enforce and would work especial 
hardship  on  a  particular group of fderrnen. Such in- 
equities  make  it  difficult  to resolve  the  problems  of 
allocation. 
An  additional problem of considerable concern to the 
workshop was  that of  determining how to extract  the 
maximum net benefits from foreign fishermen wishing 
to have  access to the  stocks in coastal state waters. It 
was noted particularly in Indonesia that the past arrange- 
ments with foreign  fisherrnen, in  particular those from 
Japan, had not been  entirely satisfpctory, and that the 
costs associated with implementing the agreements had 
been  high  and  the  returns  had  been low. Part  of  the 
problem may be due to  the negotiating strength of Japan. 
This strength is due not only to the importance of Japan 
to the economies of the coastal states in general but also 
to the fact that its interests in tuna can be met by a large 
number  of  coastal  states  throughout  the  Southwest 
Pacific  region.  Currently  the  Japanese  are  the  only 
distant-water  fishermen  with  a  strong  capability  for 
taking  skipjack tuna  in  the western Pacific.  Since the 
skipjack are not yet fully utilized, the Japanese can move 
their  vessels  to the waters  of  the coastal states whkh 
charge  the  lowest fees for access. In the absence cf a 
coordinated  approach  by  the  states sharing  the  tuna 
stocks, the Japanese may be able to use their position to 
play  off one state against  another  and drive  down the 
fees for access. 
A  coordinated  approach,  however,  means  that  the 
concerned  states  WLU  have  to reach  an  agreement  on 
allocation of the resources or resource benefits. Further- 
more, the determination of the appropriate fees to charge 
will  not  be  easy.  Finally, it  should  be  noted  that  an 
approach  which  seeks  to maximize  the  net  economic 
returns that can be extracted from foreigners may mean 
that the developing countries within the region may not 
be  able to compete. This, however, may change as labor 
costs in Japan continue to increase and as the developing 
states improve their ability to fish for tuna. 
These  problems  associated  with  the  allocation  of 
shared stocks of  fish are  not easy to resolve.  Many of 
them are essentially problems of wealth distribution and, 
like those  of  boundary  agreements, have to be  worked 
out  by  negotiation  among  the  concerned  states.  The 
workshop noted that the process of negotiation could be 
greatly  facilitated if the states were able to adopt some 
general  principles for allocation. This in  turn would bc 
facilitated by efforts on the part of the individual states 
to develop a  clear set of the values and objectives they 
seek  from  the  use  of  fishery  resources.  Unless  they 
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from  the docadtion  of  the  resources -  whether  they 
want  economic  mnues, employment  opportunities, 
somces  of  proteh, or export  -  they wiU not 
be  able to negotiate easily nor know  what they will be 
willing to trade off to reach mutually beneficial agree- 
ments. 
Generally, the workshop participants recognized and 
accepted  the  necessity  for  cooperation  among states. 
They believed that the allocation process would be most 
successful if it proceeded slowly. It was believed that an 
institutionalized  infrastructure  was  not a  prerequisite 
for coopemtion on docation. Agreements might begtn 
through  bilateral  negotiations,  moving  towards  the 
eventually necessary multilateral mechanisms. 
It was also painted out that the most important cri- 
terion for allocation was that of acceptability. All states 
which can influence or affect the decisions should believe 
that they are better off by abiding by the decisions than 
by breaking them. Here, a clear understanding and accu- 
rate percaption  of  the benefits being traded off would 
be extremely helpful. 
k  Ptuations  where  one  gtate may be  required  to 
make  a sacrifice to achieve  benefits for all con- 
cerned states, it was qbd  that some  means for com- 
pensating the  losers  would  be  desirable. For  example, 
if the total yield from a stock can be greatly increased 
when  the  fiphennen of  one state refrain from catching 
the immature fish, the ather states might join in providing 
some compensation to the fishermen that refrain from 
Mhg.  Throu@  such  means,  all  participating  states 
would be  better off. 
There was some discussion of the different systems of 
allodon and a suggestion that zonal quotas had suffi- 
cient advantages to deserve careful consideration. It was 
also  sueted that  cooperation  among  sharing states 
with  regard  to negotiations  of  agreements with extra- 
regional  states  could  be  helpful  in  strengthening the 
position  of  the  sharing states and maximizing the net 
benefits that could be extracted. 
In general, although the workshop participants recog- 
nized the technical, social, and  political difficulties asso- 
ciated with the'dmation of shared stocks of fish, they 
felt that cooperation among the states was bath feasible 
and  Mrable. 
The workshop discussed, to  sane extent, the problems 
relating to the extensions of  jurisdiction in the region. 
Only a few of the states in  Southeast Asia have thus far 
asserted  claims  for  exclusive  economic zones. It was 
believed  that  dl  states  would  eventually  assert  such 
claims  md that  the  present  areas  of  high  seas would 
disappear and $dl  under the jurisdiction of the various 
coastal states.  It  was  recognized  that  there  would be 
considerable disparity among the states in terms of their 
gains and  lms.  In pdcular, the  states of Singapore 
and Thailand would lose because a large amount of their 
present  fishing effort  is  spent  in  waters that will fall 
under the jurisdiction of other states. 
The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea is currently 
discussing measures that might be taken to alleviate the 
hardships that might be incurred by states that gain little 
from  the  ehensions of jurisdiction.  At the  workshop, 
much of the dimdon facused on the concept of "tra- 
ditional fishing nghts"  and how this concept should be 
defined. One view was that "traditional"  referred to the 
fishermen and their veawls, rather than to states. Under 
this view, it was held that the same fishermen who had 
fihed in the area that would become the exclusive zone 
of another coastal state rmght be  granted some form of 
preferential  access  but  that  they  must  use the  same 
vessels.  It  was  sugegted  that  this  preferential  access 
could  not he  transferred  to other  fishermen or other 
vessels. 
Thb view was contested by several of the partiaipants 
who argued ht  the right accrued to the state as a whole 
and that preferential access should be  available to other 
fishermen as well  as those who had  actually fished. It 
was  argued that restricting the right only to those who 
had  actually fished would severely limit the right, both 
in terms of  time  as the fishermen die, and in terms of 
precluding  modernization  of  fishing  effort.  It  was 
suggested  that  the  coastal  state's  insterests  would  be 
adequately protected  by  defining  preferential access in 
terms of quantity off&  that could be taken rather than 
in terms of traditional f&ermen  and vessels. 
The workshop did not attempt to suggest how this 
controversy should be resolved. Ir was believed that the 
issues should be more properly discussed at the UN Con- 
ference or in negotiations between the concerned states. 
A separate point about extensions of jurisdiction was 
also briefly discussed at the workshop. It was noted that 
some agreements with foreign countries and cooperative 
arrangements among the states of the region may depend 
to a  certain  extent upon  how  the  boundaries of  the 
exclusive ames are Fdy  drawn. The absence of a final 
determination  of  boundaries may impede the reaching 
of such agreements and arrangements. It was suggested 
that this uncertainty might be deviated in certain cases 
by  reaching  tentative  agreements for special purposes. 
The Rablem of  Enforcement 
The problems of enforcement  were generally agreed 
to be  particularly important to resolve, not only with xviiilLaw of  the Sea Workshop 
regard to the  changes taking place in the law of the sea 
but  also  in  terms  of  the present condition  of limited 
jurisdiction.  It was  recognized  that the  problems  and 
difficulties of enforcement diminish the net benefits that 
states receive from use of fishery resources within their 
present zones of jurisdiction  and that net benefits from 
extended zones will  also be diminished if the problems 
of enforcement  cannot be satisfactorily resolved. These 
problems apply boih to domestic and foreign fishermen 
and to the implementation of regulations and agreements 
as well as to illegal fishing or poachjng by foreign vessels. 
The workshop participants identified  a wide variety 
of causes for the present ineffectiveness of enforcement. 
One of these is clearly the high costs of patrol craft that 
can conduct surveillance and make arrests. For several of 
the states, the water area within present jurisdictions is 
vast  and much of it is isolated  and far from land. For 
these  states, investments  in  adequate patrol  forces will 
be heavy. 
But  in addition  to the  high costs,  there  are  other 
problems reducing the efficiency of enforcement systems. 
It was pointed out that one of these is the lack of coor- 
dination  between  those  responsible  for  decisions  on 
agreements  and  regulations  and  those  responsible  for 
the various phases of enforcement systems. This leads to 
the  adoption  of  regulations  that  may  not  be  readily 
enforceable  or to agreements with foreigners that place 
excessive burdens on patrol forces or on the courts. 
It  was  noted  that  there  are  several  phases  to an 
enforcement system. These include not only surveillance 
and  arrest,  but  also  trial,  punishment,  and  reporting. 
These phases are each of such importance that an enforce- 
ment  system  is  only as  strong  as  the  weakest  of the 
phases.  For example, if the courts are not adequate to 
hold trials  expeditiously, the whole  system of enforce- 
ment is jeopardized.  One  of the difficulties is that the 
various phases  fall under different arms of government 
and  that  coordination  of  their  activities  is  thereby 
impeded. 
Another problem apparently common to many states 
in  the  region  is  the lack  of  coordination  among the 
various agencies that have the authority for surveillance 
and  arrest.  In  some  cases,  this authority is shared by 
police  forces,  customs  agents, immigration  agents, the 
coast  pard,  fisheries  departments,  navy,  and  other 
governmental  departments.  Even though  there  may be 
one central command  for enforcement  of  fishery mea- 
sures, there appear to  be severe difficulties in getting the 
cooperation  of the different departments and agencies. 
It was also mentioned that the authority for arrest was 
sometimes abused and that fishermen sometimes attempt 
to  avoid regulations by bribing enforcement officials. 
An  additional  difficulty expressed at the workshop 
was the lack of awareness of the desirability of the mea- 
sures  being enforced. When  the fishermen  do not pcr- 
ceive  that  the  regulation  will  work  to their  benefit, 
they will have little incentive to comply with the regula- 
tion.  In  situations where  the regulation  is  designed  to 
distribute  benefits  to one group of fishermen, such  as 
artisanal  fishermen, and away  from  another group, the 
latter group will experience losses and will be tempted to 
violate  the regulation.  But  even if a regulation leads to 
greater benefits for all in the future, there may be some 
difficulty in convincing the fishermen of its desirability. 
This may be due to the inlposition of a uniform regula- 
tion that may not be equally applicable in all areas or it 
may  be  due  to a  lack of credibility in the infortnation 
demonstrating the need for the rcgulation. In any case, 
when fishermcn do not benefit from or do not perceive 
the  benefits  from a regulatory  measure, the  costs and 
difficulties of enforcement become much greater. 
In  addition  to the problems mentioned above which 
deal  with  enforcement  within  individual  states,  the 
workshop  identified  problems  in  achieving  effective 
cooperation  in  enforcement  among  the  states  of  the 
region.  It  was  recognized  that  cooperation  would  be 
desirable  for  a  number  of  reasons.  When  stock.  are 
shared by  several states, each state wants to be assured 
that other states are abiding by the allocation agreement. 
With  extended zones of jurisdiction,  cooperation in the 
surveillance  of  foreign  fishing vessels that are in transit 
from one zone  to another would  clearly be benef cial. 
Enforcement, however,  is  a highly  sensitive area for 
all  states  and  there  are  limits to the degree  to which 
cooperation  is  feasible.  States may  find it difficult  to 
permit  other  states  to conduct surveillance  operations 
within their zones, and yet some technique for ensuring 
credibility in reporting of catches appears to be necessary 
for  effective  agreements  on  the  allocation  of  shared 
stocks. 
The workshop participants suggested several ways to 
improve  enforcement  systems.  One  of  these  was  the 
desirability  for  states  to broaden  their  focus  beyond 
the phases  of surveillance and arrest and to include the 
phases  of trial, punishment,  and reporting.  It was sug- 
gested  that each  phase  should be improved commensu- 
rately with the others so that the whole system could be 
made more effective. Increased coordination among the 
various phases would also be desirable as well as increased 
coordination  with  those  rcsponsible  for  decisions  on 
regulations  and  on  agreements  with, foreigners. It was 
clear that states are already aware of the problems asso- 
ciated with diffused responsibilities for surveillance and 
arrest and of the need for better coordination among the 
various forces. 
An  important task that emerged from the workshop Workshop  Summary Reportlxix 
discussions is increasing the awareness of the need  for 
and value of enforcement systems. As noted above, the 
respect that Memen  have  for enforcement is related 
directly  to their understanding of the importance  and 
value  of the measures. It might also be mentioned that 
decision makers should also improve their awareness of 
the need for better enforcement systems. Enforcement is 
not an activity that is particularly rewarding to adrninis- 
traton. They would prefer to be known for the amount 
of resources they have  developed or number of vessels 
they have built than for the number of arrests they have 
made. The fulfillment of their enforcement tasks would 
be  made easier if there were  greater understanding on 
the part of their superiors of the value of enforcement. 
With  regard  to  cooperation  among  states,  it  was 
suggested that uniformity in regulations and agreements 
with  foreigners  would  be  very  helpful.  For  example, 
where it is desirable to have special lanes for the transit 
of foreign vessels, it is important that the lanes through 
one zone conform to the lanes through an adjacent zone. 
Uniformity in rules governing the stowage of fishing gear 
and in the kinds of gear or vessels that can be used would 
also  mutually  facilitate  the  tasks  of  enforcement  by 
neighboring states. 
For  these  and other  reasons, it was  suggested that 
increased contact  among the  enforcement  officials  of 
the different states in the region would be desirable. This 
might eventually lead to  the adoption of joint surveillance 
techniques  such  as  satelite systems and  transponding 
devices. It could also do much to improve credibility in 
compliance  with  agreements  on  allocation  of  shared 
stocks. 
It is interesting to note that the three different work- 
ing groups independently identified similar problems and 
suggestions for improvements. In particular,  all  groups 
emphasized  the  importance  of  fisheries management, 
believing that development prospects can be fully realized 
only if  there is improved management of the resources 
and resource users. The stress on the need for dealing with 
the problems of depletion, waste, and conflict demori- 
strated  a  strong  sense  of  responsibility  for  fisheries 
management and for the mutual regard of other states, 
The  participantshagreed that  this responsibw Fiii 
best be  exercised by improving the competence within 
their states to deal with the issues. They also agreed that 
many of the issues cannot be  resolved except  through 
multilateral  agreements aqd  that  regional  cooperation 
was  both necessary and feasible. It was recognized that 
one impediment to  cooperation was the present difficulty 
of  communication  between  the  centrally planned  and 
market  economies in the region. It was  suggested that 
the  ASEAN  states should not proceed so rapidly that 
their  actions  become  subject to misinterpretation,  nqr 
so slowly that the resources are wasted. It was considered 
possible for the ASEAN states to adopt tentative arrange- 
ments pending the resolution of the problems between 
the centrally planned and market economies. 
It was stated that one of the values of the1 workshop 
was that it facilitated informal contacts betwedn individ- 
uals  from  different  countries  and  that  such  contacts 
were particularly helpful in furthering regional coopera- 
tion.  Further  efforts through  additional workshops or 
other means were considered to be desirable in reachiag 
the  objective of mutually beneficial use  of the fishery 
resources of the region. Contents 
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Introduction  ciate this opportunity to initiate discussion on the prin- 
ciples  and  problems  in  determining  the  allocation  of 
Among  the  pelagic  fisheries in  Southeast Asia, the  catches  of  these  resources  among  the  countries  cow 
scads (Deca~tem  ~PP.)  and mackerels (Rastrelliger s~~.)  cerned. It is hoped that this will be an initial step toward 
are the most  productive- The  combined catch of these  the  rational exploitation of these resources as well as a 
species increased from 632,400 mt in  1971 to 879,974  ,,an,  to conserve the stocks for mutual benefits of all 
mt in  1976, and  accounted for 84% of the total world  concerned. 
catches of scads and mackerels in 1976 (Tables 1 and 2). 
Although  fisheries on these two resources have rapidly 
developed  during  the  last  decade, catches continue  to 
grow  in  many areas and considerable increases can be 
expected in the future. However, since it is well known 
that scads and mackerels are widely  distributed in the 
South  China  Sea  region,  a  substantial  proportion  of 
these  resources may be shared by more than one coun- 
try in the region, Thus, the increased intention of the 
coastal  states,  off  whose  shores  these  stocks -migrate, 
to invest more heavily in  fishing effort  will  eventually 
lead  to  a  mutually  destructive  race  for  the  common 
resources, unless the states concerned are able to reach 
an agreement on the allocation of the yields from these 
resources. 
The problems of international allocation and manage- 
ment raised by the generally mixed nature of the stocks 
and their variable pattern of exploitation and migration 
are just beginning to be appreciated. When a stock occurs 
in more  than one area of national jurisdiction,  negotia- 
tions and cooperation between the countries concerned 
are required  to reach an  agreement on the shares to be 
taken  by  each country. For the scad and mackerel re- 
sources which are of vital importance to the economy of 
the pelagic fisheries in the countries bordering the South 
China  Sea  region,  no attempt has  yet  been  made  to 
devise allocation schemes in the area. I therefore appre- 
Scad Resources and Fisheries 
Scads are  widely distributed in the South China Sea 
region as shown in Figure 1. At least four possible species 
were recognized in the area. In Philippine waters, Decap- 
terns  macrosoma  (syn.  D.  lajang)  and D.  nrsselli are 
abundant  while D.  kurroides is very  rare (Tiews et al. 
1970; Ronquillo  1970). In the Gulf of Thailand round 
scad (D.  maruadsi) is the most abundant, followed by D. 
macrosom. D.  kurroides seems to be very rare (Sukha- 
visidh  1978a).  In  Malaysian  waters  Russell's  scad (D. 
russelli) appears to be most abundant whereas D. macro- 
soma  and round scad are caught to a lesser extent (Chong 
1973). In the Indonesian waters, at least two species, D. 
macrosoma and round scad, were reported (Anon. 1977). 
However, it appears that there have been some difficult- 
ies and confusion  in  distinguishing these species in the 
commercial catches in  all  countries (SCSP  1978). Most 
of  the  catches  were- therefore  reported  as  combined 
catches of scads and thus added difficulties in the assess- 
ments of distribution and productivity by species in the 
region. 
Knowledge of the biology and life history of scads is 
also incomplete. Little information on spawning behavior, 
early  Liie  history,  growth,  migration,  food  habits and 
other aspects of  basic  biology are  available at present. 2/hw  of  the Sea Workshop 
From the study on the round scad stocks in the Gulf of 
Thailand, Chullasorn  and  Yusukswad  (1977)  reported 
that round  scad and D.  lajong mature to a total length 
(TL)  of  16 m. There  are two peaks of  spawning, in 
February-March  and  in  July-August.  The  spawning 
grounds  appear  to be  in  deep  waters  of  the  central 
part of the Gulf  of Thailand  (Fig.  2).  Since age deter- 
mination of Decuptems spp. is very difficult due to being 
tropical,  Chullasorn  and  Yusukswad  employed  length 
frequency analysis and showed that the maximum length 
of  round scad in the Gulf of Thailand is about 23 cm, 
with a growth coefficient of about 0.1 1. 
It is apparent that scad is a slow-growing pelagic fish 
as  compared to mackerel. Tiews et al. (1970) stated that 
scads in the Philippine waters grew to about 20 cm TL in 
their third year, but larger fish have scarcely been caught 
from the commercial fishing grounds. The record of some 
Table 1. Sad  (Decapterus spp.)  catches by  country, 1971-1976 (rntla 
fish longer than 30 cm caught in deeper waters, however, 
suggested that  there  might  be  mature  stocks in  some 
deeper  areas  which  were  virtually  unexploited  (SCSP 
1978). 
Owing  to limited  information  available, it was  not 
possible  to identify  with  any  degree  of  certainty  the 
various stocks present in the region. However, the Work- 
shop on, the Biology  and Resources of Mackerels (Ras- 
trelliger spp.) and Round Scads (Decaptems spp.) in the 
South China Sea, organized by  the  FAOIUNDP South 
China  Sea  Fisheries  Development  and  Coordinating 
Programme and held at Penang, Malaysia  from November 
7-1  1, 1977  identified eight local unit areas for preliminary 
stock analyses (Fig. 3). The  results  indicate that many 
stocks are fully exploited and expansion of exploitation 
is possible only in some areas (Table 3). 
It is important to note that the 'development of the 










'prom  FA0  (1977) Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, VoL 42. 
b~ud's  scad (D.  russellt) only. 
'~evised  data from Department of Fisherias, Thailand. 
d~p4nd4cad.  CD.  mnruodfi only. 
%airily from Atlantic Ocean, ND = no data available. 
Table 2.  Mackerel (Rastrelliger  spp.) catches by country, 1971-76 (n~t)~ 
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
World catch  474,400  306,900  301,100  281,018 
Southeast Asia  264,200  180.300  223,500  221.595 
Indonesia  65,300  62,200  56,400  65,427 
Malay&  39,000  17,600  31,500  25,109 
w~plfiw  44,400  44,900  56.000  69,8,74 
sb~om  100  100  100  85 
Thailand  115,400  55,500  79,500  61,100 
1ndiab  204,600  121,200  69,900  41,100 
Othersc  5,6 00  5,400  7,700  18,323 
'~rorn  PA0  (1977) Yearbook  of Fishery Statistics, Val. 42. 
his  m-  (R  bmrgurta) only. 
C~y  from the Northwestm Indian Ocean. saad  fishery in Thailand is quite spectacular, similar to 
the development of  trawl fisheries during the mid-1960s. 
With the introduction of luring purse seining techniques 
in the early 19709, the annual catches of scads increased 
from 489  mt in  1971 to 83,524 mt in  1976. Similar 
.development was  observed  in  Philippine  waters  when 
purseseiners  with  light  luring  techniques  successfully 
competed  with  bagnets  which  resulted  in  catches  10 
times  higher  than  those  taken with traditional  fishing 
gear in the Sulu and Visayan Seas. The disturbing fact is 
The ~llocation  of  Scud# and hckerelx/3 
that the vast majority of scadg caught in these areas were 
reported as immature, except in the northern part of the 
region, and the spawning behavior of the fish is not well 
known. It  is  possible  that  mature scads spawn in  the 
Fig.  1. Distribution and fishing ground of round scads, Decopte- 
rus spp. in the South China Sea. 
Fig.  2. Assumed spawning ground md spawning season of Decap 
terus spp. in theGulf of Thailand. (from Chullasorn et al.  1977). 
Table 3. Current catches and potential yields in the scad flshdes in the South China Sea area (from SCSP 1978). 
Area 
Gulf  of Thailand 
Philippines and NE  Sabah 
Northern ahelf of South China Sea 
E.  coast of Peninsula Malaysia 
Andaman Sa-N, Wcca  Strait 
Northern Sumatra 
Sarawak-W. Sabah 
Catch in 1000's mt  Estimated potential (mt) 
1974  1975  and status of exploitation 
26.3  83.5  Probably over 100,000 
Moderately exploited 
356.1  Robably over 400,000 
Moderately exploited 
3.4  Undetermined 
10.7  Around 15,000 
Modaately exploited 
0.9  Undetermined 
Slightly exploited 
5.3  Undetermined 
Slightly exploited off Thai ma~t 
10.8  Around 14,000 
Fully exploited 
0.5  Undetermined 
Slightly exploited 
Total  437.8  471.2  540,100~ 
a~stimated  potential plus the avw  1974175 catches k  the areas in which potential was not estimated 41I.m~  of the Sea Workshop 
Fig. 3. Subdivision of the South China Sea in areas used by the 
workshop for  assessment of the Decapterus resources. Area  1, 
Gulf of Thailand; Area 2, Philippines-NE Sabah; Area  3, Northern 
Shelf  of  the South China  Sea; Area  4, E. Peninsular Malaysia; 
Area  5,  W. Kalimantan; Area 6,  Andaman Sea-Malacca Strait off 
Thailand and  Malaysia; Area  7, Northern Sumatra; and Area  8, 
Sarawak-W. Sabah. 
deeper waters along the edge of the shelf as suggested by 
the !disappearance of mature scads in Philippine waters 
and by  the spawning grounds in offshore waters of the 
Gulf of Thailand. In  this case, mixing of stocks among 
the assumed local unit areas might occur and thus create 
problems  in  the allocation of  catches in  all  areas con- 
cerned. 
Macketel Reso-  and Fisheries 
Basic information on the biology, bionomics, and fish- 
eries of mackerels (Rastrelliger spp.) have been presented 
by Jones and Rosa (1 96S),  Hongsku1(1974), and recently 
by SCSP (1978). 'Similar to the situation with scads, the 
information is far from complete. There are problems in 
species identification, catch statistics, and life history, as 
well  as with assessments of the stocks of mackerels in 
the area. Nevertheless, the existing information as pre- 
sented at the Penang  Workshop (SCSP  1978) allows more 
insight into these resources than into those of scads. 
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution and the main fish- 
ing grounds for mackerels in the South China Sea region. 
Although the distributm of  each species was not clear 
due to the difficulties and confusion about the taxonomy 
and insufficient cwerage of surveyed area, it was agreed 
that Rastrelliger bmchysoma  (syn. R. neglectus) seems 
to be  the most abundant among the species along the 
coastal waters, while R. kanagurta and R. faughni  appear 
to be open-sea forms that are also found throughout the 
area. In  addition, two new species of Rastrelliger were 
reported from the Andaman Sea (Sukhaviddh 1978b). 
Only  the  mackerel  stocks in  the  Gulf  of Thailand 
have  been  intensively  investigated  since  1963.  The 
results  from  these studies showed that mackerels (i.e., 
R. neglectus) mature at about 17.5 cm TL and spawning 
takes place over a fairly prolonged period, from February 
to September  in  areas  along the western coast  of  the 
Gulf of Thailand. In these areas, the plankton was found 
to be  abundant  and  there  also appeared to be  a high 
daily  photosynthesis  rate in the spawning season (Suva- 
pepun and Suwanrumpha  1970; Lursinsap et al.  1970). 
Tagging  experiments  conducted  during  1960-1  965 
revealed a northward feeding migration of the young fish 
to the Inner Gulf of Thailand during April-August, and a 
southward  spawning migration of  the adult fish during 
December-January (Somjaiwong and Chullasorn  1974). 
It was supposed that fish along the eastern and western 
coast  of  the  Gulf  did not intermingle to a large extent 
although interchange of stocks  along the eastern coast 
with  those  in  Kampuchean  and  Vietnamese waters  is 
expected.  Similar  patterns  of  migration  were  hypo- 
thesized for the mackerels along the Andaman Sea coast 
of  Thailand. It is  possible that mackerels that spawned 
off the west  coast  of  Peninsular Malaysia might have a 
northward  feeding rhigration to the Thai waters (Pathan- 
sali  1967).  Some  mackerels  that  were  tagged  and 
released  off  Langkawi  Island  and  which  were  later 
caught  in  the  Thai  waters  support  this  hypothesis. 
Similarly, the mackerels in the Mergui Archipelago may 
have a southward migration to the northern part of the 
Thai  waters  in  the  Andaman  Sea.  Similarities in  the 
morphometric  characteristics  of  mackerels  from  the 
Fig. 4. Distribution and fishing ground of mackerels (Rustrelliger 
spp.) in the South China Sea. The AIlocation of Scads and Mackerels/5 
Burmese  and  Thai  waters  in  this  area  were  reported 
(Druzhinin and Myint  1970) 
Studies on the growth of mackerel have been carried 
out in several countries. Due to difficulties in age deter- 
mination, these studies have been made mostly by inves- 
tigating  the  seasonal  change  in  length  distribution. 
Hongskul  (1974)  employed  this  technique  together 
with the tagging data to  establish the growth function of 
mackerel  in the  Gulf  of Thailand, with  a high growth 
coefficient  of  0.28  which enables the  fish to grow to 
the commercial size within 7 mo after its birth. Malay- 
sian scientists obtained similar results (SCSP  1978). On 
the other hand, Sujastani (1 974) reported a lower growth 
coefficient  for  mackerels  in  the  Indonesian  waters. 
Nevertheless,  the  differences are  not highly  significant 
among the countries in the area. 
The unit of the mackerel stocks in the area generally 
appeared to be very  vague  due to lack of information. 
To assess the status of the stocks, the Workshop on the 
Biology  and  Resources of Mackerels (SCSP  1978) pro- 
posed  a subdivision of South China Sea area into eight 
local units (Fig.  5).  The preliminary assessments based 
on the available data indicate that at least 60-70,000  mt 
of increased mackerel production can be expected from 
the  region  (Table 4).  Many  traditional  fishing grounds 
for mackerels, however, showed signs of overexploitation, 
particularly in northern Malacca Strait, the western coast 
of Peninsular Malaysia, and the western coast of the Gulf 
of Thailand. 
Allocation of  Catches 
The  previous  discussion  indicates  that  scad  and 
mackerel in  this region are shortlived with life spans of 
about 3 yr, fast-growing in their early stages and reach- 
ing commercial sizes within  1 yr. They also start spawn- 
ing in their first  year  of life. Although no estimate of 
Pig. 5. Subdivision of the South China Sea in areas used by the 
workshop for assessment of  the Rastrelliger  resources.  Area  1, 
E.  Gulf  of  ThailandCambodia-W. Vietnam; Area  2, W.  Gulf of 
Thailand; Area 3, E. Peninsular Malaysia; Area 4, Andaman Sea- 
NE  Sumatra;  Area  5, W.  Kalimantan; Area  6, Brunei-Sabah- 
Palawan Island; Area 7, Luzon-Visayas; and Area 8, E. Vietnam. 
Table 4. Cuaent catches and potential yields in the mackerel fisheries in the South China Sea area (from SCSP 1978). 
Area  Catch in 1000's mt  Estimated potential and 
1974  1975  status of exploitation 
Gulf of Thailand (East) 
Gulf of Thailand (West) 
E.  coast Peninsular Malaysia 






Nearly fully exploited 
Around 98,000 
Overexploited 
West Kalimantan  15.0  17.8  Undetermined 
Slightly exploited 
Brunei-Palawan Islands  23.9  17.8  Undetermined 
Fully exploited 
Luzon-Visayas  46.0  29.3  Undetermined 
E.  Vietnam coast  ND  ND  Undetermined 
Total  17O.W  159.7+  228,000~ 
a~stimated  potential plus the average 1974175 catches in the areas in which potential was not estimated. 61hw  of  the Sea Workshop 
recruitment was ever made, it is apparent from the catch 
of these 0-group fish that variation in recruitment occurs 
in  most areas. In  fact, variation in mackerel catch was 
noted  100 yr ago (Day  1878). Natural fluctuation was 
often cited as  the main cause for recruitment and thus 
stock siae variation, although the effectsof environmental 
perturbation  on  these  stocks  are  not  known.  Murty 
(1969)  once reported  variations in pelagic fish catches 
due to variation in the pattern of surface mixed layers 
derived  from  the  coastal  drift  currents.  Murty  and 
Edelman  (MS,  cited by  Rao  1970) also suggested that 
certain low ranges of monsoon intensities are unfavorable 
for  the  pelagic  fisheries  since  they  found  the surface 
waters depleted of dissolved oxygen during such periods. 
The scad and mackerel fisheries have been major fish- 
eries in the countries bordering the South China Sea for 
decades, particularly  the  mackerel  fishery in Thailand 
and the scad  fishery in  the Philippines. With the intro- 
duction  of  modern  purse-seining  and  trawling,  these 
resources are  now being exploited at increasing rates in 
all countries. Many "local"  stocks already ahow signs of 
overexploitation, for example on the west coast of the 
Gulf of Thailand, the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, 
and  the  northern  Sumatra  area  for  mackerels.  Scads, 
stocks  in the  Gulf  of Thailand and northern Sumatra 
are probably fully exploited, whereas those in the Philip- 
pines  and  the  east  coast  of  Peninsular  Malaysia  are 
moderately  exploited  with  a  trend  toward  heavier 
exploitation. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  identification  of 
"unit stocks"  as described above was bawd on existing 
information  on the  distribution of mackerels and scads 
as a whole. Although the terms "population" and "stock" 
do not have precise definitions and are commonly used 
in a variety of contexts, "population"  generally refers to 
the fish  of  a particular species living in an area at any 
time.  "Stock"  however implies a greater degree of dis- 
creetness as demonstrated by genetic evidence, difference 
in spawning area and season, migratory routes, meristic 
and morphometric data, growth rate, year-class strength, 
an$  other individual or  group characteristics (Brander 
1978).  Thus,  a  population  inhabits  one  area  like  the 
South China Sea, but may consist of several stocks; and 
a stock may migrate or have part of its life history in 
more  than  one  area  and  therefore  be  fished by more 
than one country, For the populations being studied, it 
is possible that the mixing of mackerels could occur in 
Areas  1, 2, and 3 in the Gulf of Thailand and in areas 
6 and 7 in the Philippines (Fig. 5). The mackerel stock in 
Area 4, which is fished by Thailand, Malaysia, and Indo- 
qesia at present, may also mix with the Burmese mack- 
erels  from  the  Mergui  Archipelago  at  their  northern 
boundaw in the Thai waters. Similar mixing of scads is 
presumed  for  the  fish  from Areas  1 and 4, and from 
Areas 6 and 7 (Fig. 3). 
Characteristics  of  pelagic  stocks,  such  as  shoaling 
behavior and migrations which lead to  mixing of stocks, 
give  particular difficulties as they are not indicated in 
the commercial catch data. The accurate estimation of 
allowable catch (TAC)  requires that we  be able to esti- 
mate  the  current  exploitable  population  size  with 
reasonable accuracy. The accuracy with which we can do 
this  atrd  with  which  we  can  assess  objectives  in  the 
national  fishery  development  programs  will  obviously 
be affected by our knowledge of migration and shoaling 
processes. Without it, however, there will  always be room 
for  disagreement  in  interpretation of stock assessment 
for management  purposes. For  example, Pope (1973), 
using simple simulation models, demonstrated  that the 
stock-recruitment patterns varied  significantly with the 
migration rates between the two stocks in the neighbor- 
ing areas. When high rates of mixing are combined with 
unequal  input  error, then errors generated in  the esti- 
mates of  migration effects may obscure the population 
processes.  The  lack  of a definite relationship between 
fishing  mortality  (greatly  affected  by  loss  and  gain 
through migration) and fishing effort wiU preclude using 
fishing effort controls  to achieve  a Fmm  management 
scheme as desired. 
For  the national  fisheries management programs, in 
view of the changing economic order of the ocean regime, 
a  vital  step  is  to control the  amount  removed, either 
explicitly (e.g.,  as catch quotas) or indirectly (e.g., closed 
seasons, license limitation). This has been recognized in 
the Law of the Sea discussions. The first two paragraphs 
of  Article  61  of  the  Informal  Composite Negotiating 
Text (ICNT)  dealing with  the  Conservation of  Living 
Resources read: 
"1. The coastal state shall determine the allowable 
catch of the livhg resources in its exclusive economic 
zone. 
2. The coastal state, taking into account the best 
scientific evidence available to  it, shall ensure through 
proper conservation and management measures that 
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive 
economic zone is not endangered by overexploitation. 
As  appropriate,  the coastal state and relevant subre- 
gional, regional and global  organizations shall  coop- 
erate to  this end." 
The  probkms  that  immediately  arise  are  the  prin- 
ciples that  should be used in determining the allowable 
catch  and  the  coordination  of allowable catches from 
stocks  occurring in  the  area of jurisdiction  of two or 
more coastal states. 
The approach to  solve the first problem is undoubtedly 
related to the national objectives in f&ery  programs of 
a  particular  coastal state.  In  general,  these  objectives 
have been expressed in rather vague but inspiring phrases The Allocation of  Scad# and ~ackerels/7 
such as "conservation and rational utilization" or "main- 
tenance of optimum yield."  The term "optimum yield" 
has recently become popular. This has the virtue of being 
obscure. Everyone  is  in  favor  of optimizing the yield. 
The only question is, whom optimum, in the face of a 
multitude of conflicting interests? In the case of whales, 
where the~e  are different groups concerned with resource 
management  having  conflicting  interests,  the  New 
Management  Policy  of the International Whaling Com- 
mission spells out precisely what level of catch should be 
allowed in accordance with the current state of the stock 
and the magnitude of the sustainable yield from it. Thls 
approach is  useful for such a group. However, the rigid 
and  precise  formula  for  setting catch quotas leads to 
difficulties when there is a change in objectives or when 
it is not matched by equally precise and reliable knowl- 
edge of the stocks. The latter case becomes more serious 
when  stock abundance changes considerably from year 
to year as in the case of mackerels, as mentioned earlier. 
In  any  case,  a country in any given  situation must 
choose  a  balance  between  the various  aspects of  the 
f&ery.  Different criteria will result in different levels of 
fishing being considered optimum. For example, although 
it is well known that the level of effort giving the maxi- 
mum  sustainable yield (MSY)  Is higher than that giving 
aet economic return (NEY), from the point of view  of 
employment, a greater amount of fishing may be  desir- 
able  if  the  fishery  has already  developed in  order to 
reduce a surplus of fishermen who will need resettlement. 
It is therefore impossible to determine some unique level 
of fishing that will best provide the "optimum"  under all 
conditions. 
Given the objectives and principles, howeiter, deter- 
mination  of  the  allowable  catch  requires  scientific 
research  which  in  turn  requires adequate support and 
well  planned  programs extending over several years. A 
number of recommendations for the study of  scads and 
mackerels in Southeast Asia  were  made by the Penang 
Workshop  (SCSP  1978).  The  participating  countries 
were requested to undertake such studies to ensure pro- 
per management of these resources in their jurisdiction 
as outlined in Articles 61  and 62  of the ICNT (UN 1978). 
The problems on international allocation and control 
raised  by  the  mixed  nature  of  the  stocks and  their 
variable pattern of exploitation and migration are more 
complicated. Article 63 of the ICNT gives th~  following 
condtions: 
"1. When  the  same  stock or stocks of  associated 
species occur within,  the  exclusive economic zones of 
two  or more  coastal states, these  states shall seek 
either  directly  or  through  appropriate subregional 
or regional organizations to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation 
and development of  such stock without prejudice to 
other provisions of this Part of the present Convention. 
2. Where  the same  stock or stocks of  associated 
species occur both within the exclusive economic zone 
and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the 
coastal state and the states fishing for such stocks in 
the adjacent area shall seek either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional  organizations to 
agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation 
of these stocks in the adjacent area." 
It is apparent that when a stock occurs in more than 
one  area  of  national jurisdiction, negotiation between 
the  countries cobmed is  required to reach an  agree- 
ment on the shares to be taken by each country. In the 
past, the general method of allocating national "quotas" 
has  involved  some  "horse  trading"  strategies but  was 
based  largely  on  "historical  rights"  with  some  extra- 
allowance for coastal states. Historical rights are generally 
calculated as some weighted average of the catch over a 
period of-time. For example, in 1972 the International 
Cornrniauon  for  the  Northwestern  Atlantic  Fisheries 
reacted  very  quickly  to the  available  scientific  data 
showing the weakening of the stock position of many 
commercial  fisheries  in  the  northwestern  Atlantic.  It 
obtained  agreement  among member  states for  quotas 
for  certain  fish  stocks in  certain  areas,  together with 
agreement on a formula as to how these quotas should 
be  operated  country  by  country.  This  4040-10-10 
formula  allocated 40% of overall catch to be allocated 
in  proportion io catches made  over the last 3 yr, 40% 
to catches  over  the  last  10 yr,  10%  preference  for 
coastal states, and  10% for special needs (Scott  1973). 
At present, however, the new situation is quite different 
because  property rights are at issue rather than just  an 
allowed  catch level  for  1 yr. There  are numerous ob- 
jections  to basing property rights simply on  the distri- 
bution of  catch over the past  10 yr, and in many cases 
the  distribution  corresponding to the  new  exclusive 
economic  zones  is  not  known  (Brander  1978).  How- 
ever,  since  exploitation of  a shared stock in one part 
of its area affects the whole stock, coastal states cannot 
regulate  these  stocks  independently.  There  must  be 
common  arrangements  for  TACs  and  other  conser- 
vation  measures  before  allocation  among  the  coastal 
states  involved.  The  negotiations  among  the  states 
concerned could  take  into  account the joint  interests 
of the countries other than fisheries. The fishery aspects 
could include matters of trade, technical assistance, and 
cooperation, etc., and the relative importance of fmheries 
in different national economies as well as the narrower 
fields of  the MI  themselves and  their capture. Among 
the latter, obvious considerations would be the patterns 
of the fish  in all stages of their life history and the pro- 
portions of the total catches taken by fishermen of each 
country or taken withh-each  national jurisdiction. With 
such a range  of possible  factors for consideration, it is Bltpw of the Sea Workshop 
unokely that any single formula or principle can be used 
in determining allocation in all situations. Similarly, it is 
unvkely that the allocation of any given stock will remain 
coqstant. 
In the i~itial  years of any agreement, it is likely that 
allocation  will  be  largely  based  on  historical  catches 
since this will require the least adjustment by individual 
countries.  The argument that allocation, particularly in 
terms of property rights, should be based on average dis- 
tribution of the biomass of a stock through its life history 
is  a sound but rather difficult one to adopt because of 
lack of information. 
For areas in which little is  known  about the  distri- 
bution of the stocks, such as scads and mackerels dis- 
cussed at present,it may be possible as a first step to base 
allocation on existing data and to adjust it as more infor- 
mation  becomes available. No  allocation should ever be 
regarded  as  fud and, provided the institutional frame- 
work exists for making adjustments, this should not have 
adverse effects on the overall management of  the stocks. 
When  other  factors  become  important, particularly  if 
there are changes in the general pattern of fishing such as 
starting fishing on the feeding grounds for smaller fish, 
the allocation should be adjusted accordingly. 
Once the coastal states have divided up the TAC of a 
particular  stock among themselves, each should be  free 
to allocate those rights (catch quota) among its own fish- 
ermen or to trade them off for reciprocal fishing rights, 
license fees, or other quid pro quo with third countries. 
In practice, this tnakes zone quotas almost inevitable for 
a  shared  stock.  Historic  rights may  play  some part in 
negotiations with third countries, but these will be phased 
out very rapidly unless there is some trade-off. This prob- 
lem is leading to very rapid contraction of distant-water 
fishing fleets in the Northeast Atlantic (Brander  1978). 
With  these developments, the pattern of fishing will 
change much more rapidly and drastically than it other- 
wise  would. The  distribution of  fishing may be  altered 
by the introduction  of zone  quotas and thus  result in 
lower yields because more young fish are being caught. 
The  pattern  of  fishing by  distant water  fleets may  in 
some  circumstances lead  to higher yields than  can  be 
obtained  by  local effort because  they  can  move in  to 
heavily harvest good yearclasses close to their optimum 
size  (Pope  1973).  If  the  stocks  in  a  particular  area 
become depleted, then distant water fleets can move on 
to other areas to allow the stocks to recover. Local fleets 
with no alternative livelihood may have to go on fishing 
and further deplete the stocks. Thus, where such areas are 
small  add there are marked seasonal movements of  fish 
between jurisdictions, probably in the case of mackerels 
in  the  northern  part  of  Malacca  Strait  and along the 
eastern  coast  of  the  Gulf of Thailand,  therc  could  be 
advantages  the fishermen being able to  follow the fish 
wherever  they go, thus providing a more regular supply 
(Acmar  1978). 
On the other hand, examples from cod fisheries in the 
northeastern Atlantic indicate that with total quota sys- 
tem, some stocks might be underexploited while others 
might  be  overfiahed.  Gulland  (1968)  once  suggested 
closed  season  schemes on the  overfhed stock to en- 
courage fishing on the other. To compensate for a coun- 
try's  disadvantage in  not being able to switch its effort 
from area to  area, that country may have its share of the 
total  quota assigned  to a particular  area or stock; in 
retuni for an  agreement not to fish another stock, the 
country's  vessels  would  not  be  bound  by  the  closed 
season. In this respect, the closed season concept would 
apply only to distant  water fleets while smaller vessels 
would be licensed to  fish in only one area. 'This proposed 
scheme  seems to provide  enough flexibility to achieve 
consid~ably  better management of several stocks than 
would be achieved by the total quota system or TACs. 
Finally, the consequent problem of control will be a 
critical one in both international  and national negotia- 
tions  for  allocation  of  shared resources.  Each  coastal 
state will want to ensure that the regulations are followed. 
Unless  credible  control  measures such  as  uniform  en- 
forcement  of  mesh  sizes,  observance of  bycatch regu- 
lations,  and  accurate  and  timely  reporting  of  catc4 
statistics are instituted by all countries concerned, there 
is little hope  of avoiding zone quotas and further con- 
flicts over shared stocks in most areas. 
It is apparent that cooperation between countries is 
essential  when  stocks  cross  boundaries  of  national 
jurisdiction. The forms of cooperation depend upon the, 
magnitude  of  the  problems.  In  many  cases, bilateral 
agreements  for  technical  cooperation in  fisheries, e.g., 
agreement between Thailand and Malaysia  could provide 
a  basis  for  both  joint  research  and  negotiations  for 
exploitation and management of the shared stocks. For 
the intra- or interregional level, the existing organizations 
in the region should cooperate with the coastal states to 
ensure proper utilization of these resources, particularly 
those in the exclusive economic zones. As  pointed recent- 
ly by Bell (1977), the net benefit arising from the advent 
of  extended  national jurisdiction  may  be  very  small, 
taking into account  the potentially  enormous costs of 
effectively managing and enforcing a 200-mi limit and 
the benefits to the country which are likely to ensure. 
The  only way  to reduce costs is  to raise  the level  of 
cooperation of both international and local industries. 
In  conclusion, I strongly believe that, without accu- 
rate  information  on the  status  of  scad  and  mackerel 
stocks in this region  and  with the lack of management 
mechanism at the regional level, it is unlikely that the Ths  Allownfon of  Scads and ~ackerelslg 
coastal states in  the area will  be able to come to agree- 
ment  on  the  TACs  and  the  principle of  allocation of 
these resources at  present.  Nevertheless, the  need  for 
cooperation and negotiation will become more apparent 
due  to the  effects of  the  extended jurisdiction in the 
region.  As  predicted  by  Valencia  (1978)  recently, the 
wriousness  of  the  political  implications mlght force a 
wries  of  bilateral  or  multilateral  apeemants as  these 
effects  become  increasingly  obvious,  and  finally  an 
establishment  of  an  ''umbrella"  organization  for  the 
resolution  of  all  fisheries/resources  management prol- 
lems in the region involving two or more countries. 
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Introduction 
This paper discusses some facts about tuna fisheries in 
the Philippines in particular and in the Southwest Pacific 
in general, and some ideas on their allocation. It does not 
necessarily  express the views  of the Philippine Govern- 
ment but is written  simply to provide sufficient infor- 
mation  as basis for discussion in the "Workshop on the 
Law of the Sea:  Problems of Conflict and Management 
of Fisheries in Southeast Asia." 
Tunas are  highly  migratory  species  and  are  thus a 
common property  resource which, under the common 
property characteristic of fishery resources, are available 
and accessible to  everyone. They are, therefore, of interest 
not only to the Filipino people but also to the peoples 
of the rest of the world. The upward trend of the world 
tuna prices has spurred interest in tuna exploitation in 
the tropical western Pacific waters among the Southeast 
Asian countries, the distant Asian countries like Japan 
and  Russia,  and countries in the southwestern Pacific 
especially Papua New Guinea and Australia. 
The results of studies on  tuna research and exploration 
more pr less indicate that the tuna resource of the Philip- 
pines ,is part  and parcel of the Western Pacific stocks. 
Such indication, although not fully confirmed, is strongly 
supported by the fact that the Philippines, being situated 
in the Southwest Pacific, is within the migratory path of 
these pelagic fishes which swim from the southern equa- 
torial waters on their  way  to the North China Sea and 
the North Pacific Ocean. 
In the latter part  of the  19409, after World War  11, 
tuna research and exploration was  given a high priority 
by the Philippine Fishery Program of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service as part of a policy to examine the possi- 
bility of expanding the existing tuna fishery of the coun- 
try  which was  established by  the Japanese before  and 
during the war, Today, tuna research and development is 
again  among the priorities, being one of the important 
fisheries research projects of the Philippine Government. 
It is  thus interesting to note that tunas have assumed a 
position  of  major  importance  in  Philippine  fisheries 
research since a fishery development program was intro- 
duced  in the  country. With  tuna  research  among the 
priorities for a long period of time, the Philippine tuna 
fishery might have been expected to have been developed 
by  now.  Yet, paradoxically, the  fishery  is  still  being 
developed in  the  country. It may be  added that tuna 
research and exploration/development will always be  a 
priority in Philippine fisheries. 
Occurrence and Distribution ofTuna 
and Tuna-like Fishes from Philippine Waters 
There are  21  species of tuna and tuna-like fishes re- 
corded to occur in  Philippine waters (Herre  1953). Of 
these, five are the basis of the tuna fishery in the country. 
These are yellowfln (T'hunnus albacmes), skipjack (Katsu- 
wonus pelamis), bigeye (i"hunnus obesus),  yaito or east- 
ern little tuna (Euthynnus  ydto), and frigate tuna (Auxis 
thazard). The  first two species are the most important 
not only because  they  are most  common  but also be- 
cause  they  command  a  high  export value-being  the 
species of tuna most suitable for canning-and  they occur 
regularly in Philippine waters. The last three species are 
used  only  for  local consumption,  as  they  are neither 
suitable for export, nor as important and common as the 
yellowfin and skipjack. 
Other tuna and tuna-like species not of  equal impor- 
tance  as  those  already  mentioned  include Euthynnus 
affnh (black  skipjack; also  called eastern Little tuna), The Allocation 0.f Tuna Fiisheries I I 1 
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Fig. 1. Esthated range of tuna distribution (Saila and Norton  1974). 
Thunnus orientalis (black tuna), T. ton&  (blackfm or 
scaly  tuna),  T. alalunga (albacore), Auxis  tapeinosoma 
(frigate tuna), and Gymnosardanudn (dog-toothed tuna). 
Tunas  are  widely  distributed  throughout  the Indo- 
Pacific Region as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the 
tuna spawning areas in the Philippines. Tunas occur in 
most months of the year in almost all fishing areas; more 
often, however, in  the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea, both 
considered the most productive tuna areas. According to 
Sirnpson and Ghikuni (1976)  the Moro Gulf and, to a 
lesser extent, the Sulu Sea appear to be the nursery areas 
for skipjack and yellowfm and both species move through 
the Sulu Sea where they spend about another year. 
Larvae of tuna and tuna-like fishes have been recorded 
to be found in the archipelagic and territorial waters of 
the Philippines. Figure 3 shows the larval distribution of 
yellowfin, skipjack, yaito, and frigate tuna. 
Schaefer and others (1963) maintain that the yellowfm 
tuna (T.  albacmes) occurs in all warm seas of the world 
except  the  Mediterranean.  It occurs principally in the 
South Equatorial Current (Kamirnura and Honma 1963). 
In the Philippines this species is caught throughout the 
year in many deep fiahinggrounds,  especially by handline 
around Mindanao, Antique, off Darnortis, and in deeper 
waters  off Western Luzon. During the months  of Jan- 
uary  and  February,  it is  found  in  Davao  Gulf, Sulu 
Sea,  western  Palawan  waters,  Celebes  Sea, and in the 
waters north of Papua New Guinea.  In March it is caught 
in  the waters  of  Luzon and  Mindoro  Islands, east of 
Surigao, Moro  Gulf,  Celebes Sea, and in  the northern 
waters of New Guinea. In April the yellowfin is found m 
the  eastern  waters  of  the  country, especially  east  of 
Surigao and Samar, and in  most archipelagic waters. It 
is most  abundant in the northern waters of Papua New 
Guinea.  It  reappears in  Celebes Sea  and in  the waters 
northwest of Luzon in June, and is caught in commercial 
quantities during the month of July in eastern Visayan 
waters,  southern  Mindanao,  Celebes  Sea,  and  in  the 
waters northeast  of  Papua New  ~uinka.  During August 
and September yellowfin is caught in the southern and 
eastern Mindanao waters; it is reported to occur in the 
same area, as well as in Panay Gulf and Sulu Sea in Octo- 
ber.  In  November  and  December  this  species can  be 
found throughout  the country's  territorial waters espe- 
cially in Moro Gulf, Sulu Sea, and Celebes Sea. 
The skipjack tuna (K.  pelmnis) is  also widely distrib- 
uted, extending from the Trust Territories west through 
the  Philippines  and  Indonesia.  This  species  is  found 
everywhere throughout  this vast area, although it tends 
to congregate around the island groups where more food 
is presumably available. Within the Philippine territorial 
waters, it  is  found  throughout  the  year  in  all  fishing 
areas  where  yellowfin tuna occurs. Until recently, the 
skipjack tuna has been caught in lesser abundance than 
the  yellowfin,  although  statistical records  reveal  that 
of this species from the municipal fisheries is 
far greater than that of the yellowfm. 
The bigeye  tuna (T. obesus) is most abundant in the 
North Equatorial Current (Karmmura and Honrna 1963). 12/~uw  of  the Sea Workshop 
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It is often caught and identified with the yellowfin. It is 
rarely separated from the yellowfin, thus, bigeye catches, 
although small in quantity  are often recorded as yellow- 
fin catches. This species is found in many fishing areas 
throughout the Philippines. 
The yaito or eastern little tuna(E. ym'to) is distributed 
mainly  in  the  Western  Pacific, west  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands, through Indonesian waters.  Its distribution ex- 
tends  from  the  middle  of  Japan  through Taiwan, the 
coast of Vietnam and the Philippines, and as far as Aus- 
tralia (Kikawa et al.  1963). This species is caught in all 
fishing grounds of the Philippines especially during the 
northeast monsoon season (October to April). 
Uchida  (1963),  citing Rosa  (1950),  states that the 
frigate tuna  (A.  thazard) is  distributed  widely  in  the 
Pacific Ocean as far north as the Sea of Japan and as far 
muah as Tasmania. It is caught in commercial quantities 
*\  in  Philippine coastal waters, mostly in bays  and gulfs, 
from October through May. 
The rest of the 21 tuna and tuna-like species are rather 
restricted  in  range,  and  are  not  found  abundantly  in 
Philippine waters. 
Tuna Life History 
Tunas areheterosexual and fertilization takes place in 
the water. 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, tunas spawn throughout 
the Philippine waters the year round as reported by Wade 
(1950). Yaito or eastern little tuna seems to  have a year- 
roynd spawning period in the Philippines;  skipjack spawns 
throughout  the year,  with  the  peak  occurring during 
April, May, June, and July; and yellowfm spawns over a 
considerable period with most intensive spawning during 
May, June, July,,  and August. 
Larval stages of  tuna have' been taken from nearly all 
tropical waters of the Pacific Ocean, including the Philip- 
pine waters from which tuna larvae were taken to  deter- 
mine  the seasonal distribution of tuna species as shown 
in  Figure  3  (Wade  1951). Tuna larvae, according to 
Schaefer and others (1963),  are  found scattered in the 
surface layer above the $ennocline  and they drift, in 
their earlier stages, with thb ocean currents. 
As  to the feeding hab$s  of tunas, Ronquillo (19f3) 
shows that fishes belonging to 51 families mostly  per- 
comorphs  and nonedible,  plectognaths,  and  larvae  of 
stomatopods and squids comprise the food of yellowfin 
and skipjack. In another study based on the analysis of 
stomach contents of yellowfin, bigeye, and a few albacore 
tuna, it was reported that one-third of the food consists 
of  fish, one-third  mollusks especially squids, and one- 
third crustacean decapods. 
Tuna Reduction and Size Composition 
The country's  fishing areas are grouped into regions, 
(Fig. 4) based primarily on the idea that fipheries rnanage- 
ment is easier done through regionalization. In addition, 
catches from the different fishing grounds within a par- 
ticular region are no longer landed outside that region, 
thereby facilitating statistics collection. 
Table  1 shows the total production of the first  10 
fishing grounds based upon the 10-yr fisheries statistical 
records  of  commercial  catches  of  yellowfm,  skipjack, 
yaito, and frigate tuna. On the whole, Sulu Sea gives the 
highest yield. 
Philippine fisheries statistics records also sho,w that a 
total of 58,830 t of frozen tuna were exported from 1969 
to 1977, and 495 t of canned tunain 1975 through 1977 
(Table 2). 
Tuna production  by the different countries included 
\ 
Table 1. Total production of the Philippines' 10 leading tuna fishing grounds from 1966 to 1975. Data are from Fisheries Statistics of 
the Philippines, 1966-1975. 
Yellowfin  Skipjack  Yaito Tuna  Frigate TUW 
Fishing Ground  (Thunnus)  (Katsuwonus)  (Euthynnus)  (Auxis)  Total 
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dbtsd  dy  thm atfth d  of tuna catch within the period 1966-1975 as shown in Tables 
1 to53 in FA0  statistical area No. 71, including the Philippines, 
from 1973 to 1976 is shown in Tables 3 to 5 for yellow- 
An,  skipjack, and little tuna (Euthynnus), respectively. 
The  tables suggest that tuna are caught mostly in  the 
archipelagic  and  territorial  waters  of  the  Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Papua New  Guinea. Table 3 shows that 
the aggregate yellowfin catch for the years 1973-1976  is 
much more than the total catch of yellowh for 1966- 
1975. This h so  because, although Table 1 shows  catch 
data  for  a  10-yr period, the records include only the 
catch data from 10 fishing grounds and these data come 
only from the commercial fisheries. On the other hand, 
Table  3  includes catch data, both  from the municipal 
and  cornmercid  fisheries,  as  estimated  with  a  raising 
factor by FAO. 
Figures S and 6 show the annual catches of yellowftn 
and  skipjack, respectively, from  1965 to 1975. About 
60,000 t of yellorfm were caught in 1975 alone (Fig. 5) 
(SCS/GEN/77/11).  ?l%is is probably due to the fact that 
". .  .  considerable quantities of the catch being  sold at 
sea to carriers and unknown quantities to some foreign 
freezer boats in addition to the known catch bought by 
others. . ." may not have been included h  the PMippine 
fisheries statistics. Although the catch of skipjack from 
the  municipal  fderies is  much  greater  than  that  of 
yellowfin, the total annual catches of both species suggest 
that yellowfin is more abundant than skipjack. 
As  to the size composition of tuna species caught in 
Rdippine waters, Wade (1950) shows that skipjack tuna 
is caught at a size ranging from 340 mrn to 650 mm (Fig. 
7); yellowfin, at 350 mrn to 830 mm (Fig. 8); and yaito 
tuna, at a size ranging from 280 mm  to 670 mm (Fig. 9). 
Awre 10 shows the length-frequency distribution of 
skipjack caught by troll line based on the S.F. lWd and 
Tfl. Gill cruises from 1947  to 1949.  The size distributions 
of the yaito tuna (Fig.  11) and that of skipjack show 
marked similarity, i-e., the range of length for skipjack is 
from 350  mrn  to 660 mm,  while  for yaito tuna, it is 
between 350 mm  and 685 mm,  indicating the Wadty 
of the size of thew flah available to the troll fishery. 
In 1960 the M/V Makmrgui  of the Bureau  of Fish- 
erh  made three Iondine fishing cruises in  the southern 
waters  of  the  Philippines.  Tbe greatest  catches were 
made  in  Webes Sea, Moro  Gulf, and the waters near 
hadm Island. Dwing the first cruise (March to April), 
the yellowfins taken had an average weight of 39.04 kg 
and  were  heavier  than  the  higeyas  (T. obesus) which 
averaged $8.83 kg. 
Between 1975 and 1976, tuna fishing operations were 
conducted ia Philippine waters by FA0 chartered Cana- 
dian  purse seine vessels Royal  Yen-  and Southlwrd 
Ho.  In nine trips made by the Royal  Venture and six by 
Southwwd Ho, 975 t of fiah were caught, of which 742- 
Table 2. Philippine exporta of tuna  from 1969 to 1977. Data arc. 
from Firherim Statlstlcn of  the F'hUippinw,  1969-1977. 
Frozen tuna  Canned tuna 
Year  Quantity (mt)  Value (Peso) Quantity (mt)Value (Pam) 
Total  58,990 
-.  - 
Table  3.  YellowfJn tuna production in metric tons by different 
countries from  1973  to 1976 in FA0  Region  # 71. Data are 
.from Year Book of Fishery Statistics, FAO, Vol. 42. 
Country  Area  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Fiji  7 1  0  12  11  74 
Gilbert lsland  7 1  0  25F  25  25F 
Kom  71  -,  -  259  3,664 
PapuaNewGulnea  71  1,420  1,420  1,743  8,556 
PMippinea  71  14,900  25,271  21,830' 29,568 
Table 4.  Skipjack production in metric tom by different coun- 
tries from  1973 to 1976 in FA0 Region  # 71. Data are  from 
Year Book of Fiahexy Statistic& FAO, Vol. 42. 
Country  Area  1973  1974  1975  1976 
. -  -.  -  -. 
F@  71  100  7  1  80  510 
Gflbrt Island  7  1  -  2OOF  200  200F 
Indonesia  71  22,300  23,613  23,316  24,488 
Papua New Guinaa  71  28,500  40,350  15,884  24,379 
Philippines  71  3.200  6.057  6,998  223% 
Singapore  7  1  0  0  0  4 
Ta'blc 5.  tuna production in metric tons by ditTerent mun- 
tpims from  1973 to 1976 In FA0 Region  # 71. Data are  from 
Year Book of Ellrheiq  Statistics, FAO, Vol. 42. 
Country  Area  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Indonda  71  31.600  38.507  39,625  41,616 
Malaysia  71  4.600  7,427  6,486  6.293 
Malaysia (Sarawak)  71  400  708  1,477  1,517 
PapuaNew Gulnea  71  250F  250  30  l!M 
71  24,000  11,315  12,013  9P47  - The Allocation of Tuna  ~islrcries/  1  7 
-  YEARS- 
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Fig. 6. Annual catch of skipjack  tuna,  1965-1975 (SCS/GEN/~~/~~). 181hw  of  the Sea Workshop 
Fig. 7. Length-frequency  dhtribution  of  akipjack (K.  pelomis) taken in Philippine waters from October 
1947 through November 1948 (Wade 1950). 
I 
Fig. 8.  Length-frequency distribution of yellowfln  (T.  albam8) taken  in  Philippine waters  from 
October 1947  through  November  1948  Wade 1950). 
IUTERNbTlONU  CFNTER  Fm  LlVlM 
AQUATIC  RES9 JRCES  MAFMGEMLIYT 
LI  BI1ARY Fig.  9. Length-frequency distribution of Euthynnus yaito  taken in  Philippine waters from  October 
1947 through November 1948 Wade 1950). 
Fig. 10. Length-ftcquency distriiution of skipjack (Katsuwnus pehmis) taken by trolling in PhUppjne. 
waters by S.F. Baid and TN.  GUl, 1947-1949 (After Ronquillo 1963). 2OILuw of  the Sea Workshop 
Fig.  11. Length-freque~lcy  distribution of Euthynnus yoito taken by trolling in Philippine waters by 
S.F. Baird and T.N. Gill, 1947-1949 (Aftcr Ronquillo 1963). 
t  were  skipjack (K. pelamis) and 133 t were bigeye (T. 
obesus). The shpjacks caught in Moro Gulf were almost 
all 40 to 60 cm  (Fig.  12). Between May and October, 
few  smaller  skipjacks ranging  from 25 to 40  cm were 
caught.  In  Sulu Sea  larger skipjacks (over 55 cm) were 
more abundant than in Moro Gulf. 
Most  of  the yellowfins caught were 60 cm (4.5 kg), 
although a few of larger sizes up to 110  cm (27 kg) were 
caught  during  some  of  the  trips.  The  percentage  size 
composition of the yellowfin catch is shown in Figure 13 
where the rather similar sizes are seen. 
Albacore tuna (Thunta  alalunga) was caught in Moro 
Gulf  only  once when the catch of 5 t comprised about 
equal weights of this species and skipjack. Frigate tuna 
was often caught and occasionally in large quantities, but 
the size? were  smaller, ranging  from 30 to 50 cni  and 
from 0.5 to 2.4 kg (Sinipson and Chikuni  1976). 
In the  southern watcrs of  the Philippines, yellowfin 
tuna is cm&t  at an average size ranging from 54 cm to 
87 cm mean length, depending upon the time of the year 
(Table 6), while in the western side (near Palawan),  the 
size ranges from 55 to 122 cm total length or from 3.5 
to 10.5 kg (Table 7). 
Tuna Fishing Methods 
The main  tuna fisheries of the world are carried out 
by means ot longline, purse seine, and pole-and-line or 
live-bait fishing.  Longline and pole-and-line were intro- 
duced in the Philippines before World War 11,  while purse 
seine came during the middle part of 1956. 
The  longhe gear consists of exceedingly long lines 
with baited hooks which are suspended below the surface 
by means of buoys and Lines.  It is  often used in deep 
waters and tends to catch the older, larger, nonschooli~g, 
subsurface swimming tunas. 
The purse seine is a very long and deep sheet of netting 
with floats along one side and weights along the other. It 22/~aw  of  the Sen Workshop 
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Fig.  13. Length cornpodtion of the catch of  yellowfm tuna, 1975-76 (Royal Venture and Southward 
Ho)  (Simpson and Chikuni 1976). The Allocation of TUM  Fisheriesl23 
Table 6.  Averag~  she of yellowfin tuna in the southern part  of 
the Philippin=.  Fish were measured at markets by Regional per- 
sonnel. 
Mcan Length No. of specimens 
Area  Date  (m)  measured 
Bohol Sea  November 1977  75.7  2  1 
December  87.2  18 
February 1978  74.4  18 
March  64.25  20 
June  53.6  21 
Surigao waters  December 1977  68.0  10 
South Cotabato 
(awmed to come 
from Davao and 
Sarangani Gulfs)  June  1978  77.1  57 
- 
Table 7. Sizes of tuna caught in Paw  Island, Western Palawan 
(South China Sea). 
- 
Yellowfm  Bigeye  Eastern little tuna 
Total  Total  Total 
Date  Length  Weight  Length  Weight  Length  Weight 
(cm)  (kg)  (cm)  (kg)  (cm)  (kg) 
August 1976  80  9.5  80  7.5  35  1  .O 
83  11.0  42  1.5 
46  2.0 
51  2.5 
September  55  3.5  77  6.5  43  1  .S 
57  3.5 
58  3.5 
61  4.0 
October  -  -  -  30  0.5 
November  86  4.0  -  -  -  - 
122  10.5 
December  60  4.0  -  -  -  - 
64  4.0 
is set around schools of fuh at the surface in such a way 
that the net hangs down from the surface in the form of 
a cylinder. The bottom of the cylinder is then "pursed" 
by  a cable drawn through rings attached to the bottom 
of the net. Unlike the longline, the purse seine tends to 
catch the younger, smaller, schooling, surface-swimming 
tunas. Purse seine fishing in the Philippines, based on the 
California technique  of  fishing,  is  starting to develop 
successfully. 
The pole-and-line gear consists of a bamboo pole and 
line,  a  leader,  and  a barbless hook to which  a bait  is 
attached. The number of pole-and-line gear carried by a 
fishing boat depends upon the number of fishermen. The 
pole-and-line method, also called live-bait fishing, involves 
locating a tuna school, chumming(or throwing overboard 
mall live bait fishes)-and spraying, and hoolung. In the 
Philippines, live-bait fishing has yet to be developed for 
lack of  appropriate bait fishes. 
Other  fishing  methods  employed  in  catching  tuna 
include the  use  of  the different types of  gear, such as 
troll, handline, ring net, Otoshi-arni, and fish corral which 
are used to catch tunas that frequent coastal waters. In 
the Philippines  tunas are taken largely by smaller vessels 
(dugouts) in  deep but close-to-shore waters at night with 
lights by handline and by troll fishing. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the different types of gear and 
the percentages of yellowfin and skipjack tuna cabght by 
these gear within the Sulu Sea-Bohol Sea-Moro Gulf area. 
(Before  the  creation  of  Region  XII,  sometime  in  the 
latter part  of  1975, Moro Gulf was still part of Region 
XI. This explains why this fishing ground is included in 
these  table's as part of Region  XI instead of IX.)  Hand- 
lines  and  experimental  longlines  are  used  in  catching 
large yellowfins in the southern waters of the Philippines. 
In  the  waters near  Basilan  Island, deepwater  traps are 
used  to catch yellowfin during November  to May, and 
skipjack throughout the year. 
Generally, skipjack tuna  fishing in the Philippines is 
carried out within  the internal (archipelagic) waters by 
artisanal (sustenance) fishermen. 
Tuna Fisheries in Other Countries 
The Eastern Pacific fishery consists of young skipjacks 
which  are probably part  of  the Central Pacific stocks, 
whereas the Japan-Papua New  Guinea fisheries are prob- 
ably supplied by one or more Western Pacific subpopu- 
lations. 
Table  10 shows the annual catch of skipjack in the 
Pacific  from  1970 to 1976 by  different  countries. In 
almost all  the years, Japan had the highest catch. 
The tuna fishery in Japan is carried out by longline and 
pole-and-line which  are the mah types of  fishing gear 
used  by  Japanese  fishermen  to catch  tuna,  especially 
yellowfin and skipjack. Other types of gear, such as purse 
seines, set nets, and trolling jobs are also used to catch 
yellowfin, but only in waters closely adjacent to Japan. 
The  Japanese have  developed  the  longline  method 
which catches largely yellowfin and bigeye tuna so well 
that Japan has been known as the most important tuna- 
producing country in the West  Pacific region. The Japa- 
nese  tuna  longtine  fishery  produces  about  3,200 mt 
annually from the South China Sea alone (Marr  1976). 
The fish come largely from the deepwater areas beyond 
the Sunda Shelf. 
The Japanese pole-and-line, with live bait or jig  as a 
lure  is used  for surface fishing in Japan coastal waters 
and the contiguous open-sea regions. This method catches 
largely  skipjack,  yellowfin,  albacore,  and  small-sized 24th~  of the Sea  Workshop 
Table 8. Percentage of yellowfin tuna caught by different types of gear. Data are from SCS  (1977). 
Region/fishing ground 
Geat  VI  VII  IX  IX  X  XI 
Antique  N%rm  Sulu Sea  Tawi-Tawf  Bohol Sea  Moro Gulf 
Haadlinebongline  50  50  93  94  50  25 
Purse sine  15  5  4  -  -  - 
Ring net  -  35  -  -  40  50 
Otoshhmi  15  .  -  -  -  -  - 
Fish corral  15 
-  -  1  10  10 
PoleandUne  -  -  2  1  -  10 
0  thers  3  5  -  -  -  5 
Table 9. Percentage of~kipjack  caught by different types of gear. Data are from SCS (1977). 
Region/fisNng gound 
IV  VI  VII  IX  IX  IX  X  XI 
Gear  Taytay  Antique  Negros  Sibuguey Bay  South-Sulu Sea  Tawi-Tawi  Bohol  Sea  Moro  Gulf 
& Badan 
Handline/longline  -  50  40  -  15  20  30 
Purse seine  100  15  10  -  -  -  -  - 
Ring  net  -  -  60  5 0  50  25  35  5 0 
Otoshi-mi  -  10  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Fish corral  -  20  15  -  30  60  15  10 
Pole-andhe  -  -  -  -  10  -  20  10 
Troll  -  -  5  -  10  -  10  7 
Others  -  -  10  10  -  -  -  - 
bigeye tuna. 
According  to  a  report  by  the  Far  Seas  Fisheries 
Research  Laboratory  (1978),  the  Japanese  annual 
yellowfrn  catch by longline in  the Pacific Ocean  used 
to be around 60,000 mt in the early 1960s. This amount 
markedly decreased andfluctuatedbetween about 40,000- 
50,000 mt in recent years. In spite of this decrease, the 
total catch of yellowfin by longline has remained roughly 
constant, around 60,000 rnt due to the increased catch 
by Korea and Taiwan. 
The Pacific bigeye  tuna has been harvested predom- 
inantly  by  longline principally by  the Japanese whose 
bigeye  catches,  according  to  the  preceding  report, 
accounted  for about 80% of  the  total bigeya  catch in 
recent years. 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have been fishing by 
longline within the territorial waters of the Philippines, 
and, possibly, Indonesia. Japan is reportedly fishing for 
tuna  under  permit  in  Indonesian waters.  Lately, joint 
ventures  have  been  formed  by  Japanese  firms in  the 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia. 
In Papua New Guinea, the tuna fishery is carried out 
by live bait  and pole-line boats. The species commonly 
obtained  by  this method is  skipjack. In  4 yr  the live- 
bait  fleet  of  this  country  has grown to 33 Okinawan 
vessels, with a 1973 catch estimated at 28,000 t (South 
Pacific Commission  1974). 
Little  tunas  (Euthynnus  and Awcis) are one of  the 
important fishes of Indonesia in the Malacca Strait. The 
catch  of  little  tunas  amounted  to  4,000  t  in  1973 
(Sujastani  1976). Skipjack is caught by Indonesian tuna 
fishing  vessels  only  in  the  northernmost  part  of  the 
Strait (Aceh), while eastern little tunas and frigate tunas 
are found in North Sumatra waters. 
Approximately  2,000  t  of  skipjack  are  produced 
annually by French Polynesia. This catch is taken by the 
skipjack fleet consisting of about 100 small vessels. 
The Solomon Islands have recently developed a joint 
venture skipjack fishery, with an estimated annud catch 
of 16,000 t. 
Hawaii's  skipjack fishery averages about 5,000 t per 
harvesting by approximately 15  live-bait boats. 
American Samoa has no existing commercial skipjack 
fishery due to inadequate supply of bait. The Allocation of Tuna Fisheriesl25 
Some Problems on  Tuna  Allokation and Management 
Tunas  are  wanderers  of  the  sea  and  they  migrate 
extensively. k such, they cornprim a fishery in which 
there is unlimited entry. Because tunas are a worldyide 
marine resource which is the property of any  nation, the 
question of "who should benefit from the fishery?" arises. 
The question per  se  is a great problem which generates 
several other problems of management and allocation of 
tuna catch. Unlimited entry into the fishery leads to great 
mobility of  tuna fleets and increases the dangers of tuna 
deple*n  on  a  worldwide  basis.  As shown by  Joseph 
(1973),  the rapid growth of the world tuna fleet would 
man (by  1984) be  above  that necessary to harvest the 
mrrximum sustainable yield (MSY)  of all species even if 
the growth rate were  to increase by only 31  annually, 
which  was less than  what  was  the  annual  worldwide 
mcrease.  Unless immediate global management is  done, 
there is  great danger of declining yields and significant 
losses to the world comdty  (Saila and Norton  1974). 
The  report  of  the  first  session  of  the  Indo-Pacific 
Fisheries Council (IPFC) Working Party  of  Experts on 
Central and Western Pacific Skipjack stated, among other 
things,  that  a significant proportion of  the total catch 
from the Philippines and Indonesia did not enter catch 
and effort  statistics, although  excellent  progress  was 
noted in  both  countries; that  there were no detectable 
effects of  effort on the skipjack fishery as  it is not so 
widespread; and that the stocks were exploited at a low- 
rate and  the magnitude of potential annual yield could 
not as yet be determined. 
The  Enter-American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission 
(IATTC)  found management by  overall catch quota to 
be a failure @ the eastern Pacific and the Western Atlantic 
because  it leads to excess capitalization. Joseph (1973) 
outlines the conditions of the tuna fishery in the eastern 
Pacific which have changed remarkably since 1966 when 
the  fleet increased nearly three times and competition 
increased so sharply that the open season for yellowfin 
fishing decreased from about 10 mo to less than 3. De- 
Table  10. Summary  of  catches (thousand tons) of  skipjack in the Pacific. Numbers in parentheses are based on  available statistics up  to 
1974, and estimation by the groups for 1975 and 1976. Data are from FA0  (1978a). 
country  Year 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Papua New Guinea  2  17  12  27  40  15  26 
Solomon  Ikds  0  5  8  6  10  7  17 
Japan,  southern  waters  53  79  80  107  196  120  144 
F'dau  8  2  3  5  7  6  I  Philipphw  0  21  27  17  (25)  29 
Indonesia  -  -  20  22  (23  24  (23 
Total (Area 71)  63  164  143  192  291  198  24 7 
Japan  home  islands 
(Area 6  1)  151  99  156  201  128  133  149 
china  1  1  1  2  (2)  (2)  (2) 
 TO^ West Pacitic 
(Areas 61,711  215  204 
I 
New  Zealad (Area 81)  -  -  -  -  -  1  5 
Taw  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Hawaii (Arsa 77)  3  6  5  5  3  3  4 
~PacifEcOcean  56  105  33  45  79  116  130 
Total Areas (77.81)  60  112  39  5  1  83  121  140 
--  -- 
Total  175  316  339  446  504  454  538 26th  of  the Sap  Workhop 
vcloping natiom  then maintained that  under  manage- 
ment system, their tuna fisheries could not develop and 
there was a strong pressure for increased special alloca- 
tions. This led to shift of flag vessels from nations with 
large fleets to nations with mall fleets, and problems of 
implementation and enforcement by member nations. 
Several  other  problems  relating  to  allocation  and 
management are encountered in the tuna fisheries in the 
Southeast Asian region.  Among these problems, which 
may  serve  as stumbling-blocks in reaching cooperative 
arrangements with other countries in the region, are: 
a)  The  absence  of  a  tuna  fishery in  some member 
states of the IPFC in the region and, at the same time, 
the rapid development of the skipjack fishery in the West 
Pacific, as in Papua New  Guinea, the Solomon Islands, 
and  other states which are not members of the IPFC. 
The fishery is very important only in Indonesia and the 
Philippines and almost absent in some states bordering 
the South China Sea region. While a fishery body, i.e., 
the  South  Pacific  Regional Organization  was  recently 
established in the West Pacific region by the South Pacific 
Forum at its 17th Session, it will take some time before 
activities  on  tuna  management can be  done in  collab- 
oration  with  Indonesia  and  the Philippines. There are 
provisions, however,  for  Southeast  Asian  countries to 
join this new international fishery body. 
b)  Tuna  fisheries in the Philippines and possibly  in 
Indonesia are well developed in the archipelagic  (internal) 
waters. Skipjack and yellowfin are the most important 
species  which  form  artisanal  (sustenance)  fisheries, 
although records  show  that  the catch from municipal 
fisheries are few as  they are often not  included in the 
commercial catch record. Any management arrangements 
made in  the  region which may affect these fisheries, as 
for instance limiting their expansion,  would ptobably frnd 
opposition from the local population. 
c)  Some  distant-water fishing states do not respect 
the  archipelagic and territorial waters of coastal states 
thereby  violating  the  national  laws  of  coastal states. 
This is indeed a deterrent to cooperative arrangements 
and, to some  extent,  these fishing  states might claim 
historic fishing rights in the waters of coastal states which 
the latter claim as illegal. 
d)  At  present,  very  little knowledge is available on 
the life history, migration, and stock identity of the tuna 
stocks in the Southeast Asian region. For instance, there 
are still gaps in the biology of eastern little tunas (Euthyn- 
nus spp.)  and frigate tunas (Auk spp.).  It is possible 
that these tuna species comprise a much larger resource 
than is reflected in the catch records. Concerted efforts 
should be  initiated by an international fuhery body to 
determine the extent of these fisheries in each country 
and the possible extent of mixing  of the stocks. Sufficient 
knowledge  on these aspects will undoubtedly serve as a 
basis on which cooperative arrangement could be formu- 
lated.  mewise,  there  is  very  limited  infonnation  on 
stock assessment of the most important market species 
of tuna in the region. Some new information is available 
from  nonmember:  states  of  the  IPFC,  such  as  Papua 
New Guinea. 
e)  It is a fact that the tuna stocks in the Philippines 
are scattered in small schools. This situation has brought 
about  some  overcapitalization  and  has  caused  some 
failure in the purse seine fishery, This is aggravated by 
the availability (as incentives were made readily available) 
of  smaller secondhand fishhg vessels from Japan which 
can readily be purchased. 
f)  There  is  very  limited  information  available  on 
catch-per-unit-effort and its relation to actual abundance 
and behavior which could be used to convince decision 
makers on how member states in the region may solve 
the  problem  of  allocation. Catch  and  effort  data  are 
poorly collected in some tuna-producing countries in the 
region.  In  the  Philippines especially, tunas  are  taken 
largely by  sustenance fishken using vessels of 3 t or 
less with catches not recorded in the commercial fishery 
statistics. As a whole, the importance of information on 
catch-per-unit-effort is still not very much appreciated 
by both tuna fishermen and fisheries officials. 
g)  As compared to other countries, there are very few 
fishery biologists who  are undertaking research on the 
tuna  resource in the region. This is true in spite of the 
fact that export  of  tunas, which are a good source of 
foreign  exchange, has  been  increasing for  some  time. 
There are other points of view which need to be con- 
sidered to  understand better the problems of tuna fuheries 
management in Southeast Asia.  These  can be kated in 
the form of questions  the answers to which could be used 
as basis for management arrangements: 
a)  Is there an intermingling of tuna populations, partic- 
ularly sldpjack, among those in Papua New Guinea, Palau 
Island, Indonesia, and the Philippines? 
b)  Does the tuna breeding area, particularly that of 
skipjack, as reported in the Philippines, extend through 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea? 
c)  How  far  north  do  tropical  tuna  populations (as 
those in the Philippines) migrate before they return to 
the tropics? While a tagging program is being undertaken 
in the West Pacific area (Papua New Guinea arid Solomon 
Islands),  should  it be  extended  to Indonesia  and  the 
Philippines? 
d)  Are  the northwestern Pacific populations related 
to those in the southern equatorial area? 
e)  Studies  on  blood  relationships of  skipjack  and 
 ello ow fin in the Western Pacific are now being done in 
Australia  Should they be  extended to include samples The Allocation of Tuna ~isheries/27 
from Indonesia and the Philippines? 
f)  Skipjack and  yellowfin are taken when .they are 
small (about 50 crn) by purse seine and fish traps oper- 
ated close to shore in the Philippines and possibly else- 
where in Southeast Asia. Studies ate needed to determine 
if catches of these species affect the overall fisheries in 
the area. As the fish are taken in internal waters, should 
ihtemational regulations, if ever set, affect these fisheries? 
Alternative Management Arrangements 
According to Saila and Norton (1974),  FA0  in 1971 
listed  the objectives of tuna management in  the Indo- 
Pacific region  as  set by the joint  meeting of PFC and 
IOFC (Indian  Ocean Fisheries Council). These include: 
a)  maintenance  of  tuna  stocks  at  levels  that  provide 
high  sustained yields; b)  conservation measures that do 
not interfere  with  development of unexploited  stocks; 
and c) measures which afford the opportunity for coun- 
tries  not  yet  participating  in tuna fishing to build up 
their  fishing industries. To make these objectives more 
rational, Saila and Norton added the following objectives: 
d)  improved  economic  efficiency  and  e)  appropriate 
distribution of the  benefits. Both  of them  realize  that 
the above objectives are in the long run necessary to pre- 
vent overfishing of the tuna resource. 
It  is - probable  that  decision  makers  in  Southeast 
Asia  would  act to attain  the last-mentioned objective, 
specifically on the distribution of benefits to tuna-fishing 
nations in the region including nonfishing nations through 
whose  waters the stocks swim. However, as no form of 
tuna management exists in Southeast Asia at the moment, 
member states of the IPFC may deem it wiser to take a 
wait-and-see  attitude  and  allow  such  revolutionary 
arrangements to be initiated first in other regions where 
some schemes ofmanagement have been set up for some 
time  and  where  depletion  of  tuna  stocks is presently 
observed. 
Several methods of limiting catch and effort and/or 
distributing  benefits  from the world tuna fisheries are 
also  listed in  Saila and Norton (1974).  These include: 
a)  overall  catch  quotas; b)  national  quotas; c)  direct 
effort limitation; and d) licensing and taxation. Likewise, 
various institutional arrangements for carrying out these 
techniques have been advanced. Examples of these are: 
a)  extended coastal jurisdiction on the economic zones 
of  coastal  states; b)  regional coastal authorities; c) re- 
gional  high  sea commissions; and d)  a global manage- 
ment  agency. Emphasis is made of the  fact that over- 
capitalization and economic waste are the major difficd- 
ties associated with the total catch quota; that without 
additional regulations, such as  national  catch quota or 
limitation on entry, the idea of total catch quota alone 
does not answer the need for a sound worldwide tuna 
management program. It is possible  that if  total catch 
quotas  were  set  up  in  the  Western  Pacific  without 
national  catch  quotas,  overcapitalization  would  set in 
quickly. 
According to the same source, if catching rights could 
be  allocated and be marketable, or at leask  transferable 
among nations, a shift of tuna harvesting to nations with 
lower capital cost could occur and thus improve economic 
efficiency ..Saila and Norton (1974) believe that an ade- 
quatecapacity among nations now actively fishing for tuna 
would soon be achieved and further addition to the world 
tuna  fleet  could  not  result  in  greater catches. Hence, 
effective management requires that  there  be  provisions 
for developing nations to enter into tuna fisheries and 
thus, methods must  be  developed  which will  allow for 
transferring efforts from existing fishing nations to the 
new  nations  where  tuna  resources could  be  harvested 
more economically. 
The IPFC should consider studies to determine what 
regulatory  techniques  would  be  most  beneficial  and 
acceptable to member states.  The  technique  of  setting 
up national quotas may be  one that is acceptable. How- 
ever, the total permissible yield, whjch should be divided 
among the relevant nations as their national quotas, has 
to be determined by the IPFC. These national quotas are 
not to be  exceeded by  participating nations  and these 
may be set by species and/or area. 
Saila and Norton (1974) further explain that national 
quotas could effectively maintain a high sustainable yield 
and at the same time prevent economically wasteful corn- 
petition among states. However, it could not prevent intra- 
state  competition; hence, resprictions by  limited  entry 
within each state should be made to  prevent overexploita- 
tion of the resources within each member state. Important 
questions which are raised by this approach are listed in 
the  same  source. Among these are:  a) how to initially 
distribute the quotas among nations; b) how to allow for 
new entrants to the fishery; and c) how to distribute the 
benefits among states other than those actively engaged 
in  the  fishery. The first two questions would take time 
to  settle  even  with  expert  assistance  from  the  IPFC. 
Moreover, the  solution  to the last  question  may  elicit 
objections  from  among  member  states  of  the  IPFC 
inasmuch as decision makers would doubt the rationality 
of such a decision as it is entirely new and unprecedented. 
Decision  makers  of  developing states  in  the region 
have first to see how the world community could benefit 
from  allocations of benefits accruing from a worldwide 
fishery, for example, from the whale fishery which is at 
the moment  availed of solely by Japanese and Russian 
nationals. Similar arrangements would probably not start 
in Southeast Asia, although they may start in the IATTC area  where  some  sort of  allocation has been enforced 
since  1966 (Kask  1969). 
Saila  and  Norton  (1974)  recommend that national 
quotas be  made marketable so that quotas can'become 
available to the most efficient or lowest cost producen. 
In  this way, developed nations like Japan and the U.S.A. 
may consider selling their quotas to countries with lower 
labor costs. This can also solve the problem of how to 
allow for new entrants of coastal states of the region to 
the Wery. 
On direct effort limitation, the same authors describe 
the method as less desirable than national quota tech- 
niques  because  so  far,  no  clear  definition of  fishing 
effort has been made  for tw  fishing. This is brought 
about especially by the different types of fishing methods 
used in the tuna fishery. Moreover, direct effort limitation 
tends to retard technological advances simply because, 
when  any technological improvement is made  to keep 
the effective  effort at  a  given  level,  the  management 
agency has to reduce the allowed effort with no real gain 
to the  vessel  owners.  Christy  (1973)  provides a more 
detailed discussion associated with restriction on direct 
fishing. 
Saila  and  Norton (1974)  noted that the above tech- 
niques are not appropriate to  yield adequate return for the 
tuna fishery revenue or rent which could be used for fman- 
cing the management agency or for payments to coastal 
states  for  allowing fishing in  their  own  jurisdictional 
waters.  This can  be  corrected through  1) a license  fee 
bawd on vessel ,size; 2)  a license fee that allows landing 
of a certain amount of fish;and 3) a direct tax on landings. 
These forms of taxation could hit  catch, because those 
unwilling to pay  the tax would not dare enter into the 
fishery. 
Mention is made by Saila and Norton (1974) of some 
very baskcomplex questions which need to  be considered. 
Among these  are:  1) Who  issues  and collects the fees 
(i.e.,  a  central management  agency, individual coastal 
states, or a combination of  these)?; 2) How are the li- 
censes to be allocated among fishing states?; and 3) Who 
will share in the revenue that is to be collected? 
It is  important that a regional management  agency 
set up the rate of the fees and that the same be applied 
within and beyond national jurisdiction. This is reason- 
able, for if it were otherwise, each state might attempt 
to attract more and more effort by lowering its rate and 
be used  by coastal states to generate short-term  revenues 
rather than conserving the tuna stocks. 
Saila  and  Norton  (1974)  expound one  method  of 
allocating licenses among fishing states as an alternative, 
i.e.,  to auction alirnited number of licenses to the highest 
bidders. Through this method the individual or state, as 
the case may  be, who could make the patest @I  from 
holding the licenses would tend to bid the highest. The 
disadvantage  of  this  approach  is  keeping  out  of  the 
fishery certain nations that are just developing their fish- 
ery capabilities and thus may  not be  able to pay high 
prices for the licenses. However, one alternative might be 
to use  the  revenue generated to subsidize new  fishing 
nations. 
While recognizing that economic rent should really be 
collected for the world community rather than allowing 
an  unmanaged  tuna  fishery, it is  doubtful if  decision 
makers and ultimately the IPFC  member states could be 
convinced  of  sharing  the  benefits  derived  from  the 
fishery with the whole region or the world as advocated. 
the meantime, the IPFC, through its appropriate 
bodies of experts should prepare a position paper on the 
state of the skipjack and yellowfin tuna resource in the 
Western  Pacific,  and  on  the  trends  and  the  possible 
alternative  positions  which  may  be  taken to keep the 
tuna fisheries productive at a sustained level. The paper 
should be distributed widely to governments and fisher- 
menalike so as to  sell the idea that some concerted effort 
must  be  made to save  the tuna resource. This program 
should be  a continued one so that the production trend 
can be  made regularly available to all concerned as soon 
as  possible.  The sooner the member states luiow of the 
conditions obtaining  in  these  fisheries, the earlier the 
decision  makers can act to change the status quo and 
save  the  tuna fisheries. It is  hoped that  distant-water 
fishing nations will participate actively in  this  exercise 
by submitting necessary catch data to the IPFC. 
The extension of  fishery jurisdiction would normally 
exclude the right of distant-water fishing nations to fish 
within the area of national jurisdiction. However, in view 
of the migratory habits of tunas, the draft article in the 
text of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) 
of  the Law  of  the Sea Conference specifically provides 
that the  conservation and  optimum utilization of tuna 
species  should  be  promoted in  a cooperative  manner 
through  appropriate  international  organizations  (see 
Art.  64,  ICNT)  throughout  the region.  This provision 
allows for the participation of distant-water iishing fleets 
in the harvesting of  tuna resources in the exclusive eco- 
nomic zone along lines to be  agreed  upon by member 
states in the region. Thts calls for the establishment of a 
regional body that is more responsive to the needs not 
only of tuna fisheria but of other !%heris8 as well. 
The tuna fdery in the Philippines and @bly  that 
In  Indonesia is found to be well developed in deep but 
close-to&ore waters, more correctly within the internal 
(archipelagic) waters of these states. ?'his condition calls 
for different fi-g  arrangements. However, bigssr purse 
seiners  are  being  introduced into the  regian  through The Allocarioh of Tuna ~isheries/29 
joint ventures to allow fishing farther offshore. Extension- 
of jurisdiction  may also give coastal states the necessary 
capital, vessels,  and know-how which may be provided 
or generated by distant-water fishing nations for them to 
be allowed to continue their fishing activities within the 
coastal  states'  exclusive  economic  zones. Initially, the 
IPFC has to be the responsible international fishery body 
which can help direct activities along this line and provide 
the needed guidance. 
Marr  (1976)  gives  an  excellent  analysis on manage- 
ment  mechanisms, stating the need  for strong internal 
management of fisheries in a state to ensure international 
fishery management. Accordingly, alternative provisions 
for  the  necessary  mechanism  for  the Southeast Asian 
region  are  also listed.  In  spite  of  the proliferation  of 
international fishery bodies in Southeast Asia, it appears 
that  all are inadequate to  provide the necessary mechanism 
to save the fisheries resources, including the tunas, in the 
region from depletion. 
The newly established South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Organization  in  the Southwestern Pacific, with  seat in 
the Solomon Islands may specifically deal with the tuna 
resource in the Western Pacific and is open to states in 
the Southeast Asian region. The Philippines and Indonesia 
are  welcome  to join  this  new  international  body  to 
enhance  the research and management of the tuna fish- 
eries in the region. The establishment of this agency may 
be timely, for it is in a position to rationally manage the 
tuna fisheries in the Western Pacific before it is too late. 
As  recommended by Marr (1976), the establishment 
of a South China Sea Commission should be considered in 
the  long-term,  especially  if  funds  could  come  from 
ASEAN  and/or other international funding institutions. 
Nevertheless, it is timely that discussions be made now, 
even in such unprecedented  alternative arrangements to 
influence decision makers of fishing nations before the 
tuna resolrce becomes depleted. Saila and Norton (1 974) 
emphasize the importance of this so that all concerned 
should be  cognizant of the constraints and implications 
of the regulatory techniques described above and should 
recognize that appropriate and widely acceptable regula- 
tions  must  be  established  to prevent  the depletion  of 
tuna stocks and worldwide economic waste in the tuna 
fisheries. 
The IPFC should consider seriously, for example, the 
combination of a national quota along with a tax system 
and allowance for transfer of quotas which, according to 
Saila and Norton (1974) appear to  meet all the objectives 
of the  IPFC together with its recommended objectives. 
With the recent development in the 3rd U.N. Confer- 
ence on the Law of the Sea to the regime of the 200-mi 
exclusive economic zone, coastal states will soon declare 
extended jurisdiction  over these  areas,  thereby  forcing 
distant  fishing nations to seek bilateral arrangements to 
enable them to fish within the more productive econon~ic 
zones of  coastal  states. This could lead to more efforts 
by  distant  fishing fleets  and  aggravate the  further  en- 
trance  of  developing states into the tuna  fishery. Thcrc 
are several countries in Southeast  Asia which have joint 
ventures  with  Japanese nationals,  e.g., the  Philippines. 
There are other distant-water fishing nations which seek 
joint ventures with Filipino fishing concerns and possibly 
this is true in other countries in Southeast Asia. Definitely 
such arrangements should be set up before any alternative 
management  arrangements  for  the  tuna  fisheries  are 
established in the region. 
Marr  (1976)  lists the alternatives in  dealing with the 
management  of  fisheries and  fishery  resources in  the 
South  China  Sea.  These  are:  1)  continuation  of  the 
status  quo; 2)  extension  of  fishery  jurisdiction:  and 
3) provision of  a management  mechanism. How would 
the tuna fisheries fit into these schemes? 
Preserving  the  status  quo  means  that  the  present 
trends would be allowed to develop in the tuna fisheries 
of each country as in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia. the 
Philippines,  Micronesia,  Taiwan,  the  Solonions,  e  tc. 
In  due  course,  there  will  be  overcapitalization  of  the 
fisheries and  in  no time, biological  overfishing of the 
resources. In  the long run, there will  be increasing con- 
frontation between countries in order to get more of the 
limited  resources. These conditions surely would be  de- 
structive to the resources and the fishing states and would 
lead to negotiation of arrangements among the countries 
participating  in the fisheries. However, although studies 
show  that  the  yellowfin  tuna  resource  can  be  fully 
utilized  in the Western Pacific, more studies are needed 
to convince the  decision makers in Southeast Asia  that 
such is the case in Indonesia and in the Philippines. 
One Japanese study shows that the shpjack resource 
can also be  fully utilized  in  the Western Pacific, but a 
more recent report indicates that there is, in general, no 
detectable effect of the fishery upon the catch rate, and 
until effort becomes more widespread, a clear relatiooship 
will not be observed (IPFC 1978). This report expresses 
the need for continued monitoring of the tuna catches, 
and  that  catch-per-unit-effort  data  are  needed  in  the 
region.  All  states  in  the  region  with  developing tuna 
fisheries  should  realize  these  problems  and, together, 
their  experts  should  determine  more  acccurately  the 
production trends, at least in the yellowfin and skipjack 
catches. 
However, the time needed to put such a body  into full 
operation  prevents  more  active  management  studies 
which are now badly needed to keep the tuna fisheries in 
Southeast  Asia  at  optimal  utilization  and  properly 
managed. Hence, it is probably  advantageous for Indo- 30/~aw  of  the Sea Workshop 
nesia  and  the  Philippines  to join  the  South  Pacific  needed  for the conservation of the tuna fisheries in  the 
Regional  Fisheries  Organization  to  enable  them  to  region. 
actively  undertake  management  and  research  work 
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Chief-o  f Division, Treaty and Legal Department 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
Suranrom Palace, Bangkok, Thailand 
Introduction  claim  made  by  some  coastal  states, particularly  Latin 
America, for complete sovereignty oveq  their 200-nauti- 
The  question  of  sharing of access  among neighbor-  cal-mile territorial seas did not gain wide acceptance and 
ing  states  or, in  other words,  access  to the living  re-  support from the world community. 
sources of the sea, has, in recent years, raised interna- 
tional issues of great concern  to the world community  Effects of Exclusive Economic Zone 
and has often been  the cause of international disputes 
due  to unilateral claims made by  a numbel  of coastal 
states  for  extended  maritime jurisdiction.  This  article 
discusses  legal  problems  of  access  as  a  result  of  the 
new  developing  trend  on  the  kw  of  the  Sea, with 
particular  emphasis  on  the  Southeast  Asian  region. 
This article is written in my personal capacity and the 
views  expressed  herein  do not  necessarily  reflect  the 
official views of any particular Government. 
The Exclusive Economic  Zone 
In the early  1970s, coastal states started claiming the 
zone, sometimes known as "fishery zone," by unilaterally 
extending their natural jurisdiction to a maximum limit 
of 200.nautical  miles from their relevant  baselines for 
the main purpose of exploring and expioiting living and 
nonliving marine resources and preseving marine environ- 
ment  in the zone while still recognizing the freedom of 
other  states  to navigate  and  overfly the  zone. So far, 
about  60 coastal states have claimed the zone, among 
them India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Kampuchea, 
and Vietnam. This new concept of Exclusive Economic 
Zone developed after it became clear that the excessive 
 his article is written in my personal capacity and the viewq 
expreswd herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of 
any particular Government. 
As  stated above, the  Exclusive Economic Zone con- 
cept is mainly designed to maintain the sovereign rights 
of coastal states to explore and exploit living resources 
in the zone. As  far as nonliving resources are concerned, 
this  concept  does not give  additional rights to coastal 
states since  they  can  at least equally claim these rights 
by  invoking Article  1 of the  1958 Geneva Convention 
on Continental Shelf. Article  I  stipulates that: 
"For  the purpose of these articles, the term 'con- 
tinental shelf is used as referring: 
(a)  to the  seabed  and  subsoil of  the submarine 
areas  adjacent  to the coast but outside the  area  of 
the  territorial  sea,  to  a  depth  of  200  meters  or, 
beyond  that limit, to where the depth of the super- 
jacent  waters  admits  of  the  exploitation  of  the 
natural resources of the said areas; 
(b)  to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarlnc 
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
Article  2.  The  coastal states exercise over  the conti- 
mental shelf sovereign rights for the  purpose  of ex- 
ploring it and exploiting its natural resources." 
Today's  advanced technology makes the provision of 
this Article obsolete. Considered as one of the lacunae of 
the  four 1958 Geneva Conventions on  the Law of the 
Sea, this provision needs to be amended. 
As  regards living marine resources, it is obvious that 
the  establishment  of  the  200-nautical-mile Exclusive 
Economic  Zone by coastal states adversely affects the 
interests  of  other  states, particularly  those  whose  na- 32/hw  of  the Sea Workshop 
tionals have habitually fished in the zone. In the case of 
Thailand, a distant fishing nation in this region, the fish- 
ing industry  & being seriously affected. It is estimated 
that Thailand is likely to lose-about 600,000 mt of catch 
annually, representing around 40% of her  total &mud 
catch. Arrests of Thai fishermen as well as seizures of 
Thai fishing boats made  by the neighboring authorities 
have also been reported; on certain occasions the use of 
force in the arrests have resulted in deaths. Such incidents 
have happened elsewhere and have sometimes impaired 
friendly relations among states. 
Legal Validity of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The existing international law does not provide coastal 
states sovereign right over the water column beyond 12 
nautical miles. It is true that the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial qea and the Contiguous Zone does not 
specify the exact breadth of the territorial sea; however, 
Article 24 on Contiguous Zone does provide that "2.  Con- 
tiguous Zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from 
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured." 
Based  on  the  above  provision, it  appears that  the 
territorial  sea, together with the contiguous zone may 
not extend beyond 12 mi  from the baseline. This inter- 
pretation is consistent with international practice. There- 
fore, to subject part of the high seas, which is beyond 
the 12-mi limit from the baseline, to the sovereign right 
of coastal states is contrary  to prevailing norms of the 
sea. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the existing 
four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea to 
which a few states are members are considered obsolete 
by a majority of states. It is equally true that in accord- 
ance with Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice,  can be  accepted as international law. 
But  as to what extent State practices can be  taken as 
having developed into international customary law is a 
legal  question  that  remains  to be  determined. During 
the Seventh Session of the Third UN  Conference on the 
Law of che Sea held in Geneva from March 28 to May 19, 
1978, many delegates contested the legal validity of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. In their view this practice had 
not yet crystallized into international customary law. It 
may be further pointed out that in the North Sea Con- 
tinental Shelf cases-the  Federal Republic of Gemany vs. 
Denmark and the Federal Pepublic of Germany vs.  the 
Netherlands-the  International Court of Justice ruled in 
its judgment of February 20,1969, par. 69 that: 
"In  the light of  these various considerations, the 
Court  reaches the conclusion that the Geneva Con- 
vention did not embody or crystallize any preaxist- 
ing or emergent rule of customary law, according to 
which the delimitation of continental shelf areas be- 
tween adjacent areas must, unless the Parties other- 
wise  agree, be  carried out on an equidistance-special 
circumstances basis.  A rule was of course embodied 
in Article 6 of the Convention, but as purely conven- 
tional rule. Whether it has since  acquired a broader 
basis  remains  to  be  seen:  qua  conventional  rule 
however,  as  ha; already  been  concluded, it is  not 
opposable to the Federal Republic." 
In  1972 the  conflict between  the United Kingdom 
and  Iceland  over  fishing incidents caused by Iceland's 
extension  of  fishery  jurisdiction  was  finally  brought 
before the International Court of Justice. The Court, in 
its judgment ofJuly 25,1954, pars. 67 and 68 ruled that: 
"67.  The  provisions of  the  Icelandic  Regulations 
of 14 July 1972 and the manner of their implementa- 
tion disregard the fishing rights of the applicant. Ice- 
land's  unilateral action thus constitutes  an infringe- 
ment of  the principle enshrined in Article  2 of the 
1958 Geneva  Convention on  the  High  Seas which 
requires  that  all states, including coastal  states,  in 
exercising  their  freedom of  fishing, pay  reasonable 
regard  to the  interests  of  other  states.  It  also  dis- 
regards the rights of the applicant,as they result from 
the  Exchange  of  Notes  of  1961. The  applicant is 
therefore  justified  in  asking  the  Court  to give  all 
necessary protection  to its own rights, while at the 
same time agreeing to  recognize Iceland's preferential 
position. Accordingly, the Court is bound to conclude 
that the Icelandic regulations of 14 July 1972 estab- 
lishing  a  zone  of  exclusive  fisheries  jurisdiction 
extending to 50 nautical miles from baselines around 
the coast of Iceland, are not opposable to the United 
Kingdom,  and  the  latter  is  under  no obligation to 
accept  the  unilateral  termination  by  Iceland  of 
United Kingdom fishery rights in the area. 
68. The Andings stated by  the Court in the pre- 
ceding paragraphs suffice to provide a basis for the 
decision  of the present case, namely, that Iceland's 
extension of its exclusive fishery jurisdiction beyond 
12 miles  is not opposable to the United Kingdom; 
that Iceland may on the other hand claiy preferential 
rights in the distribution of fishery resources in ques- 
tion, and that the principle of reasonable regards for 
the interests of other states enshrined in Article 2 of 
the  Geneva Convention on the high seas  of 1958 re- 
quires Iceland and the United Kingdom to have due 
regard  to each other's  interests, and to the interests 
of other states, in those resources." 
In the light of this judgment, the Court, while recog- 
nizing the right of coastal states to extend their fishery 
jurisdiction beyond  12 nautical miles, at the same time 
expressly ruled that the established or historic rights of 
other states must be duly respected. This judgment may 
be regarded  as a  basis  for  excessive  claims of fishery 
jurisdiction;  consequently,  the  Exclusive  Economic 
Zone concept will  finally be generally accepted as part 
of the new regime of the Law of the Sea. Sharhg of  Access Anwng Neighboring States/33 
The  Third UN  Conference on the Law of the Sea 
and the Quan  of Access to 
Li*  MaIind Resources 
In 1970 the UN  General Assembly, realizing the need 
to revise the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law 
of the  Sea, convened the third UN Conference on the 
Iaw  of the Sea. Prior to  its first session in 1973,  the Third 
UN  Conference on the Law of the Sea had  created in 
1967 an ad hoc committee to discuss questions concern- 
ing the peaceful use of seabed and oaea floor beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. The seventh session of the 
conference was resumed in New York from August 21 to 
$eptember  15, 1978. To sum up, the world community 
has taken up this extremely important issue on the law 
of the sea for 1  1 yr now. 
INFORMAL COMWSITE NEGOTIATING  TEXT  (ICNT) 
After the Sixth Session in New York, May 23 to July 
15, 1977, the Resident, together with the chairman of 
the three Main Committees, entrusted with the responsi- 
bility of preparing a new negotiating test for the future 
session of the Conference,introduced anether negotiating 
text called Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). 
This negotiating text is the third of its kind. The first 
two  are  the  Single Negotiating  Text and  the Revised 
Single Negotiating Text. 
The ICNT,  like its predecessors, is informal and has 
served  as  a basis  for negotiations without affecting the 
rightsr  of  any delegation to make  amendments to the 
Text. 
LEGAL  STATUS OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
The legal status of the Exclusive Economic Zone is 
one  of  the  main  issues  the  Conference had to settle. 
During the Seventh Session of the Conference,  it appeared 
to be  generally accepted that the Exclusive  Economic 
Zone is a mi generis zone which is subject to a specific 
legal rejgime and it is, therefore, not part of the high seas 
or the territorial sea. 
RIGHT  OF ACCESS TO THE LIVING  MARINE 
RESOURCES IN  THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC 
ZONE OF OTHER COASTAL STATES 
One of the seven hard  core issues given  priority by 
the Seventh Sessiori  of  the Conference to arrive at a 
compromise-  formula was the right of access, particularly 
by  the  landlocked  and  geographically  disadvantaged 
states,  to the  living marine  resources in the Exclusive 
'Economic Zone of other coastal states. 
On the rights of landlocked states Article 69'  of the 
L~ocuments  AICONF.62IWP.10  and add. 1. 
ICNT reads: 
"1.  Land-locked states shall have the right to partic- 
icipate in the exploitation of the living resources of 
the  exclusive  economic  zones of  adjoining coastal 
states on an equitable basis, taking into account the 
relevant  economic  and  geographical  circumstances 
of  all states concemed. The terms and conditions of 
such participation  shall be  determined by the states 
concemed through bilateral, sub-regional or regional 
agreements. Developed  and land-locked states shd, 
however,  be  entitled  to  exercise  their  rights  only 
within  the  exclusive  economic  zones  of  adjoining 
developed coastal states. 
2. This  article  is  subject  to the  provisions  of 
articles 61 and 62. 
3. The paragraph is without prejudice to arrange- 
ments  agreed upon in the region where the poastal 
states  may  grant  to land-locked states of the same 
region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation 
of  the  living  resources  in  the  exclusive economic 
zones." 
Article  70  concerns the  right  of  the so-called geo- 
graphically disadvantaged states, but it does not explicit- 
ly  use  the  term  "geographically  disadvantaged state." 
The article stipulates that: 
"1.  Developing coastal  states which  are situated 
in  a  sub-region  or  region whose geographical pecu- 
liarities make  such  state particularly dependent  for 
the  satisfaction  of  the  nutritional  needs  of  their 
populations  upon  the  exploitation  of the living ra- 
sources  in  the  exclusive  economic  zone  of  their 
own shall have the right to participate, on an equit- 
able basis, in  the exploitation  of living resources in 
the  exclusive economic  zones of  other  states  in  a 
sub-region or region. 
2. The terms and conditions of such participation 
shall be determhed by the states concemed through 
bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements, taking 
into account the relevant economic and geographical 
circumstances of all states concerned, including the 
need to avoid effects detrimental to the fishing com- 
munities or to the fishing industries of the states in 
whose  zones  the  right  of participation is exercised. 
3. This  article  is  subject  to the  provisions  of 
articles 61 and 62. 
These two articles of the ICNT  are subject to articles 
61 and 62  relating to  the conservation and utilization of 
living resources which read in part as follows: 
"Article  61.  Conservation  of  living  resources. 
1. The coastal state shall determine the  allowable 
catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic 
zone. 
2. The coastal state, taking into account the best 
scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through 
proper  conservation and management  measures that 
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclu- 
sive economic zone is not endangered by overexploita- 
tion, As  appropriate,  the coastal state and  relevant 
sub-regional, regional  and  global c  anizations shall 
cooperate to this end. 
Article  62. Utilization  of  the  ,*ring resources. 
1. The coastal state shall promote the objective of 
optimum utilization of the living resources in the ex- 34/Luw of the Sm  Workshop 
clusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
2. The coastal state shall determine its capacity to 
harvest the Living resources of the exc1usive economic 
zone. Where  the coastal state does not have the capa- 
city  to harvest  the  entire  allowable  catch, it shall, 
through  agreements or other arrangements and  pur- 
suant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred 
to in  ar. 4, give other states access to the surplus of 
the df  owable catch. 
3. In giving access to other states to its exclusive 
economic zone  under  this  article,  the coastal state 
shall take into account all relevant factors, including, 
inter alia, the significance of the living resources of 
the  area to the  economy  of  the  coastal state con- 
cerned and its other national interests, the provisions 
of articles 69 and 70, the requirements of developing 
countries in  the sub-region  or  region  in  harvesting 
part of the surplus and the need to minimize econom- 
ic dislocation in states whose nationals have habitually 
fished  in  the  zone  or which have  made  substantial 
efforts  in  research  and  identification  of  stocks." 
These provisions of the ICNT  were not acceptable to 
the  group  of landlocked  and  geographically  disadvan- 
taged states. At the Seventh Session of the Conference, 
a negotiating group was  formed to take up the matter. 
The  chairman  of  the  group,  after  having  taken  into 
account the views expressed by both the group of land- 
locked and geographically disadvantaged states and the 
group  of  coastal  states, proposed a series of  texts for 
the  revision  of articles 62 (par.  2),  69, and  70 of the 
ICNT, the last version3 of which reads as follows: 
"Article 62. par. 2. 
The  coastal  state  shall determine its capacity to 
harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic 
zone. Where the coastal state does not have the capac- 
ity  to harvest  the  entire  allowable  catch, it  shall, 
through agreements or other arrangements and pur- 
suaht to the terms, conditions and regulations referred 
to in par. 4, give  other states access to  the surplus of 
the  allowable  catch having particular rehard to the 
provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation 
to the developing states mentioned therein. 
Article 69. Right of land-locked states. 
1. Land-locked states shall have the right to partic- 
ipate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an 
appropriate part of  the surplus of the living resources 
of the exclusive  economic zo  of  coastal states of 
te same sub-region or region, Kng  into account the 
relevant economic and geographical circumstances of 
all the states concerned and in conformity with the 
provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62. 
2. The terms and modalities of such participation 
shdl be  extablished by the states concerned through 
bilateral, sub-regional or regional agreements taking 
into account inter alia: 
(a)  the  need  to avoid  effects  detrimental  to 
fishing  communities or  fishing  industries  of  the 
coa:  ? states; 
(b)  the extent to which the land-locked state, 
3~~  4/9/Rev. 2,15 May 1978. 
in accordance with the provhions of this article, is 
participating  or  is  entitled  to participate  under 
existing  bilateral,  sub-regional or  regional  agree- 
ments in  the exploitation of living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of  other coastal states; 
(c)  the  extent  to  which  other  land-locked 
states and states with special geographical charac- 
teristics are participating in the exploitation of the 
living resources of the exclusive economic zone of 
the coastal state and the consequent need to avoid 
a particular burden for any single coastal state or a 
part of it; 
(d)  the nutritional needs of the populations of 
the respective states. 
3. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal state 
approaches a point which would enable it to harvest 
the entire allowable catch of the living resources in 
its  exclusive  economic  zone,  the  coastal state  and 
other states concerned shall cooperate in the establish- 
ment  of  equitable  arrangements  on  bilateral,  sub- 
regional or regional basis to allow for participation of 
developing land-locked states of the same sub-region 
or region in the exploitation of the living resources of 
the exclusive economic zones of coastal states of the 
sub-region or  region,  as  may  be  appropriate in the 
circumstances and on terms satisfactory to all parties. 
In  the implementation  of  this provision the  factors 
mentioned in par. 2 shall also be  taken into account. 
4. Developed  land-locked states  shall, under the 
provisions of this article, be entitled to participate in 
the exploitation of living resources only in the exclu- 
sive economic zone of developed coastal states of the 
same sub-region or region, having regard to the extent 
to  which the coastal state in, giving  access to other 
states to the living resources of its economic zone has 
taken into account the need to minimize detrimental 
effects on fishing communities and economic disloca- 
tion in states whose nationals have habitually fished 
in the zone. 
5. The above  provisions are without prejudice to 
arrangements agreed  upon  in  sub-regions or  regions 
where  the  coastal states may  grant  to land-locked 
states of  the same sub-region or region equal or pre- 
ferential rights for the exploitation  of  the living re- 
sources in the exclusive economic zone. 
Article 70. Rights of states with special geograph- 
ical characteristics. 
1. States with special geographical characteristics 
shall  have  the  right  to pa~ticipate,  on an equitable 
basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the 
surplus of  the living resources of the exclusive  eco- 
nornic zones of coastal states of the same sub-region 
or region, taking into account the relevant economic 
and  geographical circumstances of  all the states con- 
cerned and in conformity with the provisions of this 
article and of articles 61 and 62. 
2. For  the  purposes  of  the  present Convention, 
'states with special geographical characteristics' means 
coastal states, including states bordering enclosed and 
semi-enclosed  seas,  whose  geographical  situation 
rnakes them dependent upon the exploitation of the 
living  resources  of  the  exclusive  economic zone of 
other states in the  sub-region or region, for adequate 
supply  of  fish  for the nutritional  purposes of  their populations or part thereof, and coastal states which 
can claim no exclusive economic zone of their own. 
3. (Identical  with  article  69  par.  2  except  the 
words 'land-locked states' hre replaced by 'states with 
special characteristics' where it is mentioned only of 
land4ocked states.) 
4. (Identical  with  article  69  par.  3 except  the 
words '1and.locked  states' are replaced by 'states with 
special characteristics'  and  the words  'par.  2'  in the 
last sentence are changed to 'par. 3). 
5. (Identical  with  article  69  par.  4 except  the 
words  'developed  land-locked states9  are replaced by 
'developed states with special geographical character- 
istics.') 
6. (Identical  with  article  69  par.  5  except  the 
words 'land-locked  states' are replaced by 'states with 
special geographical characteristics.') 
The proposed text for the revision of articles 62 par. 
2, 69, and  70  of  the  ICNT  by  the  chairman  of  the 
negotiating group was viewed by the group of landlocked 
and  geographically disadvantaged states as an irnprove- 
ment, although they still found the proposal unacceptable 
to them and to the group of coastal states. Below are the 
main problems that remained to be resolved: 
Right of access: The landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged  states asserted that it was  their right  of 
access to the living resources of the Exclusive Econornic 
Zone. This they asserted on the premise that the Exclu- 
sive Economic Zone was part of the high seas and there- 
fore  accessible to all states. They  added that if  coastal 
states were  to be  granted exclusive resource rights and 
jurisdiction over a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone, the existing rights of  other states therein should 
be respected. 
The coastal states agreed to grant access to the surplus 
of the living resources in their Exclusive Econornic Zone 
to  the  landlocked  and  geographically  disadvantaged 
states as well as to other states, on condition that such 
grant of  access could not be  claimed by other states as 
a right. 
Determination of  allowable wtch: The coastal states 
reserved their right to determine their allowable catch as 
well as their capacity to harvest the living resources with- 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Where the coastal states 
did not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch, they may, through agreements or arrangements, 
grant  other states access to the appropriate part of  the 
surplus of the allowable catch. 
The  landlocked  and  geographically  disadvantaged 
states naturally contested this right of the coastal states. 
In  their  view,  coastal states should  not have  the sole 
discretion to determine the  allowable  catch and  their 
capacity  to harvest.  They  feared that if  this were  the 
case, there might be no surplus left for them. The land- 
locked  and  geographically disadvantaged states further 
insisted  that  the determination of  the allowable catch 
&add be  carried out jointly by statm caccmed or by 
m international body of  reqpized competence.  An- 
other area of concern voiced by the group was that tho 
coastal  atates might,  throu*  um#ments with other 
advanced flshlng states, incream thoh capacity to barvest 
the  total  allowable  catch, thus leaving no surplw  for 
0th  states. To cope with this possibility, the chairman 
of  the Negotiating Group sugg&sted  that when  the har- 
vesting capacity of coastal states reached a point which 
would enable them to harvest  the allowable catch, the 
coastal states and other states concerned &odd  coop- 
erate in working out equitable arrangements. 
&@ition  ofgmgnrphidly  dhhntqgsd states:  An- 
other difficulty In reaching a consensus was the definition 
of the "geographically disadvantaged states." The dew- 
tion suggested by the chairman of the Negotiating Group, 
as mentioned above, was not entirely satisfactory to the 
group  of  geographically  disadvantaged  states. Further- 
more, the use of the term "geographically disadvantaged 
s  tes"  was not endorsed by the group of coastal states.  3  e  group  of  coastal states preferred to use  the  term 
"slates  with  special characteristics." The disapproval of 
the  tern  "geographically  disadvantaged  states"  arose 
from the fact that the deflnition of states falling under 
this category could not be based solely on a pographical 
criterion. Other  criteria, especially economic and  biol- 
ogical aspects and the varied needs and Interests of other 
states had  to be taken into account since a state which 
claims a smaller area of Exclusive Economic Zone does 
nlrt necessarily put it in a disadvantageous position, eco- 
nomically speaking, because such a limited area my  be 
extremely rich in living and nonliving marine resources. 
Preferential  fishing  rights  of  lnndlocked  and  geo- 
gmphicdly disrrd~tuged~states  over other stat@: The 
group  of  landlocked  and  geographically disadvantaged 
states insisted  that  their  right to fish  in the exclusive 
economic  zone  of  the  coastal  states should  be  on  a 
preferential  basis  vis-a-vis other states, including states 
whose  nationals  have  habitually fished  in  the zone. I 
cannot concur with this view for the very reason that it 
is not justifiable to accord preferential right to the land- 
locked  and  geographically  disadvantaged  states, which 
have  not engaged in fishing activities, over states whose 
aatimals have  habitually fished  in  the  zone.  On  the 
quesbon  of  fishing,  states seriously  affected  by  the 
declation  of  the  Exclusive  Econornic  Zone  are  those 
which  have  already  engaged  in  fishing  activities  but 
which  do not belong to the class of landlocked or geo- 
graphically  disadvautaged  states  which  have  so  far 
nothing to do with fishing. Conversely, the landlocked 
and geographically disadvantaged states can be qualified 
as  states  whose nationals have  habitually fished in the 
Excludve Economic Zone if it corresponds to the fact. 
In my  opinion both the landlocked and geopaphically 36/~aw  of  the Sea  Workshop 
disadvantaged states and the statep whbse nationals have 
habitually fished in the exclusive economic zone should 
share  equal  right  of access to th'e &one. However,  the 
ICNT and the paper introduced by the chairman of the 
Negotiating Group on this subject [NG.4/9/Revs 2 above) 
tend to give preference to the  group of landlocked and 
geographically  disadvantaged states over other states. It 
may be said that the two texts reflect the majority view 
of the Conference but it cannot be denied that the group 
of  landlocked  and  geographically  disadvantaged  states 
comprising  53  states or about one-third  of the states 
participating in the Conference have a vital role in deci- 
sion-making.  This is because  the adoption of the new 
Sea  Law  Convention  requires  a  two-thirds  majority 
vote; therefore, the voice of this group of states carries 
significant weight. 
Settlement  of  disputes: At the Seventh Session, the 
matter referred to the Negotiating Group by the Plenary 
under item  5  was:  "The  question of the settlement of 
disputes relating to the exercise  of the sovereign rights 
of coastal states in the exclusive economic zone."  There 
were  two opposing views,  those who wanted the rights 
guaranteed  them by the Convention to be safeguarded 
by compulsory  adjudication  procedures  and those who 
felt  that  since  the coaztal  states had  sovereign  rights 
over  the  Exclusive  Economic  Zone, in  the exercise  of 
these  rights,  they  should  not be forced  to participate 
in  any  form  of  compulsory  settlement  of  disputes 
unless  otherwise  agreed  upon.  The  group  of  coastal 
states  further  contended  that to subject  the sovereign 
right  of  coastal  states  to  compulsory  settlement  of 
disputes  would  lead  to abuse of  the legal process  and 
would  unduly impede their exercise of sovereign rights. 
At  the  end of the Seventh Session, the concept of 
coinpulsory  recourse  to conciliation  procedure, which 
is not binding upon the parties to the disputes, emerged  - 
as a possible comprornise. The final formula put forward 
by  the  chtiirman  of  the Negotiating  Croup 5 received 
widespread  and  substanti.al  support. According  to the 
compromise formula, three categories of disputes relating 
to fisheries may be submit  to a conciliation procedure 
when it is alleged that: 
1. a  coastal  state  has  manifestly  failed  to comply 
with  its obligations to ensure, through proper conserva- 
tion  and management  measures, the safety of all living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone; 
2. a coastal state has arbitrarily refused to determine, 
upon  the request  of  another  state, the allowable catch 
and its capacity  to harvest the living resources with re- 
spect  to  stocks which  are  of  interest  to other states; 
3. a  coastal  state has arbitrarily  refused to allocate 
to any state, under the provisions of articles 62.69, and 
70 and under the terms and conditions established  by 
the coastal state consistent with the present Convention, 
whole  or  part  of the  surplus it has declared to exist. 
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
with or without a new comprehensive Convention on 
the law  of the Sea, the question of access to the living 
resources can be settled only through bilateral or regional 
agreements between states concerned as provided  for in 
the ICNT. The new  Sea Law Convention can  only lay 
down  general  conditions  for  the  cohclusion  of  such 
agreements.  Pending entry into force of the Convention, 
fishing states affected by the proclamations of the Exclu- 
sive Economic Zone have already concluded agreements 
for access to marine fishery resources with other coastal 
states. Thus far, quite a number of such agreements exist. 
In  return  for the allocation  of  fishery  resources,  in 
general, either foreign states or foreign fishermen have to 
pay the coastal states granting access. Payments may be 
in the form of license fees, royalties, taxes, joint-ventures, 
etc. They also have to comply with the terms and con- 
ditions  with  regard  to conservation  and  management 
measures imposed by the coastal states. In some cases, 
benefits  to be  accorded  to the  states granting  access 
include  the  training  of  fishermen  and  the  transfer  of 
technology  in  fisheries.  In  the case of Japan and New 
Zealand, the success of the negotiation was largely due 
to Japan's commitment to increase import of meat and 
dqry products  from  New  Zealand  in exchange  for the 
right to fish in New Zealand's  waters through payment 
of license fees.  4 
The joint-venture  type of access is a highly complex 
one because it involves additional legislative and adrninis- 
trative measures existing in the state where joint-venture 
companies  are  incorporated.  Consequently,  the joint- 
venture  system  has  sometimes  proved  ineffective  and 
economically unprofitable. 
There exist at present very few fishery agreements in 
Southeast Asia.  Recently  an  agreement on fisheries co- 
operation between  Thailand and  Bangladesh was signed 
and had been in effect,since  July 5, 1978. The objective 
of  this  agreement  is to conduct  technical  cooperation 
and  joint-venture  in  the  field  of  fisheries.  Under  the 
agreement,  authorized joint-venture  companies  set  up 
jointly  by Thai  and Bangladesh partners  in accordance 
with  the  laws  and  regulations  of  Bangladesh  and  the 
agreement  between  the  two  countries  in  the  ratio of 
49:s 1,  respectively,  may  exploit  living  resources  in 
the Bay of Bengal within the Exclusive Economic Zone 
as  well  as  territorial  waters  declared  by  Bangladesh. 
It should be noted  that the fishing grounds permitted 
under  this  Agreement  include  the territorial  waters of 
Bangladesh since it is the only country which has adopted 
4~vening  Post, 1 July 1978. the  unique  10-fathomdepth straight baseline  concept 
by invoking the geographical peculiarities of the Bay  of 
Bengal,  For  this  reason  the  distances of  the declared 
Bangladesh straight baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured are generally greater than 
12 nautical miles from the nearest coastlines. The Agree- 
ment also provides for the setting up of joint-Ministe  jal 
and  Technical  Committees  for  the  purpose  of  impie- 
menting the Agreement. Meetings were held in Bangkok 
last August  1978 and both parties agreed to start fishing 
operations in October 1978 following the establishment 
of joint-venture companies.  5 
To  minimize  economic  dislocation  caused  by  the 
creation of the  Exclusive Economic Zone, leading fish- 
ing nations have intensified their efforts to develop aqua- 
culture within the waters under their jurisdiction. Japan 
and Thailand, for example, the 1st and the 10th ranking 
fishing nations, respectively, in vdlume of catches,6 have 
launched various projects to this effect. According to the 
article  entitled  "Declaration  of  EEZ's  Temporarily 
Squeezes  Japan's  Fish  to  improve  coastal 
fishing grounds, $740 million has been invested by Japan 
in constructing artificial spawning and feeding beds and 
beaches. Aquaculture development has similarly received 
a large boost in the form of plans for 17 additional fish 
farming centers by 1980, bringing the total to 27 (exclud- 
ing salmon hatcheries). Salmon husbandry, deemeu the 
most  promising  of  all  aquaculture ventures for Japan, 
will receive special attention."  Thailand has likewise con- 
centrated on marine, brackishwater as well as fresh water 
aquaculture, and to this end various fish farming centers 
are now actively conducting their a~tivities.~  In addition, 
in order to solve  fishery problems which  it now faces, 
the Government of Thailand has set up a high level inter- 
ministerial  committee  for  the  purpose  of  formulating 
and implemgnting fishery policies. 
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
By  extending maritime jurisdiction, coastal states will, 
in principle, benefit more from the sea. But the extension 
of jurisdiction itself will not solve fishery problems. This 
is  due  to the  natural  characteristic of fish to migrate 
from place  to place. There is virtually no boundary for 
fish. 
Another area of possible conflict concerns the question 
5~he  Nation Review, Bangkok,-28 Augus; 1978. 
6~ominal  catches  by Japan and Thailand arranged by 1976 
catch size  were  10,619,917 and  1,640,396 metric tons respec- 
tively (1976 FA0  Yearbook  of FiShery Statistics, p. 11), 
7~~~~~~  Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 1, July 1978, p. 6. 
'see  report  on  "ICLARM  Staff Visits Thailand," ICLARM 
Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 1, July 1978, p. 4. 
of marltime boundaries. Unlike a laud boundpry, a marim 
time boundary is generally not Mbk and can be a cause 
for fishing conflict.  The extenion of maxitimG jwidk- 
tion  by  coastal  states  has  further  created additional 
fishing  problems  particularly  in  C~BCS where  each  of 
opposite  coastal  states  cmot claim  the  maximum 
200nmtical-mile  Exclusive Economic Zone limit. As a 
result of the extension of jurisdiction, in Southeast Asia 
as well as in other parts of the world, there exist overlap- 
ping  maritime  areas  claimed  by  more  than  one state. 
Under  international  law, maritime boundary  delimita- 
tions  between  adjacent  ox  opporsite  states  concerned 
have  to  be  effective  through  agreements;  unilateral 
claims  cannot  prejudice  the  rights  of  other  states. 
Unlike nonliving natural  resources, living natural re- 
sources are renewable. Life cycles of fish are relatively 
short.  They should be propedy exploited to avoid eco- 
n&c  waste.  However, natural living marime resources 
can be depleted if they are not rationally exploited; con- 
servation and management measures are important fac- 
tors for $creasing  their productivity. 
It should be  further pointed out that in this region, 
there  are  stocks  of  fish  called  "shared  stocks" which 
occur  within  the  national  boundaries of  two or more 
states. There are also highly migratory species like tunas. 
These stocks are interdependent in the sense that harvest- 
ing a stock in  an area may have adverse effects on the 
yield of the same stock in  another. In this case, states 
concerned should cooperate in conserving and developing 
these  stocks.  Regional  or  international  organizations 
may also ren-&r assistance in tlqs regard. 
In view of the fact that fishery problems are transna- 
tional  issues, regional  and international cooperation is 
needed. To deal effectively with these problems, regional 
and ihternational organizations can greatly contribute to 
this  effect  through  fishery  march, identification  of 
stocks,  and  assessment of maximum sustainable yield. 
With regard to the maximum sustainable yield Inthis 
re$on,  according to the  wqrkshop held in Penang, in 
November  1977, the areas with largest potential yields 
are : 
East coast Peninsular Malaysia  440,000 t 
IndonedaSouth China Sea  470,000 t 
Natuta Islands  260,000 t 
off Shrawak  ,330,000  t 
off Sabah  1  180,000  t 
off Mekong mouthCentral 
Sun& Shelf  500,000 t 
It was further estimated that out of the potential yield 
of 3~00,000  t from the demer9  resources In the Sunda 
Shelf, only about 1,000,000 t are presently harvested. In 
the Gulf  of Thailand, it was reported that 'With the ex- 
cpption of Rmtrentgm spp. (mackerel), which may now 
be yielding maximum catches, the pelagic  resources of 381hv  of the SM  Wotkahop 
the Gulf are less heavily exploited than those of dernenal  eries cooperation." 
As mantiuiled before, there is a surplus of fish in this  Conclusion 
region. It will be a waste if them reso&es  are not prop- 
erly exploited for the common benefit of the states con- 
cerned.  Cooperation  among  states  concerned is there- 
fore  required  for  fie  rational  exploitation  of  these 
resources. In this connection, I fully endorse the view of 
Dr. Francis T. Christy, Jr., aninternationally recognized 
authority on fisheries, who recently stated that, " . .  .  the 
states would have to be convinced that the potential eco- 
nomic gains from cooperation would be greater than the 
gains in nationalistic pride, etc., that they could receive 
by attempting to exercise their claimed jurisdi~tion."~~ 
Regional organizations with close cooperation among 
their members should facilitate cooperation in the field 
of fisheries. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), for example, has formulated projects for fish- 
The traditibnal legal regime on the Law of the Sea is 
seriously being challenged and is undergoing significant 
change. With regard  to fisheries, the question of access, 
to natural living resources of the sea is one of the main 
issues  of  great interest  to all states. Marine fishery  re- 
sources constitute the main source of animal protein for 
human  consumption,  provide  job  opportunities,  and 
generate revenues  for a great number of states. Fishery 
problems are  transnational  issues.  Regional  and  inter- 
national  cooperation should be  promoted to deal effec- 
tively with these problems  for the  common benefit of 
states  concerned.  It  is  gratifying  to note that various 
regiond  and  international  organizations  have  so  far 
exerted efforts to help solve these vital issues, 
'south  China  Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating 
Programme,  Vol.  2, Fishery  Country Profiles, SCS/Dev/76/11 
P 
.  1. p. 90. 
'OD,.  Frands T. Christy, Jr.  In  Press. Fisheries management 
and  the  law of  the  sea  in  Southeast  Asia and  the  Southwest 
Pacific. ICLARM Studies and Reviews. International Center for  llFteport  of  the  ASEAN  Fisheries Experts Meeting for  the 
Living Aquatic Resources Management, Manila.  ASEANCANADA  Dialogue,  24-26  January  1978, Singapore. Implementation of Agreements with Foreigners 
Director of  Legal. and Treaty A  ffiirs 
Indonesian Depanment of  Foreign Affairs 
Introduction 
The topic assigned to me is "The  Implementation of 
Agreements with  Foreigners."  I cannot discuss the irn- 
plementation  of  various  agreements concluded  among 
other Southeast Asian  countries as I am ill-equipped for 
'  the subject. I wdl instead confine my observations to the 
implementation  of fisheries agreements entered into by 
Indonesia  with  other  countries  in  waters  within  its 
national  jurisdiction.  The  opinions  expressed  in  this 
paper, however, are totally personal, and do not neces- 
sarily reflect the opinions of the Indonesian Government. 
Before  one can  discuss the various agreements con- 
cluded between Indonesia and other countries, one first' 
has to understand  Indonesia's  varied  national positions 
on  the  matter,  as  they  will  determine  or  affect  the 
agreement  itself.  Secondly,  for  the  purposes  of  the 
present  discussioh, the term  "agreement"  shall include 
not only agreements officially concluded, but also other 
arrangements that have  existed for some time  between 
Indonesia and other countries. 
Indonesian Positions 
From the point of view of Indonesia, all fisheries re- 
sources within  Indonesian archipelagic waters and terri- 
torial  seas  fall  within  its  national  jurisdiction.  These 
resoxces include those of sedentary species found in the 
Indonesian continental  shelf  or those  of  pelagic  or de- 
mersal species found in the area  which would become 
Indonesia's  exclusive economic  zone,. This  position  is 
well  known  to everyone. Therefore, I merely have  to 
refer  to  the  Indonesian  Declaration  of  December  13 
'Indonesian Representative to the Second Cumnittee of the 
Third ON  Conference on the Law of the Sm. 
1957,  announcing  the  Indonesian  archipelagic  state 
concept and the 12-mi territorial sea, both later enacted 
into Law No. 411960. In 196 1  Indonesia also ratified the 
Geneva  Continental  Shelf  Convention  of  1958, thus 
acquiring sovereign rights over the sedentary spqcies of 
all living resources within its continental shelf. 
The essence of the archipelagic state concept  is the 
recognition of the right of an archipelagic state like Indo- 
nesia to draw straight archipelagic baselines connecting 
the  outermost  points  of  the  outermost islands of  the 
archipelago, thus  enclosing the whole  archipelago into 
a single entity. The territorial sea, the contiguous zone, 
the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf 
of  the archipelagic state shall be measured outward from 
these  baselines.  The  waters  within  these  baselines are 
archipelagic  waters,  over  which  the  archipelagic  state 
exercises territorial  sovereignty. This sovereignty covers 
the waters, the airspace above the waters, the seabed and 
subsoil,  and  all  other  resources  contained  *erein2 
Derived from this basic concept, especially from the con- 
cept  of  sovereignty ovei  all  the natural  resources cow 
tained in  the archipelagic waters, the archipelagic state 
exercises sovereignty over all the fisheries resources wlthiq 
its archipelagic waters. Thus, any exploration or exploita- 
tion of these resources, in accordance with Article 33 of 
Indonesia's  1945 Constitution, can only be undertaken 
for the benefit of the Indonesian people, either by their 
own organizations or through some kind of arrangements 
with  foreign  organizations. Any  agreement concluded 
with  foreign countries on this matter will have to take 
into account this basic position. 
'~hrou*  the years the IndoneAan archipelagic state concept 
has  found  its  way  into the  ICNT.  For detailed regime of the 
archip&&  state concept which I hope will be incorporated in 
the next LOS Convention, see Articles 46-54 of the ICNT. 40/~aw  of the Sea Workbhop 
Since the whole  archipelagic waters now belong to 
the archipelagic state of Indonesia, all national legislatipn 
with respect to fisheries in its waters can now be appli- 
cable to the Indonesian archipelagic  waters and territorial 
seas. This legislation is either of recent origin  or  dates 
back to the colonial era. Some of the old legislation now 
applicable to the archipelagic waters of Indonesia is worth 
mentioning. 
First, there is the Pearl and Coral Collecting Act of 
1916~  which regulates pearl, anemone, and coral collect- 
ing within 3 mi from the coasts. Exclusive and traditional 
nghts for such activities are guaranteed local fishermen 
anywhere'in the sea where depth is less than 9 m at low 
tide. Such rights cannot be  transferred to others except 
as provided for in the Act. 
Second, there is the Fisheries Act of  1920~  which pro- 
hibits the use of poison, toxins, and explosives in fishing, 
except for authorized scientific purposes. 
Third,  there  is the  Coastal Fisheries Act of  1927.' 
The rules enunciated in this Act relate to fishing in the 
Indonesian  territorial seas, then f~ed  at 3 mi from low 
tide along the coasts. The Act stipulates that only vessels 
flying the Indonesian flag and manned by a crew of Indo- 
nesian  nationals  (unless  granted  special  permission by 
' the Minister  of  Agriculture) shall be  allowed to fish in 
Indonesian waters. All fishing activities in the Indonesian 
waters shall respect and take into account the traditional 
fishing rights of the indigenous coastal population as well 
as  the  specific rights of local governments to regulate 
fishing along the coastlines under their respective juris- 
diction  This Act has been  amended several times, the 
latest  having  been  in  1960 when both the Indonesian 
archipelagic state principles and the 12-mi territorial sea 
were enacted into Law No. 4. 
Fourth, the Whaling Act of  1927~  regulates whaling 
within  3 mi  of  Indonesian coasts. The  Act  states that 
whaling within 3 mi of the coasts (now within Indonesian 
archipelagic  waters  and  the  12-mi  territorial  sea)  is 
allowed only under special permission from the President 
of the Republic, except whaling activities traditionally 
conducted  by  the indigenous  coastal  population.  The 
Act further regulates all other details related to whaling. 
Fifth, the Territorial Sea and Mariti$e  Circle Act of 
193g7  regulates Indonesian territorial sea (3 mi from the 
coasts at low tide or from straight baselines where there 
are bays, river mouths or estuaries less than 6 mi wide; or 
where there are island fringes along the coasts, or where 
3~tate  Gazette 1916 No. 1,57 dated January 29, 1976. 
4~tate  Gazette 1920 No. 396 dated May  26,1920. 
'state  Gazette 1927 No.B1. 
%ate  Gazette 1927 No. 145 dated April 29, 1927, 
7~tate  Gazette 1939 No. 442, 
there is a strait less than 6 mi wide and both of its coasts 
belong to Indonesia). The Act also establishes Indonesian 
maritime  circles  along specific areas within  Indonesian 
coastlines.  Fishing  activities are  ~rohibited  within  the 
maritime  circles, except  by  the  Indonesian indigenous 
population  or by those with special permission from the 
Naval Chief of Staff. The Act also establishes strict guid- 
ance  for  the Naval  Chief  of  Staff in granting the  per- 
mission  to fish  within the maritime circles. Presidential 
Decree  No.  103, issued May 27, 1963 provides for the 
conversion of all Indonesian waters into a single maritime 
circle. This Decree  strengthens  the  power  of the Naval 
Chief  of  Staff to enforce  all  fisheries legislation  in all 
Indonesian waters. 
Violators  of  all  or  any  of  the  Acts cited  above  are 
either fined or jailed. 
Some of the recent regulations on fishing in the Indo- 
nesian  archipelagic waters  and  territorial  seas  contain 
provisions  on  the  use  of  equipment  and  the  use  of 
trawlers in  specified areas as  well  as  provisions on  the 
maximum use of fishery resources. 
Decision  Nos.  56111973 and 4011974, both  by  the 
Minister  of  ~~ricult\l.re~  also  obligate  all  enterprises 
engaged in shrimp fishing to make use of all the bycatch. 
In  1975 the same Minister issued a decision9 setting up 
guidelines on the proper conservation and management 
of the fishery resources. This decision regulates seasonal 
or areal closure of certain fishing grounds to one, some, 
or all fish species, as well as the kind, size, and number 
of vessels; the  size  of nets and  all  other fishing equip- 
ment;  and  the  quota  for  each  catch.  Decision  No. 
02/1975'~  prohibits  trawling  in waters less  than  10 rn 
deep around the coasts of Irian Jaya (see  Chart in the 
Annex).  Shrimp catching through the use of pair trawl, 
as  well  as  cod ends having a mesh size of less than 3.0 
crn  (stretched  mesh)  is  also  prohibited.  The  Director 
General  of  Fisheries is  authorized  to determine every 
year beginning April  1 the number of vessels allowed to 
operate after the stock of fish or shrimp in the area has 
been  assessed.  Decision No.  1  23/197511  prohibits the 
fishing  of  Rasrrelliger, Decaptems,  Caranx, Satdinella, 
and other similar pelagic species by purse seines less than 
2  in  on  the  wing  side  and  less than  1 in in the bag. 
Violation  of  this  rule  can. mean  a  revocation  of  the 
fishing permit. 
'see  Decision  Nos. 561/KPTS/UM/11/1973  dated November 
7,l 73 and 40/KPTS/UM/2/1974  dated February 1,1974. 
'See  Decision  No.  Ol/KPTS/UM/I/191S  dated  January  2, 
1975. 
losee Decision  No.  02/KETS/UM/1/1975  dated  January 2, 
1975. 
lhee  Decision  No. 123/KlTS/UM/3/1975  dated  March  31, 
1975. One  of  the  more important decisions made by thk 
-'r  of  Agriculture is  Decision  No.  60711976.'~ 
It  provides  for  the  division  of  parts  af  Indonaan 
coastlines into foyr belts (Fig. 1) namely: 
1. First Fishing Belt, namely, coast+ waters up to  3 mi 
from the low-water mark along the coasts. Here, inboard 
motorized  fishing vessels above 5 gt  or above 10 hp, all 
kinds of trawls (beam trawl, otter trawl, and pair (bull) 
trawl), purse wines and ~,  like, encircling gill nets and 
drift gill nets, or nets momthan 120  m long are prohibited. 
2. Second  Fishing Belt, namely,  waters 4 mi wide 
measured from the Fint Fishing Belt. In this belt, inboard 
mqtorized  fmg  vessels above 25 gt  or above  SO hp, 
bottom trawls (with otterboard) with head rope length 
over 12 m, mid-water trawls or pelagic trawls as well as 
pair (bull) trawls, or nets over 300 m long are prohibited. 
Fishing  vessels  owned by  State Fishing Enterprise are 
exempted from the prohibitions stipulated for the Second 
Fishing Eelt.13 
3. Third ~ishing  Belt, namely, waters 5 mi wide mea- 
sured from the Second Fishing Belt. Inboard motorized 
fishing vdssels above 100 gt or above 200 hp, mid-water 
trawls (otterboard)  more than 20 m head rope, length, 
pair  (bull)  trawls as well as nets  over 600 m long are 
prohibited in this  belt. 
4. Fourth  Fishing  Belt,  namely, waters outside the 
Third Fishing Belt. Here, all  vessels and legitimate equip- 
ment may be  used except pair (bull) trawls which may 
only be used in the Lndian Ocean. 
The  regulation also stipulates that except  for some 
specified excephons,  all nets having mesh  sizes of less 
than 25 nun  and purse seines for tuna having mesh sizes 
of less than 60 mm  aye  prohibited in all the four belts. 
in addition, the use of beam trawls, otter trawls, and pair 
(bull) trawls for  and demersal fishhgis prohibited 
In both the Strait of Madura and the Strait df Bali. 
AU fishing permits must specify the belt where  the 
vessel  is  allowed  to M.  Violations of  this  reaation 
may result in the revocation of the fishing permit. The 
Director  General of  Fisheries  is  authorized to strictly 
enforce this decision. 
To further regulate the use of trawls, the Minister of 
Agriculture  issued  Decision  No.  609/1976.14.  This 
divides  demersal  fishing within  Indonesian waters into 
four zones (see  Chart in the hex).  Each trawler can 
operate only in the zone assigned to it and it must bear 
12see  Docision No. 607/KFTS/UM/9/1976  dated September 
30,1976. 
13~~  Decision  No. 608/KPTS/TJM/9/1976  dated September 
30,1976. 
14%  Wn  No. 609/KPTS/UM/9/1976  dated Septembm 
30,1976. 
a sign with P color indicating its zone of optration. The 
four zones are:  Zone A in the  Indian Ocean; Zone B in 
the Strait of Malacca  and South China Sea; Zone C in 
the  Strait  of 'Karirnata,  Java  Sea,  and the  Strait  of 
Makassar; and Zone D in the Eastern Pqt  of Indonesia. 
The Director General of ~isheries" announced that 
the  decisions  of  the  Minister of  Agriculture (Decision 
Nos. 607,608, and 609 1976) entered into force on July 
1, 1978. Since then, 634 trawlers have been arrested in 
all parts of Indonesia for violating the rules. This repre- 
sents about 3% of all fishing vessels (about 21,000 vessels) 
operating inlndonesian waters. 
All  of the above-mentioned rules and regulations are 
necessary to conserve all living resources and to protect 
them  from being depleted especially those that are im- 
portant for the consumption and the economy of small 
local Mermen as well as other resources that are irnpor- 
tant primady for the world market. Fisheries along the 
Strait of Malacca, the Java  Sea, the Strait of Bali, and 
the  Strait  of  Makassar  can  be  classified as within the 
meaning of the first category, while tuna fishing in the 
Banda  Sea  and shrimp exploitation  in the Arafura Sea 
can be classified as  within the second category. This fact 
is particularly important since the livelihood of an impor- 
tant sector of the Indonesian coastal population, number- 
ing over one million fishermen, largely depends on fish- 
eries of the first category. The second category is equally 
important because of its potential to provide sources for 
foreign exchange which can be beneficial to the economic 
development of the country. 
It is then clear that all foreign vessels operating under 
whatever arrangements in Indonesian waters must strictly 
observe the above-mentioned rules and regulations. 
Agreements with Fore*  Countria 
When  one discusses agreements concluded by  Indo. 
nesia  with  other  foreign  countries,  various situations 
arise: 
1. Arrangement concluded with Japan for the exploi- 
tation of tuna in the Banda Sea; 
2. Agreement, in principle, with South Korea toward 
cooperative efforts in matters concerning fisheries; 
3. Arrangement negotiated between Indonesia and itd 
neighbors, specifically Singapore and Thailand, allowing 
adjacent neighboring states of Indonesia to  continue their 
traditional  fishing rights within  specified  areas  of  the 
Indonesian archipelagic waters; 
4. Agreement to be made with regard to the right of 
,access by the landlocked  and  geographically  disadvan- 
taged states to the surplus living resources in areas that 
''see  Decision No. ~.ll/l/4/4/78  dated May 15,1978. 421~4~  of  the Sen Workshop 
are  to become  part of Indonesia's  exclusive economic 
zone; and 
5. Arrangement  made with other neighboring states, 
particularly  Australia,  allowing  Indonesian  traditional 
fishermen to continue  fishing in areas within  the Aus- 
tralian exclusive fishing zone, namely within 12  mi from 
the Australian baselines. 
Arrangement with Japan 
The  Japanese Government claimed that their fisher- 
men  had  traditionally  fished  in  far-distant  waters  of 
Indonesia,  including  the  Banda  Sea  area.  This  claim 
certainly  ran  counter  to  the  Indonesian  assertion  of 
archipelagic  principles  since  1957. The  determination 
of  Indonesia  to  enforce  its  archipelagic  principles 
has brought  about problems affecting its relations with 
Japandse  fishing  interests,  especially  in  the Banda  Sea 
area. 
Protests made by Japan in 1957 and in 1960 failed to 
placate Indonesia to relinquish its archipelagic principles. 
Indonesia  continued to enforce these principles vis-a-vis 
the Japanese boats fishing illegally in the area. Various 
fishing vessels were either arrested, brought to court, or 
fined or sentenced for violating Indonesian laws. 
Various efforts by  the two countries to resolve the 
matter  finally  succeeded when both parties  signed the 
"Interim  Arrangement"  in July  27,  1968. This interim 
.arrangement,  concluded  between  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  of  Indonesia1  and the Representatives  of 
the  National  Federation  of  Fisheries  Cooperatives  of 
Japan  and the Federation of Japanese Tuna Fishermen 
Cooperative  Associations,  regulated  tuna  fishing  by 
Japanese  fishermen who are members  of the two asso- 
ciations "in'the  waters between the Indonesian islands." 
The area covered by the arrangement was the Banda Sea 
which  is  within  the  archipelagic  waters  of  Indonesia, 
with  coordinates  124'~  ~OS,  129'~  ~OS,  132'~  ~OS, 
132'~  ~OS,  124'~  ~OS,  and 124'~  2OS, all specified in 
the Interim Arrangement.  The Japanese undertook not 
to  operate  in  areas  other  than  that  specified  in  the 
Arrangement. 
Article  1 of the Arrangement granted certain Japanese 
vessels permission  to call  at the port  of Arnbon where 
they would be provided  facilities for tuna fishing in the 
area.  Before  being  able  to fish in  the Banda  Sea area, 
however, the fishing vessels were to be issued certificates 
from the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo. The call at the 
Indonesian port was to  be made at the end of each fishing 
xtivity for purposes of verification by  the local  naval 
authority. Applications for permission and facilities had 
to be  secured  by  the  Associations  on  behalf  of their 
members, specifying therein the names of the vessels, the 
names of the owners, and the vessel's  registration number 
as well as its torinage. Additional reqdremenu such as a 
crew list and a photograph of the  vessel were also imposed. 
Japanese  fishing vessels  granted  permission and  cer- 
tificate were  also  required to bear specific markings on 
both sides of the vessels' bridge, the detail8 of which were 
specified in the Arrangement. 
To be able to fish in the specific  area, fishing vessels 
had to pay  a certain fee, depending on the class of the 
vessel used. For a class A vessel, namely, a vessel of 40  t 
class of less than 70 gt, the fee was fixed at US$300 per 
vessel per year, while for a class B vessel, namely, a vessel 
of 1004 class of not less than 70 gt, but not larger than 
300 gt, the fee was fmed at US$390 per vessel per year, 
payable in yen through the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo. 
To  protect  local  Indonesian  fishermen,  Japanese 
fishing  vessels  were  not allowed  to operate within  the 
limit of 30 mi from the island of Ambon, and from other 
areas  to be  mutually  agreed  upon.  Likewise,  Japanese 
fishing vessels were not allowed the use of mother ships 
or transporting vessels. Each vessel was to be on its own, 
and fishing was limited to the longline method. 
The number of vessels allowed to operate under this 
Arrangement  was  limited  to a  maximum  of 250, not 
more  than  one-third of which  should  consist  of  100-t 
class vessels  of not less than 70 gt but not larger than 
300  t.  Within  this  category,  however,  13  vessels  of 
approximately  200 gt  but  not  exceeding  300  t  were 
allowed.  The  rest  would  be  vessels  of  40-t  class  not 
larger  than  70  gt. The maximum  catch  of  the whole 
Japanese  operation under this Arrangement was limited 
to not more  than  15,000 tlyr. The Arrangement  took 
effect on its signing on July 6, 1968 and was to be in 
force for only 1 yr. 
The form and the contents of this Arrangement were 
peculiar.  First, it was negotiated between the represen- 
tatives of the Indonesian and the Japanese Governments 
but it was signed between the Government of Indonesia 
and  the  National  Federation of  Fisheries  Cooperatives 
of Japan and the Federation  of  Japanese  Tuna Fisher- 
men Cooperative Association, both private organizations., 
It seemed that while the Japanese Government was eager 
to protect  the interests of its fishermen, it was  never- 
theless reluctant to conclude an official agreement with 
the Government of Indonesia. Perhaps Japan feared that 
such a bilateral agreement might be interpreted from the 
legal point of view as its indirect but de facto or de jure 
recognition of the Indonesian archipelagic concept. 
Secondly, the arrangement regulated Japanese fishing 
activities  "in  the  waters  between  Indonesian islands." 
From  the  very  start,  the  Indonesian  Government  dis- 
agreed  on this  formulation and preferred the phrase  to 
simply read  "in  the Indonesian waters."  The implication rn  the ma  of  tmwlm k pmMMkd 
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was  clear:  the  Indonesian  Government wanted  clear,  Enterprise,  the  ~riLuun  Samodra  Besar  (psE+)16  and 
legal  Japanese  recognition  of  its archipelagic concept,  the  same  Japaqese  Fishing  Associations  mentioned 
while  the  Japanese  side  insisted  on  maintaining some  earlier.  The  new arrangement embodied  provisions for 
semblance of led nonrecognition  through the formu-  tuna fishing cooperation on the basis of a profit sharing 
lation.  arrangement.  The  new  arrangement  also  required  the 
Thirdly, the Japanese side was willing to  pay for access 
to  the tuna fisherGes in the Banda Sea. Although Indonesia 
considered the amount paid as very little or meaningless, 
it nevertheless viewed the payment as an act which con- 
stituted Japan's  recognition  of its archipelagic concept. 
The Japanese side, of course, simply viewed the payment 
as  a fee to enter an Indonesian port since the Japanese 
fishing vessels operating in the Indonesian  archipelagic 
waters had to report the results of their  operations to 
the predetermined Indonesian port. 
Fourthly, the arrangement was valid only for a limited 
time-1  yr.  Thus,  it had to be renewed every time; and 
each time, the discussions would center on the need for 
such an arrangement and on the points previously men- 
tioned. Basically, Indonesia did not consider the arrange- 
ment beneficial to her and therefore wanted to modify 
the  terms  to better  suit  her needs. Yet,  the Japanese 
side  considered  the  arrangement  extremely  important 
primarily because it involved activities and the economic 
life of  a certain sector  of  Japanese electorates; thus, it 
was politically significant for any Japanese Government 
in power. Each time the negotiation bogged down, polit- 
ical pressure wduld be applied on Indonesia. As a result 
the arrangement was renewed five times and replawd by 
a new arrangement in 1975. Between 1968 and 1975 the 
arrangement generated less &an  US$10 million for the 
Indonesian Government, namely, US$147,640 in license 
fees,  US$1,929,186  in  the  form  of  aids  (grant),  and 
~~$7,856,285  in the form of credit for project aids. 
Associations to prepare and transmit to the PSB a sailing 
plan for tuna fishing for each contract year. The plan is 
to be  carried out after due  acknowledgment  from  the 
PSB  "which  will  be  given  expeditiously"  (Article I1 of 
the  Contract).  The  area  of  operations under  the new 
arrangement remained the same, e.g., "the waters between 
the Indonesian  archipelagic islands,"  as provided for in 
the  Interim  Arrangement.  In  the Interim Arrangement, 
Japanese .fishing  vessels  were  not  allowed  to operate 
within  the limits of  30 mi  from  the  island of Ambon, 
but  unlike  the  Interim  Arrangement,  the  Japanese 
vessels  were  not allowed to operate within  15 mi from 
other  specified  groups  of  islands, such  as  the  Ceser, 
Gorong,  and  Banda  Neira  groups. The  restriction  that 
Japanese  vessels  should  engage  mainly  in  tuna  fishing 
and  only by longline method remained. The maximum 
catch was  now  reduced  to 8,000 t/yr and the number 
of longline vessels to be used was fixed at a maximum of 
100, consisting of vessels less than  80-gt class (class A) 
and 80 gt  or more but less  than  300-gt class (class B) 
vessels.  The  maximum  number  of  class  B  vessels  was 
limited to 33. Likewise, Japanese vessels operating under 
the Contract were required to bear markings, the details 
of  which  were  indicated  in  the  Contract.  The vessels 
were  not also allowed the use of mother ships or trans- 
porting vessels. 
One  new  provision  in  the  Contract  was  the  profit 
sharing arrangement. Under the Contract the Associations 
were to relinquish to the PSB 40% of the profit accrued 
from  their  operations.  The  detailed  formula  for  the 
calculatian of the profit was to be decided by both the 
By  1975  the  Indonesian  Government  had  become  Associations and the PSB. The Associations were to bear 
very  reluctant to continue with the arrangement. How-  all  operating expenses incurred in the operations of the 
vessels  as  well  as  transmit  to the PSB reports on  the  ever, it had  to continue giving special consideration to 
operations and  their  results, including a profit and loss  this  peculiar  Japanese  interest  because  the  Japanese 
statement.  On  the  other  hand,  the  PSB  was  to  take  Government considered the solution of the issue essential 
administrative  steps  to obtnin necessary  to  for their position on the matter of archipelagic states in  facilitate operations and assist the Associations in obtain-  the Law  of  the Sea Conference. Before Prime Minister 
ing the necessary port entry permit. The Japanese vessels  Tanaka could agree to express sympathetic views vis-a-vis 
operating under the Contract were also required to carry  the archipelagic principles when he visited Indonesia in 
certificates issued by the Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo.  1974, the  Indonesian approval to continue the arrange- 
ment in the archipelagic waters had to be secured first.  The Contract was to take effect on October 17, 1975 
By  September 26, 1975  the validity of  the Interim 
'%he  PSB  was established under the Government Regulation  Arrangement had  Again, new negotiations were  No.  12, 1969,  Government  Regulation  No.  16, 1972, and  the 
made. Both sides decided against a sixth  renewal of the  Articles of ~~~~~i~~i~~  N~.  37 of M~~  12,  1972 and domiciled 
Interim  Arrangement. Instead,  a new  arraq$ment  was  in  Jakarta  on the basis of the Minister of Agriculture's Decision 
made,  this  time  between  an Indonesian  Stare  Fishing  No. 350/KPTS/UM/8/1975 of 20August 1975. 44th~  of  the  Workshop 
and was  to be  valid for 3 yr beginning from the date the 
Interim Arrangement expired., 
Again, the implementation of the Contract during the 
last 3 yr was not encouraging to Indonesia. The profit 
from  the operations was calculated only at 2.5%. Since 
PSB's  share of the profit was calculated at 4W0,  the PSB 
gained only 40% out of the 2.5%, namely, about 1% of 
tb  total gross proceeds. The amount received  by  the 
PSB  wu  not even enough to cover administrative costs, 
such  as telegrams, verifications, etc. Furthermore, the 
number of Japanese vessels reporting under the Contract 
WEIS  less  than  the  maximum  allowable  number. While 
100 vewlr per year were allowed to operate under the 
Contract, only 23 reported for verification in 1975-1976, 
35 in  1976-1977 while 77 applied between September 
1977 and June 1978. Between September 1977 and April 
1978, only 35 vessels repoded for verification and check- 
ing at  Ambon. 
Various  problems  also  arose  under  the  Contract 
arrangement.  The  Indonesian  Department  of  Finance 
claimed  that  since  the  Japanese  Fisheries  Asjociation 
and  the  Japanese  crews  operating  undc:  the Contract 
gained their incomes in Indonesia, they should be levied 
taxes under Indonesian Law. Naturally, the Associations 
and  the  crews  refused  to pay  tax on the ground that 
they have already been teed  in Japan. The problem was 
solved  only  through  a  ':dispensation"  granted  by  the 
Indonesian  Department  of  Finance,  a  situation  which 
was  hardly  agreeable. Secondly, Japanese vessels  were 
granted  bunkering  facilities upon  entry at Ambon  for 
verification. The irregular entry of these vessels created 
problems for the Pertamina State Oil and Gas Company, 
which had  to make arrangements for the purpose from 
Jakarta. 
During the 3-yr period of the Contract, aside from 
the neghgible  1% profit sharing, the Indonesian side also 
obtained one training vessel along with equipment valued 
at US$1.8 million as grants and another repair shop for 
the PSB valued at US$200,000. 
Since the Contract is valid only for 3 yr, ending Sep- 
tember  27, 1978, both sides are once again faced with 
the ever-perplexing  problem of renewing the Contract. It 
is not yet clear how the arrangement will be made, if at 
all, in the coming years. 
Strict  enforcement  of  the  arrangement  with  Japan 
presented many problems. Firstly, the area covered by the 
arrangement was  relatively large  malung it difficult for 
Indonesia's  law  enforcement agencies to supervise. Se- 
condly,  other vessels, including fishing vessels also used 
the area as  a transit  route between the Indian and the 
Pacific Oceans, thus making it difficult for law enforce- 
ment  agencies  to  distinguish  vessels  covered  by  the 
arrangement from those that were merely passing through. 
Thirdly, the er#orcement  of the arrangement required an 
improvement h the efficiency of various enforcement 
agencies in terms of personnel, equipment, methods, as 
well as coordination.  Fourthly, even if the enforcement 
activities at sea worked smoothly, the process of judicial 
solution  through  courts would still be  monumental. A 
vessel  apprehended  at sea for violating the arrangement 
of Indonesian rules and regulations on fishing had to be 
brought to the court which could be  100 mi away from 
the site of apprehension.  A  few weeks or even months 
could pass before the case was finally settled. Financial 
damage to  both the vessel and the Indonesian Government 
(which  had to feed the crew during the waiting period) 
could be enormous. 
To avoid this situation, since the early 1970s the Indo- 
nesian  Government  issued  the  "peaceful  fine  system" 
under which a vessel alleged to have violated Indonesian 
fishing laws  and  regulations may  be  allowed  to leave 
Indonesian  waters immediately  upon  paying  specified 
amounts as fines to the Indonesian Government through 
the  law  enforcement  authority that apprehended it at 
sea. The idea was to avoid lengthy  and costly judicial 
procedures  for  the  benefit  of both  the vessel  and  the 
Indonesian  Government.  Unfortunately,  this  attempt 
also met with many  difficulties, and abuse of enforce- 
ment  powers  was  discovered  later  on. As  a result the 
system was abrogated. 
On  the other hand, vessels  which  fished illegally in 
Indonesian  waters  were  also  much  to blame  for  the 
difficulties  encountered  in  enforcing the  arrangement. 
Some  of  these  vessels  would  rather  bribe  the corrupt 
government  officials  rather  than  stand  trial, which  in 
any case would surely cost them more time and money. 
Various licenses have also been given by the Indone- 
sian Government to various Japanese companies to fish 
through joint venture agreements with Indonesian private 
fishing  companies. Dating back  to earlier  years,  such 
licenses were used in Arafura Sea for shrimp and others. 
This type of operation was a simple joint venture agree- 
ment within the  context  of  Indonesian Foreign Invest- 
ment Law. Like all joint venture investment agreements, 
they were all under Indonesian laws and therefore did not 
create the same problems. 
Fisheries Arrangement with the Republic of Korea 
South  Korea  is  one of the  countries in Asia  which 
have been developing far-distant fishing capabilities. It is 
therefore logical for the Government of South Korea to 
consider  possible  fisheries cooperation  with  Indonesia, 
and vice  versa. Officials of  both countries  first met  in 
Seoul, in July 1972 to discuss the possibilities of estab- 
lishing fisheries joint ventures in Indonesia. South Korea Itnplernentatiun  of  Ameernents with Foreignm/45 
agreed to encourage participation of Korean companies 
in  such  joint  ventures  while  Indonesia  expressed  its 
readiness to support such activities, including trial fishing. 
Both  parties also agreed to promote  fisheries technical 
cooperation through exchange of scientists and technical 
and scientific data, and in the field of education. South 
Korea further expressed its wllllngness to export fishing 
vessels on a credit basis while Indonesia agreed to explore 
the  pability of  importing  fimg vessels  from  the 
Republic af South Korea. 
A  secmd meeting was  held in Jakarta in  September 
1972, The  Kman fWg  company  agreed  that  as a 
fmt  step  toward  the  establishment  of  fheries joint 
ventures  in hdohesia under  Indoneaian law, it would 
"in  the very near future" send three tuna vessels and two 
stam  trawlers to "Indonesian  waters"  to perform  trial 
operations in cooperation with Indonesian private com- 
panies for a period of 6 mo.  Both aides agreed on the 
immediate implementation  of the trial  operation.  Also 
discussed in  the  meeting were the  realization of tech- 
nical  cooperation  arrangement between the two coun- 
tries,  the  possibility  of  conducting  a joint  survey  in 
Indonesia and its adjacent waters, and the possibility of 
importing fishing vessels from the Republic of Korba. 
A  third  meeting took place in  Seoul in May  1974. 
In this meeting it was agreed that the Republic of Korea 
would share its fishing experiences and techniques with 
Indonesia to develop the latter's coastal and distant-water 
fisheries. Both countries also agreed to further strengthen 
existing technical cooperation; to cooperate in research 
and survey of marine resources in the waters of Indone- 
sia; to encourage joint  ventures between private enter- 
prises of each country in the field of tuna longline, skip- 
jack pole-and-lining, and shrimp trawling; and to arrange 
through private sectors the exportation of fishing vessels 
from the Republic of Korea to  Indonesia. 
In practite, there has not been extensive fisheries co- 
operation between Indonesia and South Korea and there 
has  not  been  any  joint  venture  agreement concluded 
between private enterprises of each country. The question 
of enforcement of the IndonesianSouth Korean cooper- 
ation  was  therefore not very  prominent.  The issues of 
South Korean vessels were primarily those of transitting 
Indonesian archipelagic waters and how to prevent them 
from fishing while in transit. The issue was not so much 
that of enforcing agreements with other countries but of 
implementing Indonesian laws  and  regulations vis-a-vis 
the trandtting fishing vessels. 
Arrangements with Neighboring Countries 
In  1969, possibly taking the hint  from the  Interim 
Arrangement  between  Indonesia  and  Japan, Malaysia 
took the initiative in concluding an agreement on fiShing 
activities by Malaysian nationals in Indonesian waters in 
the Strait of Mp.  After some lengthy negotiations, 
however,  the  qttempt  failed  to have  concrete  results 
because,Indonesia  was  reluctant  to apply  the interim 
arrangement system with regard  to fishing activities in 
the Strait of Malacca.lIndonesia was,  however, prepared 
to cooperate with Malaysia on the basis of the Indonesian 
Foreign Investment Law  of 1967 (Indonesian Law No. 1, 
1967) to the  effect  that  Malaysian  private  companies 
would  be  encouraged to invest  througH joint  ventures 
with  Indonesian  fisheries  cooperatives  or  companies. 
This idea was not so attractive to Malaysia and therefore 
no agreement on fisheries has been concluded between 
the two countries. 
Singapore was also an  issue. Singapore claimed that 
for years its fishermen had traditionally fished in certain 
parts  of  Indonesian  archipelagic waters. Moreovel, for 
years, Singap  rean  vessels had  been visiting and plying 
the waters b  ween Indoqesian islands to buy fish from 
Indonesian f  ermen. The latter activities were more of 
tivities.  6 
commercial and trading activities rather than fishing ac- 
At  the  same  time,  Indonesia  was  concentrating its 
efforts on maintaining, implementing, and gaining inter- 
national  reco@tion  for  its archipelagic state concept. 
These  efforts  created  problems with  Singapore fishing 
activities  in  Indonesian  archipelagic  waters.  To  gain 
Singapore's recognition of its archipelagic state concept, 
Indonesia  undertook  several  consultations  with  the 
former and it seemed essential that Indonesia give some 
concessions to Singapore. One of the concessions given 
was  the  recognition  of  Singaporean traditional  fishing 
rights  in  certain  areas of  the  Indonesian  archipelagic 
waters. As  later incorporated in Article 51 of the ICNT, 
an  archipelagic state must  recognize traditional  fishing 
rights of neighboring states immediately adjacent to it in 
certain areas falling within its archipelagic watm. 
The recognition of traditional fishing rights, however. 
should be a qualified one. Firstly, the concept of tradition- 
al fishing rights should be  clearly distinguished from the 
concept of traditional right to fish. While some may argue  , 
that under customary international law, all  states may 
have  traditional  rights to fish in the high seas or in the 
waters which once were high seas, the concept of tradi- 
tional fishing rights should be based on real and existing 
practices. So, the existence of sufficiently long practices 
of fishing in certain areas of the Indonesian archipelagic 
waters must first be established before traditional fishing 
rights can be recognized. Secondly, the concept of tradi- 
tional fishing rights does not relieve foreign fishermen of 
the  obligation  to observe  Indonesian  laws  and regula- 
tions and shall not detract the Indonesian Government from protecting its fisheries resources as well as the well- 
being of its indigenous coastal fishermen; in  short, the 
concept  of  traditional  fishing rights  should  not be in 
conflict  with  the  efforts  exerted  by  the  Indonesian 
Government to develop its fishing industries for the well- 
being of its own fishermen. 
The  concept  of  traditional  fishing  rights, based  on 
actual fishing, must therefore be clearly defined. As far 
as Indonesia is concerned, the word "traditional"  should 
refer and respond to several criteria. Firstly, "traditional*' 
should  be  judged  in  terms  of time-frame, that is, the 
actual  existence  of  sufficiently  long  fishing  activities 
must be established. Secondly, "traditional"  should also 
indicate  the  area  frequently visited  by  the fishermen, 
that is,  the  fishing ground visited should be  relatively 
corrtant. Thirdly, "traditional"  should also refer to the 
fishermen  themselves, in the sense that the right  shall 
be granted only to the same fishermen who have visited 
the  area  traditionally.  Fourthly,  "traditional"  should 
also refer  to equipment  and vessels used as well as the 
mount of catch, in the sense that to qualify under the 
meaning of "traditional  fishing right,''  the vessels used 
should be relatively traditional ones. It  therefore excludes 
the  possibility  of  granting traditionat  fishing rights to 
moderd  vessels  with  modern  equipment, primarily be- 
cause  such  modern  vessels  and  equipment  would  put 
Indonesian local fishermen in an extremely disadvantaged 
position. 
The concept of traditional fishing rights is thus a com- 
plex one. Therefore, Article 5 1  (1) of the ICNT stipulates 
that  "the  terms and conditions of the exercise of such 
rights and activities, including the nature, the extent and 
the  areas to which they apply,"  shall have to be deter- 
mined  by  bilateral  agreement between the  states con- 
cerned. Fe  text also stipulates that the right conferred 
on the basis of traditional fishing rights shall not be trans- 
ferred  to or  shared  with  third  parties, either through 
joint ventures with other countries or through any other 
arrangements. It is therefore clear that in the future, the 
enjoyment of traditional fishing rights by adjacent neigh- 
boring states in Indonesian archipelagic waters is recog- 
nized although its implementation and modalities would 
depend on the bilateral agreement to be concluded be- 
tween  the  countries  concerned.  Up  to  now,  no  such 
agreement has been concluded. 
Needless to say, the recognition of traditional fishing 
rights of neighboring states immediately adjacent to the 
Indonesian archipelagic waters equally applies to Malay- 
sian  fishermen.  It  definitely  excludes fishermen from 
Japan, Korea, and other far-distant fishing nations. 
Arrangement with Thailand 
Thailand  is  one  of  the  fast-growing countries,  fast 
becoming a far-distant fishing nation. It also has one ot 
the most develo  d fishing industries in Southeast Asia. 
Although Thai  shermen still fih  largely within *-Gulf 
of Siarn and in f  he Andaman Sea, many Thai fishermen 
have  traditionally visited Indonesian archipelagic waters 
within the last several years. 
Due to its fast growing fishing industry, Thailand has 
also put up some conditions to support Indonesian archi-- 
pelagic  state principles.  Fully  aware  that  Thai  fishing 
activities within Indonesian archipelagic waters may or 
may  not be  included within the concept of traditional 
fishing  rights, Thailand,  in  supporting  the  Indonesian 
archipelagic state concept, is also asking for concessions 
in the form of special arrangements and cooperation on 
fishing in the Indonesian archipelagic waters. As in other 
cases, Indonesia is  always prepared  to enter  into some 
kind  of  arrangement with  Thailand on  the basis of its 
Foreign  Investment  Law of  1967. The  officials of  the 
two countries have met twice to discuss the matter and 
they have  agreed  to conduct a joint survey to look for 
appropriate  species that are economically and commer- 
cially  exploitable.  The  survey was  conducted in  1977. 
Both  countries  are  now  studying  and  analyzing  the 
result  of  the survey before attempting to conclude the 
necessary and appropriate fishing arrangement. 
The Right of Landlocked and Geographically 
Disadvantaged States 
Aside from Singapore and Laos, it would be difficult 
to name other Southeast Asian states that fall within the 
meaning of landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged 
states." At any rate, aside from Singapore, no other land. 
locked  and  geographically disadvantaged state has exer- 
cised  fishing  activities  in  the  Indonesian  archipelagic 
waters or territorial seas. Therefore, there is no need to 
discuss arrangements for this group. 
The  question  may, however, arise should Indonesia 
proclaim its own exclusive economic zone, as many of 
its neighbors have! By  then, in accordance with Artiples 
69 and 70 of the ICNT, some kind of arrangementy will 
have to be  made between Indonesia and the landlbcked 
and geographically disadvantaged states adjacent to it to 
allow the latter to use the surplus fishing resources in @e 
area falling within the former's exclusive economic zone. 
Since Indonesia has not yet  declared its exclusive eco- 
nomic zone, the question is more hypothetical than real. 
Indonesian Traditional Fishing Rights 
in Waters off Australia 
For centuries, Indonesian fishermen from eastern and 
southern Indonesia have traditionally visited the waters 
off the coast of Australia for various,kinds of traditional Implementation of  Agreements with ~oreignsp/47 
fisheries. Fishermen from Arnbon and the South Moluc- 
cas, for instance, have  traditionally visited the Gulf of 
Carpentaria for  pearl  fisheries. The Australh govern- 
ment  has  recognized these  traditional fishing activities 
which have  continued up to  the present without much 
difficulty. 
On the other northern coasts of Australia, Indonesian 
fishermen, primarily from the Lesser Sunda Islands, 4ave 
also regularly visited  the area around the Ashmore 4d 
Cartier Island groups for various kinds of fishing. Many 
of  these island groups now part of Australia were once 
regaxded as belonghg to the ancient kingdom of Roti, an 
island chain in the Lesser Sunda Islands group. The fish- 
ing  activities themselves  were  not much  of a problem 
since the Government of Australia has always recognized 
the  traditional  fishing rights  of  Indonesian fishermen. 
The problem was more of an environmental nature than 
of fisheries. The Indonesian fishermen, being traditional, 
used traditional vessels, equipment, and methods of fish- 
ing. They  were  generally unaware  of modern environ- 
mental problems. They therefore had the habit of going 
ashore to look for fresh water and firewood. Sometimes 
they hunted birds which, ip  Australia, were sometimes 
seasonally protected.  After various discussions between 
the  Government of  Australia  and  the  Government of 
Indonesia, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
on November 7,  1974. The Memorandum granted hdo- 
nesian traditional fishermen permission to operate in the 
exclusive fishing zone and on the continental shelf adja- 
cent to  the Australian mainland and offshore islands until 
February 28, 1975. As of March 1975, Australian laws 
and regulations would apply within its 12-mi exclusive 
fishing zone.  "Traditional fishermen" means the fisher- 
men  who  have  traditionally  taken  fish and  sedentary 
organism:  in Australian waters by methods which have 
be  n traditionally used over decades of time. "Exclusive 
fibg  zone"  means the zone of waters extending 12 mi 
seaward from the baselines from which the Australian 
territorial  sea  is  measured.  The  memorandum  further 
stated  that  after  February  28,  1975, Australia would 
continue to respect and allow operations by, Indonesian 
pationals around Ashrnore Reef, Cartier Islet, Scott Reef, 
Seringapatam Reef, and Browse Islet subject to the fol- 
lowing conditions: 
1. The operations shall be limited to  traditional fisher- 
men; 
2. Landings by  Indonesian  traditional fishermen for 
the purpose of obtaining supplies of fresh water shall be 
confined to  East Islet and Middle Islet of Ashmore Reef; 
3. Traditional Indonesian fishing vessels seeking shel- 
ter niay do so within the island groups mentioned above, 
but  persons shall not go ashore except as mentiohed in 
(2)  above. 
,The  memopdurn stipulated further that Indonesian 
fishermen woWd not be permitted to take turtles in the 
Australian  12-mi exclusive fding  zone. Trochus, beche 
de mer, abalone, green snail, sponges, and  all mollukcs 
can be  taken  from  seabeds adjacent  to Ashmore and 
Cartier Islands, Browse Islet and Scott and Seringapatam 
Reefs, 
Implementing the memorandum has not been easy. 
Up  to this  day,  despite numerous  circulars issued by 
either  the Directorate General for Fisheries or the local 
governments  fishermen bave  continued  to  violate  the 
memorandum. ,It  has  nbt  been  easy  also  to  ask the 
Mditiond fishermen to refrain from going onshore of 
an Wand  where they have traditionally visited for ages. 
The problem was therefore more one of education rather 
than one of law enforcement. It is fortunate that up to 
the  preseIif,  the  Australian  government  has  shown 
sufficient  understanding  of  the  complexities  of  an 
enforcement action. 
Recently, AusWa has also declared its intention to 
mforce  a  200-mi eqonomic  zone around its territory, 
he  200-mi area, if clwed  by Australia, although it has 
not been clearly delimited, would almost certainly affect 
the  fishermen  from  neighboring  countries,  especially 
fishermen from Indonesia wh~  have been fishing in the 
area.  This  is  something differeN  from  the traditional 
fishermen  discussed  above.  Taking cognizance  of  this 
fact, Australia has also indicated its willingness to con- 
sider the matter and has  offered the states concerned, 
including Indonesia, opportunities  to diswss whatever 
fishing interests Indonesia has in the area which would 
be claimed as part of Australian exclusive economic zone. 
The  matter  is now  under  serious  study  by  the  States 
concerned. 
Conclusion 
At present the only important agreement on fisheries ' 
concluded by  Indonesia is  the interim arrangement of 
1968  with  Japanese Fishing and Tuna Associations to 
fish in the panda  Sea  area. After several renewals, the 
interim  arrangement was  replaced in  1975  by  a profit 
sharing  arrangemeat  between  the  Indonesian  State 
Fisheries Enterprise and the Japanese Fishing and Tuna 
Associations. The  terms  of  the  interim as well  as  the 
profit  sharing arrangements were  not really  profitable 
to  Indonesia.  It  felt  that  the  terms  set  forth  in  the 
interim arrangement and the profit sharingsystem needed 
revision. The arrangements concluded in the  past have 
had many political overtones. 
Enforcement of these arrangements has not been easy. 
Firstly, s6me of the fishing vessels themselves were reluc- 
tant  to  report  to  the  Indonesian  naval  authority  at 
Ambon after completing their fishing activities. Secondly, 48/hw  of  the Sm  Workrkop 
the area of fishing was too large for the limited  number 
of  Indonesian patrol  facilities  to effectively supenrise, 
resulting in many violations comrnittedunnoticed. Third- 
ly, the  IndoneBian  law  enforcement capabilities them- 
selves were  extlremely limited either in number, equip- 
ment, or other(faci1ities. The emphasis on economics in 
the Indonesian development program within the last two 
Five-Year Devqlopment Plans has failed to strengthen or 
improve  Indonesian  surveillance  capabilities  for  law 
enforcement at sea. Fourthly, while there was inadequacy 
in  the capability and the efficiency of the law enforce- 
ment  agencks at sea, the psocedures involving judicial 
solution for any violators caught also required irnprove- 
ment, particularly in speed. Finally coordination among, 
the various law enforcement agencies at sea was poor. It 
is  a well-known fact that in Indonesia the navy, police, 
,  customs, and comqunications offices has 
its  immigati$  own e  orcernent jurisdiction and officen at sea. Al- 
though in theory these agencies are under the operational 
mmand  of regional Defense Commanders, in practlce 
it has not been easy for them to  coordinate their activities 
at sea. 
The other arrangement that Indonesia will make with 
regard to fishing activities in its archipelagic waters con- 
cerns the implementation of the traditiond fishing rights 
of the immediately adjacent neihboring states in certain 
areas  of  the  archipelagic waters.  The  details of  these 
arrangement7 must be negotiated and determine&  further 
through bilateral agreements. 
Indonesia also has problems concerning its traditional 
fishing rights in waters off the coast of some of its neigh- 
bors. Some of these rights, such as the right to fish off 
the  coasts  of  Australia, have  been  regulated  through 
bilateral arrangements. However, more time is needed to 
effectively implement  and  enforce such arrangements, 
especially since traditional fishermen concerned have to 
be fully educated to get used to the new arrangement. 
For various reasons, Indonesia has not yet declared its 
own exclusive economic zone, although it will certainly 
do  so  within  the  shortest  possible  time. If and when 
Indonesia decides to enforce its own exclusive economic 
zone, it would almost certainly conclude bilateral agree- 
ments with the relevant landlocked and "geographically 
disadvantaged states" in the subregion of Southeast Asia 
to enable fishermen from those countries to participate 
in the exploitation of the surplus living resources within 
the  exclusive  economic  zone.  Similarly, if  and  when 
Indonesia  declares and enforces its own exclusive  eco- 
nomic  zone, it would  also  certainly undertake negotia- 
tions with the relevant neighboring countries to delimit 
the exclusive economic zone of these countries. Implementation of Regulations for Domestic Fishermen 
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Introduction 
Fishing  is  a  very  important  industry  in  Southbast 
Asia. It not only generates employment but also provides 
the greatest source of  animal protein for the people in 
the region.  Approximately one-half or more  of  animal 
protein is supplied by fish. The actual percentage varies 
from  country  to  country.  In  recent  years  Southeast 
Asian  courltries have  witnessed  the rapid  development 
and expansion of  their fishing industries. A-number of 
problems  associated  with  management  of  fAery re- 
sources have been brou&t  about by this rapid expansion 
of the fishing industry. 
One of the most critical problems in Southeast Asian 
fisheries is  the  steady  depletion of inshore marine re- 
sources. A, number of  fisheries scientists have observed 
that  the  fisheries in  this region, especially the coastal 
resources, seem to be overexploited or nearly so. Similar 
observations were  made by participants in the workshop 
on fishery resources in the Malacca straits.'  The fishery 
resources  here  were  noted  ro  be  at least  moderately 
heavily fished and some stocks have reached full exploi- 
tation. Increasing the number of fishermen or improving 
the efficiency of the present number of fishermen may 
not increase the quantity  of  catch. The workshop also 
noted that for all the stocks in the Malacca Straits, any 
substantial increase in fishing will result in  a significant 
drop in  the catches of fishelmen already exploiting the 
stocks. 
Almost similar conclusions have been made by partic- 
ipants  In  the  Southeast Asian  Fisheries  Development 
Center (SEAFDEC)  Technical Seminar on South China 
'~eport  of the Warkshop  on xhe  FtPhkiy  Resources of the 
South China Sea Fisheries Rogtamme, SCS/Gfi~/76/2. 
Sea Fisheries Resources held in Bangkok in 1973.~  The 
Seminar noted that many fisheries within the region are 
gradually reaching full exploitation and that unless suit- 
able  action is  taken  to control  this,  economic waste, 
social distress, and damage to the resources will result. 
There are indications that overfishing has led to a decline 
in the proportion of high valued species, a decline in the 
size of fish caught, and an increase in  the quantity of 
trash fish. In  Malaysia before 1966 less than 16% of the 
total  landings consisted  of  trash fish.  Now  more than 
33% of the total landings from all types of gear are trash 
fish.  This  tremendous increase is attributed mainly to 
trawlers whose  average  catch  consists  of  up  to about 
70% trash fish. While a portion ofthe trash fish consists 
of uneconomic species, sometimes a significant portion 
of catch consists of juveniles of economically important 
species. Jones (1 976) reported that 27% of the trash fish 
from  trawlers  consists  of  juveniles  of  economically 
important species. 
Most indicative af overfishing is the rapid decline in 
the average catch per unit effort. In  spite of poor avail- 
able  statistics, indications of decline in  catch per unit 
effort were  noted at the seminars on fish stocks in the 
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. An analysis 
of the data of Mohd. Shaari (1976) showed a tremendous 
decrease in catch per unit effort in the trawl fishery off 
the Northern half of Peninsular Malaysia (Fig. 1). 
Another proof of overfishing in Malay~a  is the drop 
in total fish landings in recent years despite increases in 
the number of fAerrnen and fishing vessels.  One exm- 
'SEAFDU:  Technical Seminar on  South China Sea FishBties 
Resources, 21-25 May 1973. Baugkok. Thailasd. SEAPDEX/SCS 
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Fig. 1.  Catch par unit effort of trawlers off Perak, Penang, Kedah 
and his  (Based on Mohd. Shnari 1976). 
ple  is  the  14.6% decrease  in  total  annual  landings m 
1975 as  compared to the annual landings in 1974. The 
total catch in  1975 was  375,235 mt tons as compared 
to 459,574 mt in  1974. While  the annual catch some- 
times decreased, the landings of trash fish continued to 
increase (Fig. 2).  Although an analysis of total landings 
indicates overfishing in  the  fisheries of Southeast Asia, 
analyses of the landings of an individual species or even 
genus of commercial importance can give better insight 
into  the  fisheries. Examples of  such analyses are pre- 
sented in Figures 3, 4, and 5. In Figure 3 can be seen a 
rapid increase in the annual landings of Rastrelliger in 
Peninsular Malaysia  during the early 1960s. Since 1968 
however, there has been a drastic decline in the Rastrel- 
liger  catch,  suggesting that these  stocks off Peninsular 
Malaysia may be overfished. Some of this decline may be 
due to natural fluctuations although the relatively small 
size of  fish  in recent  catches suggests that  overfishing 
may  be  the  major  reason.  A  similar  pattern  of rapid 
increase  in  fish  landed  followed  by  a  sharp  decline 
in  annual  catch  is  true  for  most  of  our  commoner 
fishes, e.g.  Stolephoms  (Fig.  4). There  are  at present 
few data on the status of any individual species. 
The  rapid  development  of  small  trawlers  in  Indo- 
nesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  and  Thailand  during 
the  early  1960s has  led  to severe  conflicts with local 
-  marina catch  ---  imsh fish 
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FI'g.  2. Total marine landings and landings of trash fish in Pew 
sular Malaysia. 
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Fig, 4. Landings of Stolephonrs sp, in Peninsular Malaysia. 
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Fig. 5. The relationship between yield mQ-Pishing  effort. 
small-scale  fishermen  using  different  types  of  gear, 
particularly (hand lines,  gill  nets,  bag  n,ets  and  other 
small gear. Artisanal fishermen resisted the introduction 
of trawlers because they considered trawl fis$ing an in- 
discriminate fishing  method which had  adverse  effects 
on the spawning and breeding grounds of fish and prawns. 
They also feared competition from trawlers. During the 
early introduction of trawling there was much destruction 
of inshore gear especially bag  nets and  drift nets. This 
aggravated  the  conflict  between  trawlers and artisanal 
fishermen. 
In west Malaysia a total of 11  3 clashes between inshore 
and trawler fishermen were reported between 1964 and 
1976 (Goh  1976). These clashes, involving 437 trawlers 
and 987 inshore vessels, resulted in 34 deaths. In review- 
ing the conflict in West Malaysia, Goh (1976) noted that 
the greatest tension and conflict occurred in areas where 
there  existed  critical  problems  of  steady  depletion  of 
inshore  marine resources.  One such area is  the stretch 
from Penang to Pangkor Island where 90% of the clashes- 
occurred. 
Another important problem confronting managers of 
fisheries resources in this  region is the extent of illegal 
fishing and the lack of success of their current enforce- 
ment  programs.  All  of  the  countries  have  legislation 
regulating the fag  industry.  Most  of this  legislation 
attempts to deal with the conflicts of fishermen who use 
different types of gear.  All countries within the region 
have prohibited trawling in coastal areas. Some are more 
restrictive than others.  In Malaysia otter trawl nets are 
restricted  according to the distance from the coast as 
follows: 
(a)  Vessels of 100  gt and above with 200 hp and above 
should be used only in waters beyond 12  mi. 
(b)  Vessels of 25 gt and above with 60  hp and above 
should be used only in waters beyond 7 mi. 
(c)  Vessels of less than 25 gt  and with less than 60  hp 
should be used ody  in waters beyond 3 mi. 
Exceptions are permitted from November to February 
in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Vessels of less than 25 gt and less than 60  hp fishing 
with otter trawl nets are only permitted to fish between 
0600 and 1800 hours. 
The use of beam trawl nets to catch prawns is prohib- 
ited. 
In Thailand trawling is not permitted within 3 km  from 
the shore. Further, no trawling or push netting is permit- 
ted  in  a  region  between  Sitracha  and  Sattaheep, this 
region being an  important nursery ground for demersal 
fish species. No daytime trawlingis permitted in a spawn- 
ing region for RastreIZlTger  from February till the end op' 
March. 
In the Philippines no trawling is permitted in depfhs 521~0~  of  the Sea Workshop 
less than 7 fathoms. 
There  appear  to be  widespread violations .of  these 
prohibitions in  all the count~ies.~  Trawlers continue to 
poach  in  prohibited  areas  because  of  the  location  of 
prawn resources which have a high economic value. The 
intrusion of trawlers into prohibited  coastal areas is one 
of the most pressing problems facing fisheries authorities 
in this region. Enforcement of these prohibitipns has not 
been very effective despite complaints from inshore fish- 
ermen about the illegal  Poor enforcement 
of these prohibitions contributes greatly to the conflicts 
within the fishing industry. All the countries within the 
region need more pwsonnel and vessels for enforcement. 
There  are allegations that enforcement  officers can  be 
easily  bribed.  These  problems  as well  as the apparent 
leniency of the cou~ts  encourage illegal fishing. Another 
cause of poor  enforcement  is  the political influence of 
trawlerfishermen, One example of this is that when one 
trawler boat in a fleet of about 1250 trawlers was caught 
for illegal fishin ,  all 5000 fishermen in these trawlers 
stopped fishing. 
I? 
Many  trawlers in this region fish without licenses de- 
spite existing legislation requiring them to have such. In 
Malaysia it has been  estimated that in addition  to the 
4000-odd  licensed  trawlers,  are  more  than  4000 un- 
licensed  trawlers. These unlicensed  trawlers contribute 
greatly to excessive fishing effort and to the problems of 
fisheries management in Southeast Asia. These unlicensed 
trawlers  SO contribute to the overexpangion and over- 
capitalization in the fishing industry (Yap  1973). 
Another form of illegal fishing is popching by foreign 
fishermen  within  the  territorial  waters  of  Southeast 
Asian countries. Illegal fishing by foreign vesselsnorrnal- 
ly occurs at the fringe of each country's  territorial waterp. 
In some places poaching is so rampant that authorities 
have  taken  a very  serious view  of it. One example is 
the illegal poaching by fishing vessels from foreign coun- 
tries  in Malaysian  waters in the South China Sea near 
Mersing. In response to this Tan Sti Abdul Kadir Yusof, 
Law  Minister of Malaysia, issued a warning that foreign 
fishermen  who  intruded  into  these  waters  and  catch 
fish using explosives will be charged under the Malaysia 
Internal Security Act which metes out the death penalty 
to violators found guilty.7 
Another serious problem confronting the management 
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of  fisheries resources is  the  use  of illegal  gear both by 
fo~eign  and  local  fishermen.  Although  "destructive" 
fishing methods, e.g., the use  of  dynamite, poison and 
electricity, have been banned, violations of these prohi- 
bitions are frequently reported, There are also reports on 
unscrupulous  fishermen using  tuba root and sometimes 
pesticides to poison fish.8 These methods of fishing are 
very  destructive as  their use  destroys  all  fish including 
fry. There is also the potential danger of poisoning from 
eating such fish. 
Fishing by electricity also causes tremendous wastage 
as  the young fish are much more  susceptible than  thc 
large fish. In a few places crudely assembled instruments 
are used, posing tremendous risk to  the fishermen.  9 
In most countries severe penalties are given those who 
use explosives in fishing. In Malaysia the possession and 
use  of explosives for fishing is  covered by the Internal 
Security Act which metes out the maximum penalty of 
death. 
Piracy and poaching by foreign fishermen and vessels 
in the domestic waters is another problem. This problem 
is expected to grow with the extended jurisdiction of the 
economic zones. In  some cases these foreign fishermen 
use illegal methods such as explosives for fishing. In other 
instances it is a question of encroachment. A number of 
reports of piracy and kidnapping of fishermen and vessels 
have been reported. 
It  is  clear  from  the  above  that  there  are  several 
problems confronting management of fisheries in South- 
east  Asia.  These  problems,  though  unrelated  to  the 
changes in the Law of the Sea, must be  resolved before 
the  potential  benefits  of  the  extended  jurisdiction 
can be realized. 
The  establishment  and  implementation  of  effective 
management is of critical importance to all fishing indus- 
tries  in Southeast  Asia. Without effective control very 
little  benefit  can  be  derived  from the  exploitation  of 
fisheries resources or from investments made. Temporary 
benefits  may  be  obtained  through  some  management 
efforts or through  the adoption of technological, inno- 
vations.  These  benefits  will  quickly  be  dissipated as 
greater pressure  on the fish stocks will lead to reduced 
yields and lower income. 
Objective of Fisheries Manageme+ 
The principal need of any fisheries management pro- 
gram is a clear set of well-defined objectives that every- 
one in the  fishing industry clearly understands. Failure 
'"poisoning  Fish," Malay Mail, 6 August  1977. 
'"catching  Fish  by  Electricity: A  Warning," New  Straits 
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to adopt  such  objectives greatly  affects all  aspects of 
fishery management. The absence of well-defined objec- 
tives gives rise to confusion as to  the kind of realations 
needed for proper and effective management. Decisions 
tend to be ad hoc and haphazard and give rise to contra- 
dictory fishery programs which offer limited benefits to 
the fishing industry. 
A  fishing  industry  with  well-defined  objectives will 
enable  the authorities to adopt proper regulation. Fish- 
eries scientists will  be  able to collect  the right type of 
data  to  support  management  efforts.  Fishermen  will 
then be in a better position to understand all regulations 
and support all management programs. 
It is possible to adopt various objectives for the fishing 
industry. Some of the objectives are: 
1. Maximum sustainable yield 
2. Maximum economic yield 
3. Maximum employment opportunities 
4. Maximum production for exports 
5. Maximum production of animal proteins 
6. Increased efficiency of the fishermen 
7. Optimum sustainable yield 
The  above  list  is  not  complete  as  there  are  other 
objectives proposed by policy makers, scientists, admin- 
istrators, and fishermen. While all of these objectives are 
by  themselves  laudable, unfortunately  it is not possible 
to adopt all of them for a particular fishery  as some of 
the objectives are in direct conflict with the others. For 
example, the objective  of maximum  economic yield  is 
in direct conflict with  the aim of increased employment 
opportunities. It is not possible  to simultaneously  and 
successfully pursue both objectives in a fishery. Similarly, 
the goal to increase efficiency of fishermen via the intro- 
duction  of technology  and advanced  gear runs counter 
to the need  to maintain  employment opportunities.  If 
dual  objectives  of  increased  efficiency  and  maximum 
employment are adopted, the increased income, because 
of  the  introduction  of  technologically  improved gear, 
will  attract more people  into the fishing industry. This 
was evident when trawlers were introduced in Malaysia. 
Unfortunately, the majority  of these people were unem- 
ployed  urban  youths who were  not from the existing 
fishing  community  (Gibbons  1976).  The  increase  in 
productivity  and production has not been accompanied 
by a significant reduction  in poverty or an  improvement 
in the level of living of traditional fishermen. Most of the 
economic profits from the modernization was reaped by 
boat owners who had little or no previous experience as 
fishermen. On the other hand, the increased productivity 
and exploitation had a greater pressure on the fish stocks 
and led  to subsequent  declines in catch per unit effort 
and productivity. Conflicting objectives of management 
have led to a variety of results, most of them bad. 
Maximum  sustainable  yield  is  a useful  objective of 
fishery  management  especially  for the conservation  of 
f&  stocks.  However, strict adherence to the maximum 
sustainable yield concept will not achieve socioeconomic 
goals (Crutchfield  1967; Rothschild  1971). While rnaxi- 
mum sustainable yield may be  a useful  guideline as to 
the  limits  of  exploitation  of a fishery, socioeconomic 
objectives should  be  considered in any fishery manage- 
ment program. 
A concept of optimal sustainable yield may be useful 
for the fisheries in Southeast Asia. This optimal sustain- 
able  yield  is  at  a level of exploitation  somewhere be- 
tween  the maximum  net economic yield  and the maxi- 
mum sustainable yield (Fig. 5). This objective takes into 
accdunt  the  maintenance  of  fish  stocks as well  as the 
socioeconomic aspects of fisheries. This optimal level of 
exploitation should be  based on analyses of the interest 
to all users of fishery resources. It should ensure reason- 
able  wages  and a reasonable  return  on investments for 
those  involved  in  the fishing industry.  Further, unless 
otherwise  necessary,  the  maximum  sustainable  yield 
should never be exceeded. 
Allocation of Resources 
The basis  of regulations governing the use  of fishery 
resources  is  usually  the status of  the stocks.  However, 
allocation  of  the resources and  the economic status of 
the user  are  obviously  involved. Unfortunately, insuffi- 
cient  attention has been  given  to the allocation  of  re- 
sources among user groups in the management of fisheries. 
Conflict between  traditional  inshore  fishermen and 
trawler  fishermen has developed as a result of poor allo- 
cation  of  resources  between  them.  They  essentially 
compete  for  similar  resources.  This problem  is  a con- 
sequence  of  the  common  property  nature  of  fishery 
resources, and its importance increases with the increased 
competition for fish. 
The allocation problem is not unique to the fisheries 
in Southeast Asia. It is a difficult issue that managers of 
fishery resources must consider. In Southeast Asia fishery 
managers  must  make  decisions  on the allocation of re- 
sources between traditional artisanal fishermen and those 
using trawlers and other modern gear. The recurring con- 
flict among different user  groups is clear evidence that 
there  is  an  urgent need for proper allocation uf fishery 
resources. 
With  resources  becoming more  scarce  and the prob- 
lems  more  critical,  fisheries  management  in  Southeast 
Asia  should immediately  take  steps to solve this prob- 
lem. A useful policy  would be to reserve the inshore rc- 
sources including the important prawn  resources to the 
more  selective  traditional  or  artisanal  gear.  Trawling 
fleets should be developed to exploit only offshore fish- 54/Low of the Sea Workshop 
ery resources. The traditional  gear should be improved 
to increase their  selectivity and efficiency in exploiting 
prawn resources. 
Serious consideration should be givkn to  the allocption 
of an  adequate area or adequate  resources to maintain 
fauna  assemblages or population  of certain species for 
conservation purposes. 
Methods of ~+eries Wgement 
As  a number of  fish stocks in this region are either 
becoming fully exploited  or are  already overexploited, 
fisheries authorities must examine the various methods 
by which they can regulate fisheries to achieve optimum 
fishing. This optimum fishing should take into considera- 
tion the biological and economic aspects of the fisheries. 
The productivity of a fishery is related to four main 
variables:  (1) growth rate of the fish,  (2) recruitment of 
fish into the fishery by reproduction or migration, (3) nat- 
ural  mortality  of the fish, and (4) fishing mortality. Of 
these, we have no control over natural mortality and rate 
of growth. We  can control fishing effort and recruitment 
into the fishery. Recruitment into the fishery is conttol- 
led mainly by regulating the age at which fish enter the 
exploited phase of the fishery. 
All schemes for regulating fisheries can be classified as 
those to control fishing intensity and those  to control 
the age at which fish entered the fishery. The two basic 
methods of regulation are : 
(1)  Control of fish effort 
(a)  catch limitation 
(b)  control of fishing intensity (effort) 
(c)  reduction of fishing time 
(d)  protected area 
(2)  Control of age of entry into fishery 
(a)  minimum mesh size regulation 
(b)  minimum size of fish 
(c)  protected area 
These two groups of methods are complementary and 
not alternatives. Regulations for optimurh fishing must 
concern both. The main  consideration is therefore one 
of deciding which method or combination of methods is 
mast effective in regulating the fishery at its optimum. 
Control of Fishing Effort through 
Catch Limitation 
Catch  limitation  or  the  establishment of annual or 
sgsonal  quotas  foi  regulating  fisheries is  an  indirect 
method  of  controlling fishing effort. When  quotas are 
filled, fishing is stopped. With this method no considera- 
tion is given to the exact size of the fishing fleet and the 
methods of  fishing. Although  the regulation by catch 
limit may be administratively simple, there is no precise , - 
control of the fishing. This method of regulation requires 
a very precise estimate of the total fish landed, and hence 
a very extensive infrastructure  for the collection of data 
as  fish is landed in numerous  fishing villages in all the 
countries.  This  method  appears to be  very  costly and 
difficult to enforce. Furthermore this type of regulation 
may  result in  extremely short fishing seasons, as in the 
Pacific Halibut  Fishery between  1941 and 1952 where 
quotas were  the only  regulative methods adopted (Bell 
1970). However, the greatly improved fishing resulting 
from  catch  limitations  induced  a  large  influx  of  new 
fishing vessels, thereby doubling the fleet, With this un- 
controlled  entry  into  the  fishery,  quotas  were  filled 
within a very  short time.  The fishing season, originally 
ab6ut 8% mo, was reduced to about 1 mo. There was no 
fishing  for  the  rest  of  the  year.  If  this method  were 
adopted as  the  only method  for regulating fisheries in 
Southeast  Asia,  a similar problem of short fishing sea- 
sons could arise. The harmful effects of short fishing sea- 
sons will be more pronounced as there is no alternative 
fishery or employmentfor fishermen. 
Whereas quotas may be suitable for sport fisheries, it 
should be avoided for social and economic considerations 
in commercial fisheries. 
Control of Fishing Intensity 
Control  of  fishing intensity is  one  of the most im- 
portant  methods  of  regulating fisheries. Even  when it 
is  feasible  to establish other  regulative  methods, it is 
still  necessary  to  stabilize  fishing  rates  at  reasonable 
levels; otherwise, the benefits of regulative measures will 
be lost. This regulation method limits the entry of man- 
power  and  vessels  into  the  fishery. It is  practiced, al- 
though  sometimes not  successfully,  in  all  fisheries  in 
Southeast Asia. 
With this method of regulation, restrictions are placed 
on the number of fishing vessels or gear for each fishery. 
The number of licenses issued should be limited to some 
predetermined number based on the policy for that par- 
ticular fishery. This limitation should take into considera- 
tion biological, economic, social, and political factors. 
Fishing intensity is very  responsive to economic in- 
fluences. To maintain  it constantly  at  optimum, it is 
necessary to ~LX  it by  limiting the number of pieces of 
gear and vessels engaged in the fishery. If fishing intensity 
is not controlled, it will continue to increase until ineffi- 
ciency, caused by scarcity of fish, eliminates the incen- 
tives for expansion. This will give  rise to the dual prob- 
lems of overexpansion and overfishing. 
Effective control of fishing effort at a predetermined 
optimum will maintain optimum abundance of fish and 
hence  provide  optimum yield; permit  efficient use  of Implementation of  Regulations for Domestic Fishermen 
manpower and equipment; and permit improvement in 
the earning and living standards of fishermen. 
The  potential  benefits  of  this  regulation  can  be 
achieved only if the limits of fishing intensity are prop- 
erly determined and the limitations are strictly enforced. 
The failure of  current fisheries  authorities in Southeast 
Asia to prevent overexploitation is mainly due to lack of 
enforcement, and hence, the presence of a large number 
of unlicensed vessels.  As  far  as the fish stocks are con- 
cerned, any fishing activity, licensed or unlicensed, will 
apply  pressure  on them. The actual  fishing intensity is 
the sum of all fishing activities, legal or illegal. This is an 
excellent method of regulating fisheries. Unless enforce- 
ment is improved and unless more effective measures are 
adopted to check illegal fishing, this method of regulation 
will fail. 
The importance of regulating fishing intensity in fish- 
eries  management  must  never  be  underestimated. The 
success  or failure of  any  fishery management program 
largely depends on whether it can maintain fishing inten- 
Sity 'at or near the optimum. This is best done by limiting 
the number of boats and gear engaged in the fishery. If 
the fishing rate is excessive, it can be reduced by elimi- 
nating  some  of the units or by requiring each  unit  to 
operate at less than its capacity. The biological effects of 
both methods of reducing fishing intensity are the same 
but the social and economic consequences are vastly dif- 
ferent. 
Methods to reduce the fishing efficiency of each vessel 
are  much more  difficult  to implement as they impose 
hardships for the fishermen. There will be an immediate 
decrease  in  catch.  Unless  the  reduction  in  catch  is 
matched by a corresponding increase in the price of fish, 
there will be a reduction in income for the fishermen. It 
will  be  e~rtremely difficult  to convince  fishermen  to 
accept short-term losses for future potential increases in 
income. Even if  regulations are implemented, it will be 
difficult to enforce them. 
When  there  is  excessive  capacity  in  the  fishery,  a 
better alternative is to gradually reduce the fishing fleet 
by discarding the oldest and least efficient vessels. There 
is much merit in the recent attempts by the Canadian 
Fisheries  Authorities  to reduce  excessive  capacity  by 
introducing  the  "buyback"  policy.1  Governments  in 
Southeast Asia  should  consider subsidies  to the fishing 
industry and use the money to remove old and inefficient 
vessels from the fisheries. This should be examined togeth- 
er  with  programs  to find  alternative  employment  op- 
portunities for fishermen, especially in aquaculture pro- 
l~e~ort  of  the Workshop on the Fishery  Resources of the 
South China Sea Fisheries  Programme,  SCS/GEN/76/2. 
grams as a long-term solution to  the problems of excessive 
fishermen in the fishing industry. 
The problems  associated with reduction  of excessive 
fishing  capacity-either  excessive  fishermen  or  fishing 
vessels-are  very great. It is a better policy to determine 
the optimal effort of a fishery before expanding it. Fur- 
thermore,  during  the exploration and location of new 
fishery resources, it is important that both the standing 
crop and the maximum  sustainable yield are estimated. 
Limits  to  the  fishing  intensity  in  these  new  fishing 
grounds, either inshore or offshore, should be established 
before the fish stocks are exploited. The limitation of 
fishing  effort  should  consider  biological,  social,  and 
economic  factors but should not exceed the maximum 
sustainable yield unless absolutely necessary. Only when 
the  fishing  rate  is  predetermined  can  the problems  of 
overfishing and overcapi&dization in the fishing industry 
be solved. 
Control of Fishing Time 
Restriction of  fishing to  selected seasons has been tried 
in  some  temperate  countries. The concept of  seasonal 
fishing may not apply directly to tropical areas. A modi- 
fication of seasonal fishing with respect to  specific areas 
or zones may be useful in some fisheries. 
Limitation of fishing time may be useful if there is a 
need to  immediately reduce fishing effort due to scarcity. 
A  good  example  is  the  regulation permitting trawling 
for 6 d  a week. This will reduce the effective fishing 
effort of the trawlers by one-seventh. The fishing effort 
can  be  reduced  further by  limiting  trawling  or  other 
fishing methods to 5 da or less per week. Under certairi 
conditions these regulations are enforcible although such 
methods increase the cost of fishing. 
Limiting  fishing  to  specific  times  has  been  imple- 
mented  to improve enforcement of fishery regulations. 
In Malaysia otter trawlers of  less  than  25  gt  with  less 
than  60  hp are  only  permitted  to fish  from 0600 to 
1800 hr. Although this reduces illegal fishing by traders 
at night, additional poaching problems are presented'by 
larger trawlers. 
Protected Areas 
The establishment of specific sanctuaries in the fishing 
grounds  to protect  fish  during  specific  stages in  their 
development or to protect the species may provide a par- 
tial solution to the problem of overfishing. The creation 
of a sanctuary in areas which have large concentrations 
of juvenile  fish or are known spawning grounds will pro- 
tect these young fish until they are much larger. Further- 
more, fish within these specific reserves will mature and 
breed  with greater  success. This concept of specific re- 561hw  of  the Sen  Workshop 
serves has been used  quite successfully in the manage- 
ment of wildlife and forests. 
The location of these speciflc reserves is very irnpor- 
tant as the enforcement of such protected areas largely 
depends on their location,  Furthermore, if these  areas 
are  chosen  based  on  biological, geographical, and aes- 
thetic  factors  they  will  be  useful  educational  tools 
to inform  fishermen  and  the  public  on the need and 
importance of proper management and conservation of 
fishery resources. Support of fishermen and the public 
for conservation of fishery resources will greatly help the 
introduction and implementation of proper management 
policies. 
Enforcement of specific reserves may be much easier 
to implement as management can concentrate enforce- 
ment  units  within  these  specific  reserves. Moreover, I 
have been informed by some trawler fishermen that they 
would  help  patrol  these  specific  reserves  if  they  are 
created. A scheme such as the 'Rukun Tetangga" scheme 
in Malaysia  can be implemented to provide surveillance 
within  the  area  on  a  voluntary  basis.  For  fishery  re- 
serves  or  marine  reserves,  fishermen living  near  these 
reserves could help provide surveillance. 
Closed areas is an imprecise method ofmanaging these 
fisheries as it cannot maintain the spawning stock at any 
desired level. It generally results in overstocking of the 
sanctuary  areas  and  understocking of the unprotected 
areas. In spite of their inefficiency these sanctuary areas 
could  provide breeding as  well  as nursery grounds for 
fish.  Stocks  of  fish  within these sanctuaries could mi- 
grate and replenish the exploited areas of the fisheries. 
Mesh Regulations 
A rhethod to control  the age  of entry of fish into a 
fishery  is  the  establishment  of  legal  minimum  mesh 
size of fishing nets. This method is widely used in tem- 
perate  countries,  especially  in  fisheries  exploiting  a 
single deMersal species. A mesh size regulation reducing 
the  capture  of  young  and  small  fish  could  possibly 
increase the yield of some of the larger and more valuable 
species. 
If the mesh size of fish nets, especially those of trawl- 
ers, is increased, many smaller fish will be able to escape 
through the meshes. Soon these small fish will grow until 
they are big enough to  be caught by the net. With suitable 
mesh size the increase in weight of fish caught will more 
than balance the reduction caused by escapement. There 
will  also  be  an  increase in  the  population  of  larger, 
mature fish and this may result in greater production of 
young fish. 
The fisheries in this region are based on a great vari- 
ety  of species. The  optimum mesh  for each  species is 
different, depending on the species' size and shape. Most 
of the countries within Southeast Asia have established 
minimum mesh size limits for some gear. 
In the establishment of minimum mesh sizes especially 
for trawlers, overemphasis may be placed on the ability 
of trawlers to catch small fish, especially those that are 
unable  to grow larger. While ensuring that trawlers can 
exploit  these  resources,  fisheries  administrators  may 
have encouraged the development of a nonselective gear 
which endangers the stocks of other commercially impor- 
tant fish. This contributes greatly to  the conflict between 
the trawlers and the artisanal fishermen. If the mesh sizes 
of  trawl  nets  were  made  larger they  would  allow the 
escape of juvenile  fish as well  as fish and prawn that are 
small  by  nature.  These naturally small fishes could be 
exploited  by  other more  specific gear  especially those 
used by artisanal fishermen. With some modification and 
development,  traditional  gear  will  be  able  to exploit 
these  resources  specifically  without  endangering  the 
stocks of juvenile fish. 
By  the introduction of larger mesh  sizes it may  be 
possible to reduce the competition for similar resources 
between traditional gear  and trawlers. This reduction in 
competition will  also minimize the conflict within the 
fishing industry. Moreover, if the mesh sizes of trawl nets 
are such that they cannot catch small fish and prawn re- 
sources effectively, then trawlers will be forced by  eco- 
nomic factors to go further out to sea to fish and there" 
by  reduce  the  problem  of  encroachment into coastal 
waters by trawlers. 
In a recent analysis of the trash fish in the commercial 
landings of  fish in  Southeast Asia, Aoyarna  (1973) re- 
ported that there was  a wastage of young fish. The ratio 
of  trash  fish  to total catch was very high. Based on his 
analysis he recommended that the- mesh size of trawlers 
in Southeast Asia be enlarged to over 50 mm. 
Size Limits 
Minimum  size  limits are  established to increase the 
sustainable yield  by  allowing  more  animals to mature 
and increase reproduction. Size limits have been cited as 
the  most  effective  method  of  managing  some  stocks. 
This method of regulation has been adopted by Malaysia 
to regulate  the  cockle  (Andam granosa) fishery. The 
Malaysian regulation statcs that: 
(I), No cockle which is less than ?4 inch, measured in a 
straight line across the widest part of  the shell, shall be 
taken  for  the  purpose  of  transplanting to a  cultured 
cockle bed. 
(2)  No cockle which is less than 1%  inches, measured 
in a straight line across the widest part of the shell, shall 
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Unfortunately no legislation for teleosts exists. A size 
limit can be  used to enforce the closure of nurspry areas 
to fishing and encourage the fleet  to search  for larger 
fish and thus avoid the nursery grounds. Size limits may 
be useful for the Rastrelliger fishery in Soutlieast Asia. 
In practice, a size limit is valuable in enforcing a mesh 
regulation  for  different  species whose habitats  do not 
overlap.  In  a  multispecies  fishery  it may  be  easier to 
introduce  and  enforce  minimum  size limits than mesh 
size  regulations.  Where  a  mesh  regulation  exists  and 
fishermen voluntarily adopt it, there will be no need for 
size  limits.  Mesh  regulations  normally  release  a  large 
number of fish; hence there is temptation to use a smaller 
mesh size, especially in a fishery where it is virtually im- 
possible to ensure that all fishermen adhere to the mesh 
regulations. If minimum legal size is the only regulation, 
there will be an increase in the catch of small-sized fish 
which  cannot  be  landed. Unless these rejected fish can 
sunrive after capture, there  will be wastage. This varies 
greatly with the species concerned. With the use of mini- 
mum size limit some wastage is inevitable. Unless there is 
a reasonably clear-cut segregation and selection of large 
and small fish of a species, size limits will not be a useful 
measure to  adopt. 
Choice of Regulation Methods 
The choice of methods of regulation should take into 
consideration  economic, biological, social, and political 
factors  existing  within  the  fishery.  Methods  that  are 
difficult  to  enforce  are  less  likely  to  succeed  than 
methods that are slightly less efficient  but more easily 
enforced. In selecting the method of regulation the cost 
of  enforcement should be  taken into consideration.  It 
will be difficult to sustain the enforcement of regulations 
that  are  too expensive and  are  beyond the economic 
value of the resource. 
It will be extremely useful to discuss various regulative 
methods with  fishermen's associations and cooperatives 
before  a final  decision is made. The extent of support 
from  fishermen for various regulative methods depends 
on their perception of the regulations adopted. Support 
from fishermen will be greatly weakened if they feel that 
there is little or no benefit at dl for them. With regula- 
tions  that  are  designed  to redistribute  the  fishery re- 
sources,  fishermen who  feel  that  the  redistribution  is 
unfair will have little incentive to abide by it. Although 
such  regulations may  be  useful to the fisheries in the 
long term, they will be extremely difficult to implement. 
In such cases it will be  better if fishermen are first con- 
vinced  of  the  need to conserve fish  stocks.  In  quite  a 
number of fisheries, including those exploited by trawl- 
ers,  this  will  not  be  too difficult,  as  the recent  poor 
catches have  convinced many fishermen of the need to 
conserve. Some trawlerfishermen are convinced that fish 
stocks can  be  exploited to extinction. If fishermen are 
convinced of the depletion of fisheries resources and the 
need  for  control,  then  implementation  of  regulative 
methods  will  be  much easier. They  will then  be  more 
willing to help  in surveillance efforts, and there will  be 
peer pressure to observe the regulations. 
Regulations  drafted  wholly  by  officials may  be  in- 
adequate because officials do not have access to many of 
the  pertinent economic and social facts known only to 
fishermen. 
While there may be  many different methods in regu- 
lating fisheries as discussed above, one stands out as crit- 
ical  to the  proper  management of  fisheries. If  there  is 
satisfactory  control over the fishing intensity  as well as 
over new entries into the fisheries, measures adoptqd to 
- 
maximize the economic returns from the fishing industry 
will  be  fruitful. While  the  other methods are  useful in 
managing fisheries, they can at best provide only short- 
term  benefits  unless  there  is  effective  control  of  the 
level  of  fishing.  Where  there  is  no  effective  control 
of  the  amount  of  capital  and  labor  that  can  enter a 
fishery, the total costs of the industry will rise until they 
equal  the  total revenues.  Licensing systems to control 
entry into fisheries are already operating in the region. 
They may  require improvements especially in their irn- 
plernentation before the benefits can be evident. 
Effective control of fishing effort will: 
1. Maintain  optimal  abundance  of  fish  stock  and 
hence yield. 
2. Permit  close  approach  to fully  efficient  use  of 
manpower and equipment. 
3. Permit  improvement  in  the  earnings  and  living 
standards of fishermen. 
Enforcement 
Perhaps no management problem  is  greater for fish- 
eries  authorities  and  fishermen  than  that  of  enforce- 
ment.  Although  there  is  a  variety  of  regulations  for 
fishery  resources,  there  is  considerable  difficulty  in 
ensuring that  these regulations are  adhered  to.  This is 
particularly true of the Southeast Asian fisheries. 
The  most  important  task  is  to raise  the morale  of 
enforcement  officers  and  to  replacc  corrupt  ones. At 
the  same  time  the  efficiency  and  number  of  patrol 
vessels  should  be  increased.  Ancraft  with  modern 
detection  devices  should  be  introduced  to  carry  on 
surveillance  within  the  fishing  grounds.  This  can  be 
done  with  other surveillance activities such as the con- 
trol of smuggling  and piracy. 
There is an urgent  need  to eliminate bribery  in  the 58/1,ow of  the Sea Workshop 
fishing industry.  Illegal  fishing  by  fishermen  must  be 
stopped  as  it  encourages  bribery.  Fisheries  authorities 
in  Southeast  Asia  must  solve  the  problems  of  the  An- 
licensed  vessels.  Licensed  or  not, they  exert  pressure 
on  fish stocks. Wherever  possible,  those  caught  fishing 
illegally should be prosecuted. 
The existence  of  an extensive number of  unlicensed 
trawlers calls for a new  approach to the problem. One 
possible solution is to declare amnesty for all unlicensed 
fishing vessels and then to license them. This will enable 
fisheries authorities to obtain betterstatistics and be in a 
better position  to determine the effective fishing effort 
to be exerted. After the amnesty period, enforcement of 
regulations should be stricter. 
Control of piracy  and poaching by  foreign fishermen 
can be achieved through strict surveillance and by intro- 
ducing joint  patrols at the border areas. For example, at 
the  Thai-Malaysia  border,  vessels  with  enforcement 
officers of both countrics can be used to patrol the fish- 
ing grounds. These joint patrols can be based on bilateral 
agreements or on one covering all of Southeast Asia. With 
the introduction of joint patrols, there will b::  a reduction 
in  cost.  Hot  pursuit  and arrest  or the cu1,orits can  be 
more  effectwe.  The  sensitive  issue  of  nationality  of 
pirates  or illegal  fishermen  vis-a-vis that of  the enforce- 
ment  officers will  be reduced. Although this suggestion 
may be  new to Southeast Asia, a system of international 
control of approved regulations between members is pro- 
vided for in the International Pacific Halibut Commission 
(Bell  1969). 
Suggested Strategy for Management 
of Domestic Fisheries 
While  formulating  policies  and methods to regulate 
fisheries  in this region, the authorities should take into 
consideration two fundamental elements-one  concerning 
the  common  property  nature  of  the resource  and  the 
other concerning  the multispecics  fish stoc~s  exploited 
by  different  gear  of  varying  efficiency. Two different 
strategies can be adopted. One is "composite  regulation" 
where  several different regulative measures either on an 
area or gear basis are adopted so that each major species 
or group of species is exploited at its optimum. With this 
type  of  strategy  the  criteria  for optimum fishing will 
depend  on  the fishing  fleet  and the  status of the  fish 
stocks. 
The other strategy is to have uniform regulation, that 
is,  to accept  the existing distribution of  fishing effdrt 
and  to stabilize  the fishing effort in all the  fisheries by 
similar regulations. Regulations will  then be required to 
give  the best average result for all species and all types of 
gear. This will  be  extremely  difficult to implement be- 
-  cause of the multisbecies fi-&ery in  Southead Asia. 
There is no doubt that composite regubtim of the 
fisheries in Southeast Asia would produce better results 
than  uniform  regulations. This is  so despite  the great 
overlap in the distribution of many species and  the ~lec- 
tion of existing fishing gear. 
The main  problem with  composite regulation is the 
need to enforce regulations which apply to some areas 
and species but not to others. This  seems insurmount- 
able with  the  current status of enforcement. There is a 
greater dependence on voluntary conformity with rap- 
lative measu!es  by fishermen. 
One approach which can be adopted is to allocate the 
inshore fishery resource to artisanal fishermen and other 
selective gear, while the trawlers and other modern types 
of gear are restricted to the offshore fishing grounds. In 
adopting  this allocation the boundary  between the in- 
shore  and  offshore  fishing  grounds  must  be  clearly 
defined, The boundary must consider the distribution of 
fish as well  as the implementation and enforcement of 
such boundaries. A useful factor in allocating fishery re- 
sources is the distribution  of  prawns. Competition  for 
this  resource  is the  main cause of confiict within  the 
fishing industry. It may be useful to allocate the prawn 
resources to the inshore fishery. If this is accepted many 
of the problems can be solved. Even with this, there is a 
need to increase the selectivity of some gear as well as to 
improve other types of gear so that they can exploit the 
inshore  resources,  including prawns, more  efficiently. 
The artisanal fishery can be  developed with a policy of 
providing  more  employment,  but  due  consideration 
should also be  given  to the status of the stocks to pre- 
vent  overexploitation. The economic returns to fisher- 
men  can  be  regulated  by  regulating  the marketing of 
fish, 
The offshore fishery resources should be exploited by 
trawlers as well as other modem gear. Within this fishery, 
advances  technology and efficiency should be encour- 
aged. In this fishery the common property nature of the 
resource can be curtailed by limiting the entry of fisher- 
men. 
No  management  program  can  be  successful unless 
policy  makers,  fishery  administrators,  and  fishermen 
themselves are convinced of the,eeed for regulations and 
proper management of the fishing industry. This calls for 
an educational program to increase the awareness of all 
concerned  for the conservation of fish stocks. Greater 
public awareness of the need to conserve fih  stocks will 
bring greater support for management efforts. 
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Report of Group A 
Introduction 
It is recognized that there is a lack of factual data, and 
even  conflicting  sets  of  statistics,  on shared  stocks in 
Southeast Asia. Hence there is a need for regional coop- 
erative niechanisms for data exchange. 
More  specifically,  there is a need for improved com- 
munication and information distribution. There is a need 
for  a  regional  mechanism  to stimulate and coordinate 
regional and national research and collection of data on 
types of equipment, use of research vessels, and teaching 
of skills. Such a regional mechanism, acting as a clearing- 
house among other functions, can carry out schemes for 
regional and national benefits which may be low on the 
scale  of  a  particular  state's  priorities.  It is  recognized 
that some regional organizations already exist. The idea 
is to supplement and complement  those already in exis- 
tence. 
A  region-wide  framework  for  more  refined  data 
collection is needed, especially in resource evaluation. 
It  is  furthermore  recognized  that planners  have,  of 
necessity, to make timely decisions, but it is also recog- 
nized that there should be a firm basis for medium- and 
long-term research. In this respect there should be greater 
attention to improved research methodologies as well as 
fuller use of standardized methodologies. 
There  is  also  a  widespread  need  to develop  strong 
national  research  capabilities  through  education  and 
training schemes. Also skills in fishery  development and 
management should be built up. 
It is emphasized that many of the problems reviewed 
here are clearly national probleins. They become regional 
in  cases when  stocks are  shared, for example.  In  such 
instances,  cooperative  efforts such  as  regional  tagging 
programs are clearly called for. 
A division of labor in the area of cooperative research 
is needed. 
A small but competent regional mechanism can keep 
track and  coordinate  activity  of many kinds, provide  a 
~ider,  balanced regional view, prevent waste in research 
effort,  and  can  do some  work  mrre effectively  than 
national bodies and also stimulate such national bodies. 
Allocation and Waste 
Domestic and international arrangements to deal with 
allocation  and waste  may be necessary, but it is under- 
stood that institutionalized infrastructures are not neces- 
sarily a prerequisite for action. 
It is emphasized that whatever measures are taken for 
resource allocation, some of the benefits derived should 
seep down to the traditional fishing communities. 
There is aneed to  examine closely the efficacy of zone 
and catch quotas in relation to resource allocation. 
In allocation and in the prevention of resource waste, 
enforcement  of  rules  is  an  essential  ingredient.  Such 
enforcement could be  achieved  through suitable  forms 
of agreements covering regulations on stocks and harvest- 
ing. 
When  there are such agreements, it is important that 
they  incorporate  clauses  which  help  develop  national 
capacities  for  enforcement  against  waste  and infringe- 
ment of agreed allocations. 
To carry out resource allocation and waste prevention 
effectively, stable financing  of research workers is needed. 
Also needed is the accumulation of a reservoir of skill in 621~aw  oftthe  Sea Workshop 
terms of technology and management. 
One negative point in this connection is the widespread 
practice  of  promoting highly  slulled  md experienced 
researchers to purely administrative functions.   his leads 
to a loss  of  skill which should be  remedied by a con- 
tinuity of training programs. 
The generally low remunerations of both research and 
administrative  personnel  works  against  motivation, 
commitment, and high competence. 
Any form of bilateral, multilateral or regional arrange- 
ments  should not infringe upon national  sovereignties, 
insofar  as possible. Care should be taken to ensure that 
benefits should exceed the costs. 
Some problems cannot be solved except through such 
agreements. Therefore, it is advantageous to have mech- 
anisms to  facilitate such agreements. 
It is recognized that political decisions may often be 
pcial  in regard to  allocation as well as in the making of 
agreements. In this sense bilateral arrangemkntsmay have 
some advantage-over-multiparty arrangements. 
Extensions of National Jurisdiction 
Extensions of national jurisdiction will  lead to greater 
necessity for bilateral  and other agreements since some 
states will get increased resources, while others get less. 
Inevitably there is the problem of enforcement. Here 
there is a need for a summary review of mechanisms and 
costs involved. While  there are opportunities for better 
management  of  resources,  the  techniques  should  be 
examined through cost-benefit analysis. 
Extensions  of  jurisdiction  will  necessitate,  among 
other  things,  a  strengthening of security  arrangements 
and pollution controls. These should again be seen in the 
context of bilateral or multilateral agreements. 
One  disadvantage is the possibility that international 
political iproblems  will  arise out of  overlapping claims 
and  loss  of  access  to resources by some states.  When 
highly sophisticated techniques are introduced in relation 
to traditional fishing rights, friction may well arise. 
Extensions mean that traditional navigational meth- 
ods,  e.g.,  coast-hugging, use  of  coastal landmarks,  and 
lack of a compass, may become risky for some traditional 
fishermen who may be accused of trespassing on another 
state's property. Education of such fishermen is therefore 
needed, as well as the building up of technological capa- 
bility. 
All  this calls for proper policing of transit and passage 
in the region. 
The responsibilities of coastal states claiming extended 
jurisdiction are emphasized. They should therefore devel- 
op their own  capacities to respond effectively to these 
responsibilities. These responsibilities are outlined in the 
1X)S TI1 ICNT. 
Enforcement 
It is  ipportant to streamline  national enforcement 
implementation  procedures  to minimize  irregularities 
at all levels, where such irregularities are a problem. 
Enforcement  will  be  more effective if  all  personnel 
involved  obtain  improved  remuneration  and  at  the 
same  time  wrong-doers are  faced  by  stiffer  penalties. 
To  ensure  against  poaching and other infringement 
by  distant water  fleets or vessels,  those  caught should 
be  given  heavier  penalties  as  has  been  done  in  some 
countries. 
There  should  be  cooperative  working arrangements 
between neighboring states to better enforce rules. 
In some cases, boarding of foreign vessels by research, 
technical,  and  other  personnel  will  help  in  gathering 
needed  data  and  in  ensuring compliance.  Also  better 
education of fishermen to understahd rules and to report 
infringements dl  help. 
Regional cooperation in the use of satellite surveillance 
and  "black  boxes"  (transponding  devices)  should  be 
exanked. 
Some problems of enforcement include the fact that 
it may be expensive for governments. 
Cost-benefit and costeffectiveness stuhes are called 
for in relation to the building up of large patrol fleets. 
Above  all,  in  enforcement  the  coastal  state has to 
weigh  the  effects  of  strict  enforcement in  the  overall 
context of its relationship with the other states involved, 
in terms of trade, aid, capital inflow, etc. 
Some Other Observations 
The  system  of  franchises should be  examined  in 
relation to use of resources. 
Joint  and  cooperative ventures  are suitable vehicles 
for development, technology transfer, teaching of slulls, 
and capital inflow. 
Private  companies  within  the  region  should  be  en- 
couraged  to  go  into  regional  joint  ventures.  These 
"cooperative  ventures"  will  strengthen  regional  capa- 
bflities and regional cooperation. 
Joint or cooperative ventures will  probably be  based 
on  high  value  species, and post-harvest processing will 
likely be  involved. Ths will  necessitate higher technol- 
ogy  and  skills to which the regional  mechanisms, e-g., 
regional  joint  ventures,  will  have  to  respond.  In  this 
process,  a  movement  of  labor  may  be  created.  This 
labor  should,  where  necessary,  be  provided  by  the 
traditional  fishing communities,  which  should  benefit 
from the creation of the new fishing ventures. 
Ventures  wholly  owned  by  externals  may  create 
problems  of compliance if the technological gap  is too 
great. Generally,  joint  ventures  will  help  to ensure  com-  the effectiveness of resource use. 
pliance  with  national regulations, as  well  as imreasing 
Report of Group B 
I. The allocation of valued shared stocks of fish must 
be dealt with by bilateral, multilateral, or regional 
agreements among the states concerned. 
A.  Cooperative  research  is necessary 'by the states 
concerned to assess thc srate of the'stocks under 
exploitation. 
B. Allocation might be bas?d on zonal quotls. 
Advantages 
1.  Management  becomes  the  responsibility  of 
the coastal states. 
2. Zonal  quotas  support  the establiament of 
property rights. 
Disadvantages 
1. If management is inadequate, the stocks could 
be jeopardized.  ' 
(Possible solution:  To ensure adequa+p  =Ian- 
agement, enforcement agencies of  LAL~  con- 
cerned states must, from time to time, cool- 
dinate their activities.) 
2. If  the waters of one zone contain the stock 
only in its juvenile form, fishing in that zone 
could lead to lower yields in other zones and 
to the eventual depletion of the stock. 
(Possible  solution:  Size limits could  be ir 
posed and some means for compensating the 
losing state could be worked out by the par- 
ties concerned.) 
3. Zonal  quotas would require detailed knowl- 
edge of the stocks. 
(Possible  solution:  Cooperative  research  by 
the concerned  states could facilitate the ac- 
quisition of the knowledge.) 
C. With  regard  to  stocks  of  interest  to extra- 
regional  countries,  cooperation  to  maximize 
returns and benefits may be desirable by states 
in whose waters the stocks are found. 
Advantages 
1.  The concerned states have.a better negotiat- 
ing position with regard to the extra-regional 
states. 
2. There are improved possibilities for the trans- 
fer of technology. 
3. Inforn~ation  for management  would  'be  im- 
proved. 
IS.  Extension  of  national jurisdiction  over  fisheries  is 
desirable 
Advantages 
1. It helps to guarantee the integrity of the coastal 
states. 
2. It guarantees the primacy of the interests of the 
states within the region with regard to the activi- 
ties of extra-regional states. 
3. It  increases  opportunities  for  development  of 
fisheries by certain countries. 
Disadvantages 
1. There  is  a  reduction  of  fishing areas for some 
states. 
(Possible  solution:  Cooperative  arranbements 
among  concerned  countries  can  alleviate  diffi- 
culties.) 
2. There are increased  responsibilities  and costs for 
research, conservation, management, and enforce- 
ment. 
(Possible  solutions:  Cooperative  arrangements 
among  concerned  states  can  reduce  costs  and 
facilitate meeting of responsibilities.) 
3. Delay  in  creating  Extended  Economic  Zones 
creates  uncertainty  about  fisheries  boundaries, 
thus creating problems for fisheries development 
and  for  cooperation  in  fisheries  arrangements. 
(Possible  solution:  Tentative  agreements among 
concerned states may  be  reached  for special pur- 
poses.) 
III. Strengthening of enforcement requires strengthening 
of  surveillance and arrest capabilities, improvement 
of  judicial  systems,  and reporting  of  results, each 
commensurate with the others. 
A. Increased  public  awareness  of  the  objectives of 64/~aw  of  the Sea Workshop 
enforcement is necessary. 
B, Effective surveillance and arrest requiie a greater 
degree of coordination or unification of enforce- 
ment forces within countries than presently exist. 
C. Cooperation between neighboring countries over 
enforcement in border areas, or in other areas as 
necessary, is desirable. 
D. For shared stocks, enforcement is made easier if 
there  is  uniformity  in rules  and regulations  on 
fisheries among bordering states. 
E. Flag  states  should  take  more  responsibility  in 
teaching their fishermen  the rules of the states in 
which  they  fish, to prevent them from violating 
the  rules.  Coastal  states  should  educate  the 
concerned4aw enforcement officers so that laws 
and regulations will be enforced correctly. 
F. Attempts should be made to develop a uniform 
record of catch for all fisheries in the Southeast 
Asian region. 
G. Enforcement  will  be  more  effective  if there is 
increased  communication  and  understanding 
among  Southeast  Asian  states  through  more 
frequent contact between officials. 
Report of Group C 
Problems of Allocation and 
Management of Fish Stocks 
It was the feeling of the group that there is a need for 
additional  information  bearing  on  the management  of 
fishery  stocks in the region. Nevertheless, the group was 
of the opinion that there already existed sufficient data 
indicating  that  substantial  proportions  of pelagic  fish- 
eries, especially scads (Decaptems spp.),  mackerel (Ras- 
trelliger spp.),  and  tuna, are shared  by  more than  one 
country in the region. 
On the basis of the available evidence it appeared that 
the present "free for a1l"situation would not advance the 
interest  of either individual countries or the region  as a 
whole. Indeed, it was felt that there was both necessity 
and  room  for  some  sort  of  regional  arrangements  for 
more effective management of such shared stocks. 
It  was  also  noted  that  such  regional  agreements 
could bc reached only if it was seen to be advantageous 
by  cach  of  the  participating  countries.  For  example, 
artisanal  fishermen,  who comprise a significant element 
of most of these countries in the region, would have to 
be considered through the setting up of designated fishing 
areas. 
Some advantages of regional cooperation would be to: 
i. promote the orderly and rational conservation and 
utilization of fisheries resources, 
ii. provide  morc  effective  mechanisms  for dealing 
with nonregional parties, 
iii. rcduce cost of managemenl, 
iv. allow for inore efficient gatherins wd  dissemina- 
tion of information relating to fishe ies, and 
v. facilitate the securing and utilization of technical 
aid from appropriate international bodies. 
A possible  problem anticipated is that it may be diffi- 
cult  for  all  parties  concerned  to agree  on  a common 
approach.  As  such,  regional  cooperation  may  have  to 
proceed from a bilateral to a multilateral stage. 
Implications of Extended Jurisdiction 
The extension  of jurisdiction  by states in the region 
will  benefit  the  coastal  states  with  the  exception  of 
Thailand  and  Singapore.  Thailand,  as  a nation  with  a 
distant  fishing  fleet,  rnay  lose  some  fishing  grounds. 
Singapore  would  gain  little  spatially  and  would  also 
lose some fishing grounds. 
On  the other hand, extended jurisdiction  may allow 
for more effective handling of fishermen from countries 
outside the region. 
Enforcement 
It was felt that to realire maximum benefit from the 
foregoing,  there  has  to be  more  coordinated  enforce- 
ment. There is a need to improve the quality of surveil- 
lance  and monitoring of fishing activities in the region. 
New  technology  for  surveillance  should  be  examined 
arid  introduced as appropriate. The capability to appre- 
hend illegal fishing vessels should be enhanced. 
Here,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  such  enforce- 
ment would be possible only if there is maximum coop- 
eration between and among participating countries. 
For  example,  this would  be  particularly  applicable Report of Group C/  6  5 
for policing of transiting fishing vessels. 
Conclusion 
advantages of regional cooperation in  the  management 
of  fisheries based  on shared  stocks and in dealing with 
extra-regional countries, concluded that cooperation was 
both possible and desirable. 
The group, having considered the advantages and dis- List of  Participants 
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INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LIVING AQUATIC RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
~ The International Center for LivingAquatic ResourcesManagement(ICLARM)is an auto-
nomous, nonprofit, international scientific and technical center which has been organized to
conduct, stimulate, and accelerate research on all aspects of fisheries and other living aquatic
resources.
The Center was incorporated in Manila in 20 January 1977 and its operational base was
established in Manila in March 1977. Although the interests ofICLARM are worldwide, initially
the organization~s primary attention is being directed to problems in Southeast' Asia and the
Southwest Pacific. .
ICLARM is an operational organization, not a granting or f~nding entity. Its program of
work is aimed to resolve critical technical and socioeconomic constraints to increased pro-
duction, improved resource management, and equitable distribution of benefits in economic-
ally developing countries. It pursues these objectives in the fields of aquaculrore, traditional
fisheries, resource development and management, fisheries affairs, and education and training
through cooperative research with institutions in developing and developed countries.
Policies are set by a Board of Trustees with members drawn from the international com-
munity. Direction of ICLARM, under the policies set by the Board, is the responsibility of
the Director General. Advice on programs is received by the Director General from a Program
Advisory Committee composed of scientists drawn from the international community.
The ICLARM core staff consists of internationally recruited scientists drawn from the areas
of aquaculture, fishery biology, population dynamics, economics, anthropology, and interna-
tionallaw. In addition, provision is made for interns, consultants and visiting fellows, contribut-
ing to breadth of competence and flexibility. The core program and core staff are supported by
private foundations and governments.
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organi-
zation in May 1968. It is a regional research center for scholars and other specialists concerned
with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted
problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia.
The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the
University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the government, as well as
representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A 10-
man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations;it isex-officio chaired by the Director,
the Institute's Chief academic and administrative officer.
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